Alsop, Stewart. "The
Lessons of the Cuban Disaster." Saturday Evening Post, 24 Jun.
1961, 26-27 ff. [Petersen]
Alsop, Stewart. "The
Lessons of the Cuban Disaster." Saturday Evening Post, 24 Jun.
1961, 26-27 ff. [Petersen]
Aguilar, Luis, ed.
Operation Zapata: The "Ultra-sensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981.
This is the sanitized version of the report made to President Kennedy by Gen. Maxwell Taylor's Board of Inquiry (with Gen. Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke, and DCI Allen Dulles).
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Intelligence
Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel,
and Britain. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1995.
Clark Comment: Bar-Joseph analyzes four case studies of what he designates "intelligence intervention" in politics: the 1961 Bay of Pigs episode; the 1954 Israeli "Unfortunate Business" or "Lavon Affair"; and the 1920 "Henry Wilson" and 1924 "Zinoviev Letter" affairs in Britain. The author's comparative approach may prove to be heavy going for the casual reader, but the politicization issue is certainly one that deserves serious study. However, as Brody, PSQ 111.3, observes, the intervention in the Lavon and Wilson affairs was at least arguably "as much by the military as by intelligence."
According to Wirtz, APSR 90.1, the "tension created by th[e] effort to offer timely estimates while overcoming incentives to pander to policymakers ... serves as a point of departure for Uri Bar-Joseph's comparative study.... Bar-Joseph is especially interested in situations in which intelligence agencies spiral out of control and undertake unauthorized activities that overstep policy bounds.... The potential contribution made by Intelligence Intervention to developing a theory of civil-intelligence relations, however, is limited by several shortcomings in execution and conception." Nevertheless, this "ambitious book ... does a fine job in identifying several factors which affect the willingness and ability of intelligence officials to place their preferences into the policy arena."
Warren, Surveillant 4.3, declares that "this book is mandatory reading" for serious students of intelligence: "Bar-Joseph sets the stage historically and then fits his argument onto the stage with logic and even wit." Writing in the CIRA Newsletter, Fall 1996, Warren adds that this is "an important contribution to the continuing dialogue on the politicization of intelligence and intelligence organizations."
Stafford, I&NS 11.2, judges the book to be "impressively researched and written." The work "is most likely to provoke discussion through its argument that at the root of the abuses [the author] describes lies insufficient separation between intelligence and politics."
For Clutterbuck, Political Studies 44.4, Bar-Joseph "gives an excellent analysis of how these abuses of power occurred and argues that a high degree of professionalism in the intelligence services is as important as effective political control in preventing them."
Friedman, Parameters, Summer 1997, finds that "Intelligence Intervention is presented in a detailed but often humorous manner that makes for an entertaining as well as an educational experience."
Bissell, Richard M.,
Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. Reflections of a Cold
Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1996. JK468I6B55
Shryock, WIR 15.6, sees Reflections of a Cold Warrior as a "thoughtful, candid, provocative, and ultimately puzzling memoir." However, at times, the author "conveys his thoughts in a stiff, disorganized, and even excessively lawyerly manner."
For Immerman, Choice 34.2, Bissell's "chronicle of his years as Allen Dulles's special assistant and then deputy director for operations is disappointing.... [The] memoir nevertheless has value. It provides a succinct history of some of America's most dramatic Cold War initiatives and insight into the mindsets of their architects."
Falcoff, National Interest, Winter 1996/1997, finds the book "informative and stimulating," despite "its unexciting prose and a tendency to flatten what must have been far more dramatic events."
"Methodological problems" with Bissell's memoirs are raised by Westerfield, Studies (Winter 1998-1999). Noting the clear acknowledgement that the "actual writing was done by [Bissell's] two collaborators," Westerfield also is concerned that "the posthumous additions (not clearly delineated ) obscure throughout what words were ever personally approved by Bissell and what ones were not."
Chambers concludes that "[t]here are no major disclosures. However, Bissell's personal recollections do add a new and useful viewpoint to the history of these operations." Click for a full review by Chambers.
Bissell, Richard M.,
Jr. "Response to Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, The 'Confessions' of Allen
Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs." Diplomatic History
8, no. 4 (1984): 377-380. [Petersen]
Blight,
James G., and Peter Kornbluh, eds. The Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
According to Maxwell, FA 77.3, this edited volume consists of "the transcripts of an extraordinary discussion between many of the key participants" in the Bay of Pigs invasion. The conclusion was that "delusion rather than betrayal was the fundamental cause of the disaster."
Jeffrey-Jones, I&NS 13.4, calls the appendix to Politics of Illusion "a splendid compilation," but also finds that "the documents are not properly identified.... [N]owhere is one told the precise provenance of the document concerned.... The book has a unifying overview, namely that everyone from the President down suffered from a 'John Wayne complex', consisting of the belief that the USA could not fail."
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