Baker, Stewart. "Should Spies Be Cops?" Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994-1995): 36-52.
ProQuest: The BNL affair "centered on charges that the Justice Department and the CIA covered up the Bush administration's channeling of prewar military assistance to Iraq. Whether the CIA should expand its traditional beat to become cops is discussed."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Editors. "Committee Criticizes CIA in Iraq Loans Case." 6 Feb. 1993, 277.
"Ineptness and inadequate communications between the CIA and the Justice Department -- rather than intentional wrongdoing -- impeded the government's handling of a case against the Atlanta branch manager of the Banco Nazionale del Lavorno (BNL), the Senate Intelligence Committee staff has found.
"In a 163-page report released Feb. 5, the committee staff chronicled numerous intelligence reports -- dating back to 1989 -- raising the possibility that officials of BNL's Italian Headquarters knew of illegal loans to Iraq. However, the information was never received by Justice Department prosecutors.... The report calls on the director of the CIA and the attorney general to work with Congress to come up with a better way for the agencies to share such information."
Fialka, John J. "Reports Attack CIA for Its Role in BNL Case." Wall Street Journal, 8 Feb. 1993, 4.
Mantius, Peter. Shell Game: A True Story of Banking, Spies, Lies, Politics -- And the Arming of Saddam Hussein. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.
According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the author investigates how Banco Nazionale del Lavorno (BNL) was "part of the Reagan/Bush plans to use Saddam as a trading partner and political ally.... Mantius explains that Congress was thwarted in its investigation ... [by] the U.S. Justice Department, the State Department, and CIA."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Unclassified Summary of the Final Report of the Office of Inspector General Investigation of CIA's Handling of BNL-Related Matters, 14 January 1993. Washington, DC: 1993.
Surveillant 3.1: "[F]ocuses totally on CIA and lists a good number of shortcomings in CIA's responses to the BNL/DoJ matter."
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