Merom, Gil. "Virtue,
Expediency and the CIA's Institutional Trap." Intelligence and National
Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 30-52. Merom, Gil. "Virtue,
Expediency and the CIA's Institutional Trap." Intelligence and National
Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 30-52.
The author rejects both an exceptional American virtue and an out-of-control CIA as explanations for the attacks on the CIA in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, he argues that "institutional and individual interests" were the driving force behind the attacks.... The argument here is that the CIA was merely a political football rather than a target in and of itself. In essence, the attacks on the CIA, "which were to a large extent a Congressional phenomenon," took place "because it was the vulnerable link in the power structure of the Imperial Presidency."
Nolan, Cynthia M. "Seymour
Hersh's Impact on the CIA." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 18-34.
In assessing the impact of Hersh's series of articles in the New York Times, beginning on 22 December 1974, the author concludes that "[e]ven if Hersh had not published the story of domestic abuses by the CIA, it seems likely that congressional oversight may have occurred in some format..., but perhaps not as soon.... The information provided by Hersh may have pushed congressmen to move, but it did not move them or the public in a new direction."
For Hersh's original story, see Seymour M. Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," New York Times, 22 Dec. 1974, 1.
Olmstead, Katherine S.
1. Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigation of the CIA and FBI. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. JK468I6O45
According to Choice, May 1996, this book focuses on the Church and Pike "committee investigations of CIA abuses (less extensively those of the FBI) in the wake of Watergate.... [Olmstead] applauds Pike more than Church ... and laments that, in the final analysis, the revelations produced few meaningful reforms. Her judgments are controversial, and some will argue naive, but they warrant careful consideration."
Marshall, JAH 83.4, finds Olmstead's work "perceptive and gracefully written." Although it "suffers from a shortage of available archival sources" and "could have discussed more deeply the foreign policy context of the hearings' ultimate demise," this book "is the most comprehensive account" of the congressional investigations.
2. "Reclaiming Executive Power: The Ford Administration's Response to the Intelligence Investigations." Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 725-737.
The author's thesis is that "the Ford administration's skillful handling of the intelligence investigations demonstrates that it was neither inept nor weak. Largely because of the executive branch's sophisticated management of the crisis, little came of the calls for reform."
Prados, John. Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
David Wise, Washington Post, 27 Apr. 2003, comments that "[a]lthough written in generally dry, academic style, Prados's study is richly detailed (sometimes overwhelmingly so)." The author "has mined newly declassified documents and scores of interviews to reveal some previously undisclosed gems.... If at times Prados is too admiring of his subject, there was nevertheless much to admire.... [Colby] paid dearly for revealing the agency's transgressions, but he was comforted by the knowledge that what he did was right for his country and his conscience. By portraying William Colby's life in all its nuances, Lost Crusader makes an important contribution to intelligence literature."
Karabell, FA 82.4, finds that this is a "comprehensive (although often dry) account of the strange career of Colby." However, "much of [Colby's] life and personality remain veiled, and Prados ... does not succeed in fleshing out his personality."
For Bath, NIPQ 19.4, this work is as much about the Agency as it is about Colby. Prados is "firm in his conclusion that Colby's basic strategy [during the CIA's troubles in the 1970s] was to reveal only enough information to preserve the CIA." The amount of detail included by the author, while "germane to his arguments," is "sometimes difficult for the uninitiated to follow. However, the value of the book lies in this detail."
Tovar, IJI&C 17.1, notes that in covering the assassination of Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, "it is hard to escape the thought that Prados's real target" is the CIA. Elsewhere, the author "worries the Indonesian bone through many pages of supposition and speculation." With regard to the public problems of 1974-1975, Tovar believes that "Prados reports the events of those turbulent times even-handedly," but at the same time does not agree with the author's interpretation of either the events or Colby's rationale for dealing with them.
To Leary, I&NS 18.4, this work "constitutes the best defense to appear to date on the actions of the beleaguered director" in 1975. The author "knows what he is talking about, and his judgments are balanced." He "deals well with Colby's public career, but not his personal life, or the interaction between the two."
Robarge, Studies 47.4 (2003), sees the author handling "the narrative of Colby's curriculum vitae in a workmanlike fashion.... But in a biography, the less captivating attributes of the main character or lacunae in the documentary record of his career cannot be offset with lengthy accounts of Agency operations and bureaucratic developments with which, at least based on the material presented, Colby's involvement can only be discerned by inference.... Surprisingly for a researcher of Prados's diligence, Lost Crusader contains many factual errors and questionable interpretations."
Rosenbaum, David. "House
Prevents Releasing Report on Intelligence." New York Times,
30 Jan. 1976, 1.
The House voted not to release the Pike Committee Report. The vote was 246-124 against releasing the report, with 127 Democrats and 119 Republican voting against and 122 Democrats and 2 Republicans voting for publication.
Snider, L. Britt. "Recollections from the Church Committee's Investigation of NSA." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000): 43-51.
The author, CIA's Inspector General, was staff counsel on the Church Committee. Here, he revisits some of the difficulties in beginning an investigation of an agency "that had never before had an oversight relationship with the Congress." The focus is the uncovering -- and the aftermath of that discovery -- of Operation Shamrock, through which NSA "had access for many years to most of the international telegrams leaving New York City for foreign destinations."
See James G. Hudec, "Commentary: Unlucky SHAMROCK -- The View from the Other Side," Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter-Spring 2001): 85-94, which responds with a view from the Executive Branch side to Snider. Hudec was an attorney in NSA's Office of General Counsel during the 1974-1975 timeframe.
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