Materials presented in chronological order.
Risen, James. "In Hindsight, C.I.A. Sees Flaws That Hindered Efforts on Terror." New York Times, 7 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
DCI George J. Tenet "issued a secret directive shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks" that called for "an immediate end to peacetime bureaucratic constraints on the C.I.A." and demanded "improved coordination and information sharing throughout the government's national security apparatus." The DCI's "directive did not address the controversy surrounding the C.I.A.'s guidelines that require high-level approval before the C.I.A.'s American officers can recruit foreign spies with unsavory backgrounds." But a U.S. intelligence official said that since 9/11, the CIA."has streamlined the guidelines in order to speed the approval process for the recruitment of new agents. Now, new agents can be approved by the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director of Operations..., and the requests no longer have to be sent further up the agency's organization chart, including all the way to the director himself."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Steps Up Scope, Pace of Efforts on Terrorism." Washington Post, 9 Oct. 2001, A4. "A New Era in Cooperation: The CIA, Other Government Agencies and the Military Are Pooling Efforts to Fight Terrorism." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 15-21 Oct. 2001, 31.
Senior intelligence officials say that the "CIA has doubled the size of its counterterrorism center" since the 9/11 attacks, "adding not only more of its own analysts and operations officers but also FBI and Pentagon personnel, including members of the Army's Special Forces.... To ensure that there is a more complete exchange of information, officials from the counterterrorism center meet twice a day with FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III and his deputies to go over new data."
Sipress, Alan, and Vernon Loeb. "CIA's Stealth War Centers on Eroding Taliban Loyalty and Aiding Opposition." Washington Post, 10 Oct. 2001, A1. "The CIA's Stealth War: U.S. Covert Efforts Include Winning the Loyalty of Taliban Defectors." Washington Poat National Weekly Edition, 15-21 Oct. 2001, 6.
According to administration officials, the CIA has launched an effort "in the parts of Afghanistan where the ruling Taliban is most deeply rooted in the local ethnic Pashtun community ... to win the loyalty of dissident Taliban commanders through the use of money or fear.... The success of this strategy could turn on the intelligence efforts and intimate cooperation of Pakistan.... That prospect received a crucial boost" on 7 October 2001 when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf "ousted several influential intelligence and military leaders who remained close to the Taliban, most notably purging Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed of the Interservices Intelligence Agency."
Fenton, Ben. "CIA Tries to Bribe Taliban to Swap Sides." Telegraph (London), 11 Oct. 2001. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
"CIA agents were reported [on 10 October 2001] to be trying to bribe and cajole Taliban commanders to turn against the regime in the south and east of Afghanistan."
Ignatius, David. "War in the Shadows." Washington Post, 14 Oct. 2001, B7. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
"[T]he CIA is trying to build a global 'intelligence coalition' similar to the overt military and diplomatic alliance the Bush administration has gathered since Sept. 11. The aim of this coalition is to penetrate the terrorist network, disrupt its operations and, in the sort of language favored by President Bush, 'take it down.'"
Hitz, Frederick P. "Not Just a Lack of Intelligence, a Lack of Skills." Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2001, B3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"[T]he solution to our intelligence problem isn't going to be ... simple. America's new terrorism target puts us in the same difficult and challenging position we were in 55 years ago, when we were trying to penetrate the Soviet Union with insufficient Russian language capabilities and little understanding of the tough totalitarian hide we were trying to pierce." Clark comment: This is a broad-brush but well-thought-out look at some of the issues surrounding the question of how the CIA can get ready to wage its part of the war on terrorism.
Woodward, Bob. "CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden." Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2001, A1.
"President Bush last month signed an intelligence order ['finding'] directing the CIA to undertake its most sweeping and lethal covert action since the founding of the agency in 1947, explicitly calling for the destruction of Osama bin Laden and his worldwide al Qaeda network, according to senior government officials."
Gellman, Barton. "CIA Weighs 'Targeted Killing' Missions." Washington Post, 28 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Armed with new authority from President Bush for a global campaign against al Qaeda, the Central Intelligence Agency is contemplating clandestine missions expressly aimed at killing specified individuals."
Carroll, Thomas Patrick. "Aftermath of September 11: Espionage for Grown-Ups." Human Events, 29 Oct. 2001. [http://www.humaneventsonline.com]
"Covert operations against Islamism and Islamist terrorism must ... be the CIA's top priority. The second priority, whatever it is, needs to be a distant second.... [During the 1990s, a] lack of direction from the top, [a] treating of the intelligence community as a handy source for anything about which policymakers might be curious, was debilitating and must not be repeated. The mission of the CIA is to steal secrets and engage in covert operations, and to do so only when no other option exists."
Loeb, Vernon, and Marc Kaufman. "CIA Sent Aircraft to Rescue Slain Leader." Washington Post, 29 Oct. 2001, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
U.S. officials said on 28 October 2001 that "[a]n unmanned aircraft operated by the CIA attacked a Taliban convoy [on 26 October 2001] in a desperate attempt to save guerrilla commander Abdul Haq, but the airstrike failed to keep Taliban forces from capturing and executing the Pashtun leader."
Risen, James, and Tim Weiner. "3 New Allies Help C.I.A. in Its Fight Against Terror." New York Times, 30 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to U.S. officials, a top CIA Directorate of Operations official traveled to Damascus in October "to talk to Syrian intelligence officials about helping the United States investigate and defeat Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.... The Damascus meeting follows a meeting in London between State Department and C.I.A. officials and the chief of Libyan intelligence.... [O]fficials have indicated that Libya's possible cooperation on counterterrorism efforts was ... broached.... Since Sept. 11, C.I.A. officials have [also] opened communication lines with intelligence officials from ... Sudan."
Risen, James. "Secret C.I.A. Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11." New York Times, 4 Nov. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to government officials, the CIA's "clandestine New York station was destroyed in the Sept. 11 attack on the World Trade Center.... The ... station was in the 47-story building at 7 World Trade Center.... All of the agency's employees at the site were safely evacuated soon after the hijacked planes hit the twin towers, the officials said."
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The C.I.A. Con-Trick. History Today 51, no. 12 (Dec. 2001): 20-22.
Well before September 11th, the intelligence reservationists/expansionists in the US had won the political argument. Intelligence was not a Cold War invention, and it was not doomed to extinction with the destruction of the Berlin Wall . The need for intelligence ... does continue in our dangerous world. However, the engine of intelligence expansion in the US remains powered by the dangerous fuels of bureaucratic opportunism and a variety of chauvinisms. For this reason, the US intelligence community is too big. Those who would boost it further are spectacularly wrong.
Loeb, Vernon. "CIA Chief Met With Musharraf." Washington Post, 5 Dec. 2001, A14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DCI George J. Tenet arrived in Pakistan on 31 November "for meetings with Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.... The Pakistani press reported that Tenet ... [also] held talks with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Ehsanul Haq."
Cloud, David S. "CIA Supplies Anti-Taliban Forces in South." Wall Street Journal, 7 Dec. 2001, A4.
Woodward, Bob. "CIA Paid Afghans To Track Bin Laden: Team of 15 Recruits Operated Since 1998." Washington Post, 23 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"For four years prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the CIA paid a team of about 15 recruited Afghan agents to regularly track Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, according to well-placed sources. The team had mixed results, ranging from excellent to total failure. Once every month or so, the team pinpointed bin Laden's presence in a specific building, compound or training camp, and that location was then confirmed by the CIA through communications intelligence or satellite overhead photography.... The creation of the tracking team was part of a covert CIA operation to capture or kill bin Laden launched first by the Clinton administration and continued under President Bush."
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