Mistry, Kaeten, ed. "Special Issue on: The CIA & US Foreign Policy Since 1947: Reforms, Reflections & Reappraisals." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): Entire Issue.
1. Kaeten Mistry, "Introduction: The CIA and US Foreign Policy since 1947: Reforms, Reflections and Reappraisals," 133-138.
"This collection is based on a conference that was held at the UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies, University College Dublin, in February 2009."
2. Richard J. Aldrich, "'A Profoundly Disruptive Force': The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization," 139-158.
The CIA "is fundamentally unsuited to address many of the new security problems which are transnational, messy, networked and violent. Admittedly, this is an organizational problem of a meta kind, but one that bureaucratic reform alone cannot fix."
3. Richard H. Immerman, "Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret," 159-181.
Abstract: "This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence community have undergone far more fundamental reform than the public or scholarly communities recognize. It identifies the dimensions of this 'Analytic Transformation' and explains the reasons for optimism about the future."
4. Stephen Marrin, "The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis," 182-202.
From abstract: "[T]he 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of [an NIE] on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped" decision-makers "prevent the 9/11 attacks.... This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing [NIE] by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical" NIE "would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy.... It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis."
5. Scott Lucas, "Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq," 203-227.
"[T]he Bush administration's politicization was so distinctive, in its manipulation of intelligence and analysisto pursue a war for regime change, that it may be regarded as exceptional."
6. Nicholas Dujmovic, "Getting CIA History Right: The Informal Partnership Between Agency Historians and Outside Scholars," 228-245.
The author contends that "the truth about CIA history is knowable even if every truth is not." He offers the argument that "CIA historians on the inside and outside intelligence scholars can together, but only together in [an] informal partnership, determine and make available for public knowledge true CIA history." Clark comment: Everyone wishing to write on the CIA should read this article before they begin.
7. Kaeten Mistry, "Approaches to Understanding the Inaugural CIA Covert Operation in Italy: Exploding Useful Myths," 246-268.
The author suggests that "[a] more fruitful path to advancing the historiographical debate [about the CIA's role in the 1948 Italian elections] is to highlight CIA intervention in the wider context of US foreign relations and Italian policy objectives.... Agency activities were improvised and far from pivotal amid the [broader] American mobilization." Clark comment: This is a highly interesting and well-argued article.
8. Bevan Sewell, "The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 195361," 269-290.
From Abstract: The author suggests that Dulles was "an active and rational participant" in the Eisenhower administration's discussions on Latin America. This "raises important questions for our understanding of the CIA's role during the Eisenhower era."
9. Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, "Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967," 291-312.
Clark comment: I have no problems with scholars who stray off the beaten path to provide new insights. However, this article flies too far from the known reality without credible evidence to back it up.
10. Mark Kramer, "US Intelligence Performance and US Policy during the Polish Crisis of 198081: Revelations from the Kuklinski Files," 313-329.
"[I]t is simply not true ...that the distribution of Kuklinski's reports and documents within the intelligence community was too limited." The problem was "that analysts at the CIA and State Department did not make better use of it."
11. Linda Risso, "A Difficult Compromise: British and American Plans for a Common Anti-Communist Propaganda Response in Western Europe, 194858," 330-354.
From Abstract: This article examines how the British IRD worked with the CIA's International Organizations Division "in shaping the foundation and early activities" of the Western Union and the NATO Information Service in coordinating "the Western response to Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns." It seeks to explain "why, in the early Cold War, the West struggled to produce a coherent and fully coordinated propaganda response to communism."
12. Giles Scott-Smith, "Interdoc and West European Psychological Warfare: The American Connection," 355-376.
From Abstract: The International Documentation and Information Center (Interdoc) "was established in The Hague in early 1963 ... to coordinate a transnational network ... active in ... analysing trends in communist ideology and societies.... Interdoc reflected a need to develop and project a European stance on Cold War issues separate from ... US influence. Yet the Americans were present from the beginning.... This article covers the details of this involvement."
13. Eric D. Pullin, "'Money Does Not Make Any Difference to the Opinions That We Hold': India, the CIA, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 195158," 377-398.
From Abstract: "During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert propaganda activities in India.... [D]omestic opposition composed primarily of members of the Praja Socialist Party worked closely with US-backed groups, in particular the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, to generate a political alternative to the ruling Congress party. Although receiving covert money from the Americans, these Indians did not believe that foreign money determined or shaped their opinions. On the other hand, their close association with the Americans undermined their claims to represent a legitimate domestic opposition."
14. Michael G. Kearney, "Review Essay: The 'War on Terror,' Law and the Defence of the State," 399-404.
15. Book Reviews, 405-440.
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