CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2005

Inspector General's Report on 9/11

Materials presented in chronological order.

Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Report Finds Its Officials Failed in Pre-9/11 Efforts." New York Times, 7 Jan. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to current and former intelligence officials, "a near-final version of a report" by CIA Inspector General John Helgerson concludes that "officials who served at the highest levels of the agency should be held accountable for failing to allocate adequate resources to combating terrorism before the Sept. 11 attacks.... Among those most sharply criticized in the report, the officials said, are George J. Tenet, the former intelligence chief, and James L. Pavitt, the former deputy director of operations." See also, Dana Priest, "CIA Leaders Criticized on Pre-9/11 Actions," Washington Post, 8 Jan. 2005, A2.

Pincus, Walter. "CIA Report on 9/11 Is Complete: Inspector General's Findings Have Yet to Reach Congress." Washington Post, 20 Aug. 2005, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to administration and congressional sources, CIA Inspector General John L. Helgerson's "report on the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has finally been completed ... but has yet to be sent to Capitol Hill because CIA Director Porter J. Goss is still deciding how to respond to its findings."

Shrader, Katherine. "CIA Sends Finished 9/11 Report to Panels." Associated Press, 24 Aug. 2005. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 23 August 2005, "CIA Director Porter Goss personally delivered to Congress the findings" of CIA Inspector General John Helgerson's "report on the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, opening a debate about how much of the highly classified and critical document should be made public."

Shane, Scott, and James Risen. "C.I.A. Report Said to Fault Pre-9/11 Leadership." New York Times, 26 Aug. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

CIA Inspector General John L. Helgerson's "report on the agency's performance before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks includes detailed criticism of more than a dozen former and current agency officials, aiming its sharpest language at George J. Tenet, the former director, according to a former intelligence officer who was briefed on the findings and another government official who has seen the report."

The report recommends that CIA Director Porte J. Goss "convene 'accountability boards' to recommend personnel actions against those faulted in the report, who are identified by title rather than by name. Officials said the only action possible against ... officials who have retired would probably be to send them a letter of reprimand."

Shane, Scott. "With Only Reputations at Stake, Talk on C.I.A. Report Turns to How Much to Publish." New York Times, 27 Aug. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Most of the central figures faulted" in CIA Inspector General (IG) John L. Helgerson's "report, notably [former DCI] George J. Tenet,... retired last year." On 25 August 2005, "the September 11 Advocates group demanded the immediate declassification and release of Mr. Helgerson's report.... On the other side, Mr. Tenet and some of his colleagues have been fighting ... to soften the report's tough judgments, which they consider unfair, distorted and uninformed." Tenet's supporters say the "report is seriously flawed" because the IG's "investigators never talked to policy makers to get their views on the C.I.A.'s performance. Even some key people inside the agency were not interviewed, they say, including Charles E. Allen, whose title in 2001 was assistant director of central intelligence for collection."

Linzer, Dafna, and Walter Pincus. "CIA Rejects Discipline for 9/11 Failures: Goss Cites Fear of Hurting Agency." Washington Post, 6 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 5 October 2005, CIA Director Porter J. Goss said that "[t]he CIA will not seek to hold any current or former agency officials ... responsible for failures leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks,... despite a recommendation by the agency's inspector general that he convene an 'accountability board' to judge their performance."

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