CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Culture and Components

Directorate of Intelligence

P - Z

Significant materials relevant to the Directorate of Intelligence can also be found in the "Analysis" files.

See also the material on Sherman Kent, "widely recognized as the single most influential contributor to the analytic doctrine and tradecraft practiced in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence." Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations," Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jun. 2003).

Petersen, Martin. "The Challenge for the Political Analyst: Advice from a DI Careerist." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 51-56.

"Policymakers are political animals," and this "make[s] the credibility hurdle higher for political, leadership, and country analysts." It is the job of the political analyst "to put the political behavior that policymakers see into a larger cultural and historical context -- that they do not see -- with enough sophistication to demonstrate that the context matters."

Petersen, Martin. "What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 1 (Mar. 2011): 13-20.

This article focuses on "three broad topics: understanding the consumer, the importance of a service mentality," and the six things the author "learned in doing and studying intelligence analysis" during his career in the DI.

Pincus, Walter. "CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses: Analysts to Receive Details About Sources." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to officials on 11 February 2004, "[t]he CIA is making changes in how it handles intelligence after identifying specific problems in its disputed prewar assessment that Iraq's Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction." DCI George J. Tenet "has ordered an end to the long-standing practice of withholding from analysts details about the clandestine agents who provide the information that analysts must evaluate."

In a speech on 11 February 2004 to the agency's analysts, DDI Jami A. Miscik said that "[t]he changes were ordered after an internal CIA review revealed several occasions when CIA analysts mistakenly believed that Iraq weapons data had been confirmed by multiple sources, when in fact it had come from a single source.... 'Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the source's access to the information on which they are reporting,' Miscik said, according to a text of her speech given to The Post."

Pincus, Walter. "From the CIA, the PDB, FYI, Each A.M." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 Sep. 1994, 31.

The reporter compares President Clinton's interface with the CIA's briefers and the PDB with that of other presidents. Some difficulties with the White House are mentioned.

Russell, Richard L. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance against WMD Threats" Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 466-485.

The author argues that "the CIA has habitually failed to accurately gauge WMD programs.... These intelligence failings were due in large measure to poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied [simply] by the creation of the DNI.... The establishment of the DNI ... unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community." In addition, the creation of new intelligence centers for terrorism and proliferation further "bloats the intelligence community's bureaucracy and does nothing to increase competency in human intelligence collection or analysis."

Simon, James M., Jr. "Intelligence Analysis as Practiced by the CIA." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 641-651.

Smith, Russell Jack. The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. Berkeley Press, 1991. [pb]

Former DDI R. Jack Smith died on 27 April 2009 at the age of 95. See Rebekah Davis, "Russell Jack Smith CIA Deputy Director," Washington Post, 10 May 2009, C7. See also, Nicholas Dujmovic, "Russell Jack Smith, Giant of CIA Analysis, Dies at 95," Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 2 (Jun. 2009): 1-3.

Clark comment: Smith served as Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) 1966-1971.

Richard Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder (2003), 386/fn., calls Smith's book "an excellent text on the Directorate of Intelligence, and a fundamental document in CIA history." For Lowenthal, the book has "some useful detail on key analytical issues" through the mid-1970s and contains "a detailed and sympathetic portrait of DCI Raborn." The book gets a "highly recommended" rating from Surveillant 2.2; it gives a "rare glimpse into the analytic hub of the CIA." However, there are "some factual errors."

Wark, I&NS 6.2, believes that Smith's memoirs are "relatively unrevealing about the man, and function more as a kind of insider's history of the institution that he served." The work helps reinforce the perception that "the working relationship between intelligence assessment and presidential politics has scarcely been sorted out." To Stein, CIRA Newsletter, Fall 2000, Smith "describes the [analysis] process vividly and enhances it with descriptions of his personal interactions with policymakers of the five administrations he served.... And he relates the often amusing, sometimes harrowing experiences he encountered in a lively, sometimes droll manner that is a delight to read."

United Press International. "Hayden Names New Director for Intelligence." 13 Mar. 2008. [http://www.upi.com]

According to a CIA report, DCIA Mike Hayden has announced that "current Associate Deputy Director Michael Morell will succeed John Kringen as the agency's director for intelligence at the beginning of May.... Officials say Kringen has been moved to a senior intelligence community post. Current CIA Director for Support Scott White will succeed Morell as associate deputy director.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Analysis: Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century (Strategic Plan). Washington, DC: Aug. 1996.

This is primarily glossy boilerplate in a style that probably came over from the Pentagon with DCI Deutch. The inside cover has the (then) latest DI wiring diagram.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes: Volume I (Notes 1-10). Washington, DC: Feb. 1997.

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Ward, Steven R. "Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 29-36.

The author offers "counterpoint" to Carmen A. Medina, "What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 23-28. Medina argues: "The DI's tradecraft model was developed during the 1960s and 1970s and optimized against the characteristics of that period." Today, intelligence analysts must be prepared to operate in "an era of information abundance, wellconnected policymakers, and non-traditional issues." The focus needs to be "on customer requirements, collaborative work, and less formal products."

Ward, on the other hand, suggests that Medina's critique "fails to take into account the wide variety of consumers that the DI serves, ranging from the Executive Branch and the Congress to the military and foreign intelligence partners.... [M]ore proof needs to be shown that the traditional model has failed and that significant change, much less a revolution, in the DI is needed."

Westerfield, H. Bradford.

1. "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part I." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 407-424.

The author looks at the dilemma created in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) by "the struggle for the DI's soul" beginning in the mid-1970s between two groups: the "objective analysis" school (also called "traditionalists" or disciples of Sherman Kent) and the "actionable analysis" school (also called "opportunity-oriented analysis"). Somewhat to his surprise, Westerfield concludes that both types will be needed in the future, although with the "actionables" in a distinct minority.

2. "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part II." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 19-54.

Westerfield concludes the development of his argument for creating a "dual functional differentiation" within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence: "a large human infrastructure," devoted to "objective analysis"; and "a much smaller suprastructure," supplying "actionable analysis."

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