October - December 2005

Materials presented in chronological order.

Linzer, Dafna, and Walter Pincus. "CIA Rejects Discipline for 9/11 Failures: Goss Cites Fear of Hurting Agency." Washington Post, 6 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 5 October 2005, CIA Director Porter J. Goss said that "[t]he CIA will not seek to hold any current or former agency officials ... responsible for failures leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks,... despite a recommendation by the agency's inspector general that he convene an 'accountability board' to judge their performance."

Vest, Jason. "Ex-CIA Officer Heads to Court for Second Time over Proposed Book." GovExec.com, 13 Oct. 2005. [http://www.govexec.com]

On 12 October 2005, "Gary Berntsen, the CIA's top officer in Afghanistan during al Qaeda's 2001 escape from Tora Bora," requested for a second time that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia "expedite a lawsuit he filed against the CIA earlier this year, charging that the agency is hampering publication of his forthcoming controversial memoir by failing to abide by its own publication review rules."

Jehl, Douglas. "Little Authority for New Intelligence Post." New York Times, 14 Oct. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Two senior intelligence officials said on 13 October 2005 that the director of the National Clandestine Service (NCS), the new CIA office "will wield only limited authority, leaving the Defense Department and the F.B.I. free to carry out an increasing array of human intelligence missions without central operational control." The NCS director "will instead be responsible primarily for setting standards and rules designed to minimize conflicts between the agencies, whose human spying operations in the United States and abroad have been expanding rapidly and are expected to continue to do so."

Pincus, Walter. "CIA Spies Get a New Home Base: Agency Will Set Up the National Clandestine Service." Washington Post, 14 Oct. 2005, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 13 October 2005, intelligence officials announced establishment of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) at the CIA, replacing the Directorate of Operations. The announcement gives the CIA Director "another title, national humint manager." The NCS director "will report to Goss, but the new agency's work will be overseen" by the DNI's staff. However, officials said the DNI's office "will not get involved in setting targets or running or approving specific covert operations. The DNI's role is 'to set policy,' one official said....

"The director of the NCS will have two deputies, one to run CIA clandestine operations and the other to coordinate activities of other overseas operators. The second deputy will also set standards for training by all agencies involved in intelligence, including tradecraft and the vetting or validation of foreign agents or sources being recruited."

Shrader, Katherine. "CIA Manager to Head Clandestine Service." Associated Press, 14 Oct. 2005. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The director of the National Clandestine Service will be "[a] top CIA manager who remains undercover.... Publicly, he is referred to simply as 'Jose.'" He has been head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations.

Linzer, Dafna. "A Year Later, Goss's CIA Is Still in Turmoil: Congress to Ask Why Spy Unit Continues to Lose Personnel." Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

CIA Director Porter J. Goss remains "at loggerheads with the clandestine service.... At least a dozen senior officials ... have resigned, retired early or requested reassignment. The directorate's second-in-command walked out of Langley last month and then told senators in a closed-door hearing that he had lost confidence in Goss's leadership."

Rovner, Joshua. "Preparing for a Nuclear Iran: The Role of the CIA." Strategic Insights 4, no. 11 (Nov. 2005). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/rovnerNov05.asp]

"The CIA should address two puzzles that, once solved, will help deter Iran from proliferating nuclear materials and using its own arsenal coercively: First, it should attempt to isolate the unique characteristics of nuclear material produced at Iranian facilities.... Second, the CIA should provide a detailed analysis of Israel’s ability to strike Iranian facilities."

Priest, Dana. "CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11." Washington Post, 2 Nov. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important al Qaeda captives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe, according to U.S. and foreign officials familiar with the arrangement. The secret facility is part of a covert prison system set up by the CIA nearly four years ago that at various times has included sites in eight countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan and several democracies in Eastern Europe, as well as a small center at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, according to current and former intelligence officials and diplomats from three continents."

Whitlock, Craig. "Italy Seeks Extradition of 22 CIA Operatives." Washington Post, 12 Nov. 2005, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 11 November 2005, "Italian prosecutors ... formally requested the extradition of 22 U.S. citizens believed to be CIA operatives on charges that they seized" Egyptian cleric Abu Omar in Milan in 2003 and "flew him to Cairo, where he later said he was tortured.... The prosecutors' extradition request is now before Italian Justice Minister Roberto Castelli."

Waller, Douglas. "Outing Secret Jails." Time, 14 Nov. 2005, 21-22.

"At a secret briefing for U.S. Senators on Oct. 26, a senior U.S. intelligence official tells Time, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte was pointedly neutral on Vice President Dick Cheney's Capitol Hill lobbying to have the CIA exempted from legislation banning mistreatment of detainees."

Priest, Dana. "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account for Bulk of Agency's Post-9/11 Successes." Washington Post, 18 Nov. 2005, A1.

According to current and former U.S. and foreign intelligence officials, the CIA has established joint Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs) "in more than two dozen countries." At the CTICs, "U.S. and foreign intelligence officers work side by side to track and capture suspected terrorists and to destroy or penetrate their networks.... The network of centers reflects what has become the CIA's central and most successful strategy in combating terrorism abroad: persuading and empowering foreign security services to help. Virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- more than 3,000 in all -- was a result of foreign intelligence services' work alongside the agency, the CIA deputy director of operations told a congressional committee in a closed-door session earlier this year."

Priest, Dana. "Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake: German Citizen Released After Months in 'Rendition.'" Washington Post, 4 Dec. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The case of German-citizen Khaled Masri "offers a rare study of how pressure on the CIA to apprehend al Qaeda members after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has led in some instances to detention based on thin or speculative evidence."

Lewis, Aidan. "Judge Issues Warrants for CIA Operatives." Associated Press, 23 Dec. 2005. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

An Italian Prosecutor said on 23 December 2005 that European arrest warrants have been issued "for 22 purported CIA operatives in connection with the alleged kidnapping" of Abu Omar in Milan in 2003. Italy previously issued internal arrest warrants for the 22. "Prosecutors have identified one of the suspects as Robert Seldon Lady, a former CIA station chief in Milan who has since returned to the United States."

Priest, Dana. "Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor: Anti-Terror Effort Continues to Grow." Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[F]ormer and current intelligence officials and congressional and administration sources" say that the effort launched by a top-secret presidential finding signed by President Bush six days after the 11 September 2001 attacks "has grown into the largest CIA covert action program since the height of the Cold War." The program has "expand[ed] in size and ambition despite a growing outcry at home and abroad over its clandestine tactics."

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