CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Culture and Components

Directorate of Intelligence

A - J

Significant materials relevant to the Directorate of Intelligence can also be found in the "Analysis" files.

See also the material on Sherman Kent, "widely recognized as the single most influential contributor to the analytic doctrine and tradecraft practiced in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence." Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations," Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jun. 2003).

Berkowitz, Bruce. "The DI and 'IT': Failing to Keep up with the Information Revolution." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 67-74.

The author was a Scholar-in-Residence at the Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis during 2001-2002. He looked at how the DI uses information technology and how it might use such technology more effectively. He "came away from this experience impressed by the quality of DI analysts, but also concerned about their lack of awareness of and access to new information technology that could be of critical value to their work."

Clemente, Jonathan D.

1. "CIA's Medical and Psychological Analysis Center (MPAC) and the Health of Foreign Leaders." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 385-423.

The CIA's MPAC is "tasked with preparing assessments on key foreign individuals, including world leaders, terrorists, and narco-traffikers.... The CIA has incorporated, within its leadership analysis paradigm, a program to prepare remote psychological and medical assessments of select foreign individuals."

2. "In Sickness and in Health." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2007): 38-44, 66.

"[I]n many cases the physical or mental health of a foreign head of state has the potential to influence the course and conduct of U.S. foreign relations.... [A] small analytical team" within the CIA's "Directorate of Intelligence known as the Medical and Psychological Analysis Center (MPAC)" has the job of "provid[ing] policy makers with assessments of the physical and mental health of key foreign actors.... The unit also conducts assessments of epidemiological and other health issues that are important to national security, such as the global impact of pandemic disease."

Codevilla, Angelo. "The Arrogance of the Clerks." National Review, 4 Nov. 1991, 38-40.

The author attacks what he sees as the ideologically liberal tendencies of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (which, in his view, date back to OSS' Research and Analysis branch), and links those tendencies to the criticisms directed by CIA analysts at Robert Gates during his confirmation hearings.

Cohen, David. The CIA's Evolving Analytical Program. Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series, Monograph No. 12. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.

Cremeans, Charles D. "Basic Psychology for Intelligence Analysts." Studies in Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 109-114. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 232-237. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

Cremeans' focus is the psychology that analysts need to understand about themselves and their colleagues in order to be effective within the analytic culture. The article is amusing and contains some insights that those not particularly knowledgeable in the peculiar bureaucratic culture of intelligence analysis undoubtedly will think are more important than they are.

Davis Jack.

Drogin, Bob. "School for New Brand of Spooks." Los Angeles Times, 21 Jul. 2000, A1.

On Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis.

Ernst, Maurice C. "Economic Intelligence in CIA." Studies in Intelligence 28, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 1-22. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 305-329. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

This is an excellent -- it is tempting to say "classic" -- brief history of the development of economic intelligence in the CIA. It is interesting, although a minor part of the article, that writing in 1984 Ernst says the question of whether the CIA should provide assistance to private U.S. firms "has been a hot issue for more than a decade."

Featherstone, James. W. "Cloud Nine: A Problem in Intelligence Production." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 4 (Fall 1969): 11-17.

The author discusses the DI's response to a NSC directive of 24 January 1969 calling for a review of the international situation with a due date of 20 February 1969.

[Gannon, John C.] "China as an Emerging Power." CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 3-7.

Speech by the Deputy Director for Intelligence to Central Intelligence Retirees Association, Ft. Myer, Virginia, 10 October 1996. Selected responses to audience questions, by Marty Peterson, Senior DDI Chinese Specialist, are included (pp. 8-9).

Gentry, John A. "Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 133-146.

Gentry relates a negative change in the DI culture -- and in its effectiveness as an analysis production activity -- to the arrival of Robert M. Gates as DDI in 1982. The article is a concise replay of Gentry's book, Lost Promise (1993).

Gentry, John A. Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation; An Intelligence Assessment. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993.

According to Peake, FILS 12.2, the book is a "chorus of woe with an anti-management leitmotif." The author finds fault in three main areas -- "politicizing intelligence, a faulty review process, and incompetent management." This is a "very redundant book in content and style.... [Robert Gates] bears the brunt of his attack.... Differences will occur with Gentry's judgments as to the meaning, severity, and prevalence of the problems.... [His] recommendations for correcting the deficiencies ... read like simplistic statements of the problem." There is "nothing new here and little constructive." The endnotes "are most often descriptive rather than documentary" and the "sources are mostly secondary." This book would better be "termed a personal assessment."

Surveillant 3.1 calls Lost Promise "[s]our grapes -- with a vengeance"; there is "much whining and bitterness here.... Many of the problems the author describes have been discussed before in other forums." McGehee, CIABASE, July 1993 Update Notice, says that "Gentry describes how CIA's intelligence is distorted through pressure, politicized reviews, and personnel selection. His book focuses on the confirmation hearings of Robert Gates where over 24 intelligence analysts volunteered to testify regarding Gates' politicization of intelligence -- which did not halt his confirmation."

For Allen, DIJ 2.1, Lost Promise is a "scathing treatise" that "tediously relies on Sherman Kent's signal work ... as a baseline." Gentry "says that the problems are systemic.... The comprehensive documentation ... lends credibility to his views.... While ... some of the charges appear to be overstated, his observations have some merit and need to be seriously considered." Farson, I&NS 9.4, notes that Gentry "clearly believes that the CIA has lost its way." He argues that the "review process ... had been corrupted and ... led to judgements that were politically opportune rather than independent of bias."

Gertz, Bill, and Rowan Scarborough. "Inside the Ring: Spy News." Washington Times, 27 Aug. 1999.

According to a report to Congress by DCI George Tenet, "the CIA has ended publication of its premier top-secret report, the National Intelligence Daily. The NID has been replaced by the Senior Executives Intelligence Brief 'as the daily vehicle to inform policy-makers.' The move was part of 'procedures to more carefully control copies of the SEIB and protect it from accidental or intentional disclosure.'"

Gleichauf, Justin F. "A Listening Post in Miami." Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter-Spring 2001): 49-53.

The author served as head of the field office of the DI's Domestic Contacts Division from its establishment in 1959 through the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Gruner, Anne. "A Quiet Victory in a Cold War Skirmish." Intelligener 20, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2013): 51-52.

The author details her role as a CIA junior missile analyst at the 1982 INF negotiations in Geneva.

Jehl, Douglas. "Despite a Pledge to Speed Work, Fixing an Internal Problem Takes Time at the C.I.A." New York Times, 10 Jun. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The Central Intelligence Agency has yet to put in place a plan to address what senior officials have described as a major flaw in its operations, despite a pledge four months ago that the problem would be resolved within 30 days. The problem, which contributed to errors in the agency's prewar estimates on Iraq, is rooted in practices that severely limit how much information about human sources is shared with analysts who produce intelligence assessments, according to senior intelligence officials."

Johnson, Loch K. "Making the Intelligence 'Cycle' Work." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 1-23.

The focus here is not on some theoretical construct but specifically on the CIA's "intelligence cycle" -- planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination. Although somewhat dated today, this remains a useful article.

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