Evans, Joseph C. "Berlin
Tunnel Intelligence: A Bumbling KGB." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 43-50.The CIA history of the Berlin Tunnel operation has been declassified and published as U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Berlin Tunnel Operation, 1952-1956 (Washington, DC: 1968). Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/tunnel.pdf.
Evans, Joseph C. "Berlin
Tunnel Intelligence: A Bumbling KGB." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 43-50.
The author, a participant in the tunnel operation (1954-1955), argues that the most important information gleaned from the intercept activities was early warning indicators and military readiness intelligence. Evans also disputes that the Soviets used their knowledge (from George Blake) of the taps to put disinformation into play. This latter view is supported by David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
Feifer, George. "The
Berlin Tunnel." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History
10, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 63-71.
This effort reads more like an article from True magazine (thereby showing my age) than a serious analysis of the Cold War's Berlin Tunnel episode. For an author who describes CIA Berlin Operations Base Chief William Harvey as engaging in "hyperbole," Feifer seems rather given to the same failing. His evident belief that he needed to pump just a little more zest into an already intriguing scenario diminishes, rather than enhances, his retelling of this well-known story. And overly familiar references to "Big Bill" really do not add a touch of verisimilitude, as Feifer seems to believe.
Martin, David C. Wilderness
of Mirrors. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. [pb] New York: Ballantine
Books, 1981.
In Cram's opinion, this is the "best and most informed book written about CIA operations against the Soviet target in the 1950s and 1960s." Martin tells an "exciting and generally accurate story." The book was "well received by almost every reviewer" with the exception of Epstein and Angleton.
Petersen adds that Martin "presents information on postwar counterintelligence activities of the CIA and FBI focusing on James Angleton and William Harvey. Based on inside information, it is well regarded by most experts."
NameBase notes that "[i]n the case of the most famous spy of the century, Harvey's instincts were better than Angleton's.... Kim Philby ... was close to Angleton, whom he had known in wartime London. But he was also a KGB penetration agent, and it was Harvey rather than Angleton who figured this out.... The pistol-packing Harvey ... oversaw the famous Berlin tunnel that briefly tapped Soviet communications. Later he ran the CIA's notorious Operation Mongoose, whose avowed object was to assassinate Castro."
Constantinides calls this book "a penetrating look into some issues and challenges faced by CIA, and the cognoscenti recognize it as based on information stemming from the bowels of that agency." Nevertheless, "the work has a number of flaws, both major and minor." For example, the rivalry between Harvey and Angleton, so central to the book, did not exist, and Harvey was hardly of transcending importance within CIA.
Murphy, David E., Sergei
A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey. Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in
the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
Clark comment: Murphy is a former chief of the CIA Berlin Base and later headed Soviet operations at CIA Headquarters. Kondrashev is a retired KGB lieutenant general and headed the KGB's German Department. Bailey is a journalist and former director of Radio Liberty.
Is this the final word on the Cold War as fought over, around, and in Berlin? Probably not, but we are unlikely to get a view from a more intimate standpoint. There are 57 pages of notes that bear out a conclusion that these are more than the meanderings of two old Cold Warriors.
From the "Preface": "Our goal has ... been ambitious: to provide never-before-seen documentary evidence of what each side knew during the crises, and to give readers a sense of what it was like to face off with an intelligence foe in Cold War Berlin."
Cohen, FA 76.6, notes that Battleground Berlin "covers primarily the grim glory days of the Cold War in Berlin -- the period up to the building of the Berlin Wall." Although this "is a major contribution to the intelligence history of the Cold War," the book has a number of gaps; and "Bailey's efforts to reconcile his coauthors' views of reality do not always succeed."
McGehee, in cloaks-and-daggers@maelstrom.stjohns.edu, says that "the book is laden with details that are difficult to follow as they swing from the CIA operational stories to the KGBers focus on political intelligence about postwar Germany. The authors unsuccessfully juxtaposition their stories, adding to the difficulties in comprehension and interest." In addition, the claims advanced as to the value of the Berlin Tunnel "seem overblown but a definitive appraisal is impossible."
The Publishers Weekly, 21 Jul. 1997, reviewer calls the book "a crucial addition to filling an important gap in our understanding of the Cold War. The book is not only authoritative, it is also well written and possesses the qualities of a very engaging espionage novel." In the same vein, Friend, History 26.3, calls Battleground Berlin "sober, authoritative, unsensational, documented, and revelatory."
For Bates, NIPQ, 14.3, a downside of the book "is the massive amount of detail." Nevertheless, the narrative fleshes out the history of the Cold War in Berlin "with a mass of heretofore-untold facts.... Another plus for Battleground Berlin is the detailed discussion of CIA and KGB tradecraft." Adams, IJI&C 12.1, sees this as "an unusual and very important volume ... [that] is illuminating on a number of levels."
The review by Jeffreys-Jones, I&NS 13.4, reads a bit haughty for my taste. Although he grants that they provide "balanced accounts of some significant episodes,... some interesting details ... [and l]ittle glimpses ... of characters," the reviewer takes the authors to task for being "historical amateurs." He finds particular fault with the absence in the book of "historical context" for the events they are relating. Welcome to the real world, Jeffreys-Jones.
Powers, NYRB (23 Oct. 1997) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 141-158, sees Battleground Berlin as "a fascinating and important account of the opening campaigns of the secret cold war waged by the CIA and the KGB.... Anyone interested in just how complex a counterintelligence case can become should read the fourteen pages in which Battleground Berlin lays out the intricate web of what was known to whom, through which channels," as the KGB closed in on Col. Pyotr Popov.
See also, William Drozdiak, "Rival Spies Relive Thrills of Cold War," Washington Post, 21 Oct. 1997, A16.
Stafford, David. Spies Beneath Berlin. London: Murray, 2002.
Clark comment: This is a scholarly account, supplementing and even extending Murphy/Kondrashev/Bailey's Battleground Berlin (1997).
Bath, NIPQ 9.1/2, notes that the author "sees no sign that the Soviets used their knowledge of the tunnel to plant disinformation." This is "[a]n interesting story, well told."
For Peake, Studies 47.1 (2003), Spies Beneath Berlin presents "the most complete story of this amazing operation," adding new details and putting down some of the myths. The author "does a good job of explaining why the tunnel operation was indeed a success even though the KGB knew about it."
Cain, JIH 3.2, concludes that "Stafford's book will stand as the last word on this subject and in this manner it recommends itself to all intelligence historians."
Stockton, Bayard. Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006.
From http://bayardstockton.50webs.com/note2.htm: "Flawed Patriot was conceived in the early 1980’s ... as a rebuttal to David C. Martin's Wilderness of Mirrors, but the project was postponed until 2001. Then Stockton raced around the country, talking to men and women who had known Harvey ... and who were rapidly dying off.... Retired members of CIA Foreign Intelligence ... confided in Stockton because he had been one of their own. They seized the chance to set the record straight ... a record they thought had been publicly mutilated over the past several decades, not least in Norman Mailer’s Harlot’s Ghost."
Clark comment: I wanted to enjoy this book, but was in the end disappointed. The author clearly worked hard to capture Bill Harvey and his work and life, and there is no question that doing so was an almost impossible task. However, it seems in some ways that Stockton gathered material in his research that he felt he had to use even if it was not central -- or even germane -- to his story. I almost quit the book when the author went into wildly speculative musings about the Kennedy assassination and, then again, when much space was wasted (to no conclusion) on Harvey's links with Marajen and Michael Chinigo. The Berlin part is interesting, and probably an accurate reflection of work and life in that place at that time. Just as things went downhill after Berlin for Harvey, so do they go downhill for this book after that time. There are just too many "it must have been...," "he was likely to...," and the like for me to feel comfortable that what is being coveyed is on the mark. Legends certainly serve a legend teller, but we are unlikely to see another biography of Harvey. Therefore, we will have to make do with this book with all its flaws.
For Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), "some -- but by no means all -- of [Harvey's] career" is covered in this work. Since "much of Harvey's work was done in the darkest of shadows, one is not going to learn much about the specifics of how he earned his reputation." The reviewer's "one major criticism" of the book concerns Stockton's dragging "David Atlee Phillips into ill-grounded speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy."
Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), reminds us that "Richard Helms characterized Bill Harvey as aggressive, demanding, and conscientious, with a good knowledge of operations. Flawed Patriot adds meat to these bones while tempering the contrary Angletonian view found in David Martin's Wilderness of Mirrors and the image of Harvey as the 'weird eccentric' portrayed by Norman Mailer in his novel Harlot's Ghost. The story of Harvey's often controversial career has lessons for all readers interested in intelligence."
A review by Chapman, IJI&C 20.4 (Winter 2007), deals more with evaluating Harvey's career as presented by Stockton than with evaluating the author's effort. The reviewer does note, however, that "Stockton build the cornerstone of the Harvey legend on the Berlin Tunnel.... By Stockton's account, the tunnel was Harvey's brainchild, with him as planner, architect, and engineer, but that is gravely in dispute."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Berlin Tunnel Operation, 1952-1956. Washington, DC: 1968. [http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/tunnel.pdf]
This is the official version of the Berlin Tunnel Operation (PBJOINTLY), written as part of the Clandestine Services History. It was declassified and released to the public in redacted form in February 2007.
Whitlock, Craig. "The East Berlin Tunnel: Whose Ruse? In Cold War Spy Games, a Coup for the CIA Wasn't All It Seemed." Washington Post, 28 Jan. 2008, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The author rehashes the usual points of discussion that surround the Berlin Tunnel. The occasion for the article seems to be the apparent recent discovery of the release (it was released in February 2007) of the CIA's internal history of the operation, The Berlin Tunnel Operation, 1952-1956. The CIA document is carried in three parts on the Washington Post's website:
1. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/tunnel1.pdf
2. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/tunnel2.pdf
3. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/tunnel3.pdf
It is also available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/tunnel.pdf.
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