Scott-Smith, Giles, and Hans Krabbendam, eds. "Special Issue on The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): Entire issue.
1. Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, "Introduction: Boundaries to Freedom," 1-11.
The essays gathered here are "connected by the issue of what freedom and free society actually meant in opposition to the Soviet-communist alternative, and how Western Europe in the period 1945-1960 was a battleground for the shaping of democratic societies."
2. W. Scott Lucas, "Revealing the Parameters of Opinion: An Interview with Frances Stonor Saunders," 15-40.
This interview with the author of Who Paid the Piper? (1999) took place in January 2002.
Clark comment: It is interesting that even when she admits that she cannot document overt censorship by the CIA with regard to Encounter, Saunders can find what she calls "a kind of censorship by omission" because some authors did not get their material published. Saunders' skills as a researcher have not provided her the material findings to justify an attitude that basically says "if the CIA was involved, it had to have been bad." And references to the CIA's "grubby hands" do not advance our understanding of the subject under discussion.
3. Hugh Wilford, "Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, 1945-1960," 41-50.
"[T]he tendency has been to portray the CIA as fatally compromising the independence of the British left.... [However,] the British response to the cultural campaigns of the CIA was more complex..., involving ... resistance, appropriation and complicity."
4. W. Scott Lucas, "Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Culture and the State-Private Network in the Cold War," 53-72.
While "the CIA led the implementation of the government's cultural strategy, it was a 'total' strategy which involved all agencies in the Executive.... The operations were part of an integrated strategy.... To put it bluntly, if the US government had not covertly funded the 'private' efforts (or, in some cases, assisted in their funding through foundations...), they would not have existed."
5. Anthony Carew, "The Politics of Productivity and the Politics of Anti-Communism: American and European Labour in the Cold War," 73-91.
"It is hard ... to see how, in any direct way, the politics of productivity had much impact in strengthening non-communist unions" in France and Italy. The AFL's Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) was headed by Jay Lovestone. "What is important about Lovestone's FTUC operation is that it was generously funded from CIA sources, especially in the early 1950s."
6. Valarie Aubourg, "Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952-1963," 92-105.
"The intelligence community was certainly important for the creation of the Bilderberg group, but more in terms of milieux, personal contacts and shared values than political initiative or funding." On the other hand, the Atlantic Institute "had more difficulties attracting official support. But in neither case do we find a systematic organization of a Cold War waged by covert means through these two private institutions."
7. Richard J. Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Watfare," 109-133.
By 1945, the Foreign Office's Cultural Relations Department (CRD) "was at the cutting edge of Britain's information Cold War, focused upon the twin issues of culture and organized youth and working closely with MI5 and to a lesser extent the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)." The formation of the Soviet-organized World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) led to the "launch of the first covertly-run British front organization, the World Assembly of Youth" (WAY). Also in 1948, Britain "set up a proper covert political warfare section, the Information research Department" (IRD). The British effort suffered continually from a lack of funding; and "[b]y 1955 the International Secretariat of WAY was becoming a largely an American-funded body."
8. Karen Paget, "From Stockholm to Leiden: The CIA's Role in the Formation of the International Student Conference," 134-167.
This article focuses on the period from 1949 to 1952, not the full existence of the National Student Association-International Student Conference-CIA relationship. The author believes that "a careful distinction must be made between CIA objectives and its capacity to execute them.... Who had the power to make decisions, and to make them stick, varied greatly throughout the life of the relationship.... In the earlier years,... most differences between the CIA and NSA or ISC offficials tended to be tactical."
9. Joël Kotek, "Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War," 168-191.
"[F]rom 1952 onwards large sums of [CIA] money went to organizations that were for the most part progressive and were actually independent, so much so that towards the end of the 1960s they did not hesitate to criticize [U.S.] foreign policy.... The situation was not, however, as paradoxical as it seems; we must remember that the chief objective of the intervention was not to control or intervene in the internal affairs of these organizations, but to break the communist monopoly."
10. Helen Laville, "The Memorial Day Statement: Women's Organizations in the 'Peace Offensive,'" 192-210.
The 1951 Memorial Day Statement, signed by the leaders of 10 women's organizations, "re-affirmed American women's gendered commitment to peace but defined this peace in a way which could oppose and thwart the aims of the Soviet peace offensive.... They became less partisans for peace and more advocates of a ... peace ... which demanded such corollaries as freedom and democracy."
11. Marc Lazar, "The Cold War Culture of the French and Italian Communist Parties," 213-224.
"[T]he Cold War had a considerable impact in France and Italy, being relayed domestically by two powerful communist parties and amplifying already-existing conflicts in each of these societies. In France, as in Italy, the confrontation was violent, and developed into a kind of 'war culture'.... It permitted polemical and political passions to be unleased against ... 'the enemy'.... Yet, despite its intensity and continual stoking, this confrontation was always mastered and controlled by communists and non-communists alike."
12. David W. Ellwood, "The Propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War Context," 225-236.
"The Marshall Plan delivered the goods, and deployed an ever-wider range of communication methods to inform, educate, and convince its beneficiaries. The [Communist] Party failed to learn the importance of mass audio-visual media from its defeat in the 1948 elections, and had no useful response to the double onslaught of Hollywood and the USIS/ERP programme."
13. Ingeborg Philipsen, "Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark, 1953-1960," 237-253.
The author notes that the formation of the Society for Freedom and Culture "was an all-Danish initiative," not the result of activities by the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Even when the CCF Secretariat tried to take a more active role with the national committee, controlling the Danish committee was not an easy task -- or perhaps was an impossible proposition.
14. Tity De Vries, "The Absent Dutch: Dutch Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom," 254-266.
"[T]he Dutch were almost completely absent" from the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). "[T]he main explanation for the Dutch lack of interest in the CCF [is] to be found in Dutch society itself.... [P]ost-war Dutch writers and artists hardly had a deeply-rooted tradition of political engagement." At the same time, "Dutch political intellectuals lacked cultural interest."
15. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "'How Good Are We?' Culture and the Cold War," 269-282.
"[H]igh culture provided the basis for Cold War propaganda as much as the Cold War manipulated representations of high culture.... [I]n the case of ... Europe, cultural relations and exchanges had been in place before, both on the level of high and popular culture. The Cold War ...triggered programmes to finance individual interactions that would otherwise not have been taking place. But it did not inspire new cultural affinities.... These had been in place before and they remained in place thereafter."
16. Cora Sol Goldstein, "The Control of Visual Representation: American Art Policy in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949," 283-299.
"The post-war development of West German fine arts was the result of both the spontaneous revival of the German art scene, and the implementation of an OMGUS [Office of the Military Government for Germany, US] political agenda targeted at the use of art as a tool for political re-education."
17. David Monod, "'He Is a Cripple an' Needs My Love': Porgy and Bess as Cold War Propaganda," 300-312.
"[P]erformance art was employed as a form of Cold War propaganda without there being clear agreement on the point of sending it abroad or understanding of the complexity involved in presenting and receiving foreign cultural products."
Also published as Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).
Schumacher, JIH 3.2, says that "[t]his collection of essays is a timely and valuable addition to the growing literature on the symbolic dimensions of the East-West confrontation." The work includes "sixteen impressive contributions to the study of American overt and covert propaganda and cultural relations in Western Europe during the early cold war.... The well-crafted essays demonstrate the complexities of the transatlantic relationship, underline the importance of local initiatives as well as limitations to Washington's overall strategy by local conditions. They offer valuable and nuanced insights into the limits of clandestine operations, the workings of cold war alliances, and the uses of soft power in international affairs."
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