Source: U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Eds., C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950 -- Truman Series: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. Washington, DC: GPO, 1996. Available electronically at http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/155_164.html.
(Excerpt) [Document] 155. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board, Washington, June 10, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Confidential. The meeting was held at the War Department.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Also Present
Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. Colonel F.K. Newcomer, G-2
Colonel L.J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group
Captain W.B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. L.L. Montague, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel H.F. Cunningham, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel C.P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel T.J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group
Secretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary
[Agenda item] 1. Provision of Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers (C.I.G. 1/1, C.I.G. 1/2, and C.I.G. 1/3)/1/
[Footnote] /1/None printed. (Dated respectively, April 26, May 8, and June 4; ibid., HS/HC-276) See the Supplement for all.
Admiral Souers recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg's suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. Admiral Souers felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.
Dr. Langer underscored the reasons leading to State's conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like--all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.
General Vandenberg observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.
In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by Admiral Souers that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.
After concluding discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5.)/2/
[Footnote] /2/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC- 243) NIA 5 was a slightly revised version of CIG 1/1. See footnote 1 above. (Other agenda items omitted)
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