Koch, R.W. "The CIA's Death Valley Albatross." Air Classics 15 (Apr. 1979): 68-73, 98.
Petersen: "USAF support for CIA operations."
Lescaze, Lee. "Sorenson Bows to Opposition, Withdraws as Nominee for CIA." Washington Post, 18 Jan. 1977, A1.
President Carter's initial nominee for DCI withdraws in the face of controversy over his nomination.
Marks, John. "How to Spot a Spook." Washington Monthly, Nov. 1974, 5-11.
McGarvey, Patrick J. CIA: The Myth and the Madness. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. New York: Penguin, 1973. [pb]
According to Pforzheimer, McGarvey's "biased and unbalanced criticisms, frequent errors of fact, and lack of realistic solutions [to the problems illustrated] detract from the book's value." Constantinides points out that the author was only in the CIA for three years, and those were with the Directorate of Intelligence. There are errors here that "show a careless and unreliable work."
Powers, Thomas. "Doing the Right Thing." New York Times Book Review, 21 May 1978. Chapter 18 in Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 275-282. Rev. & exp. ed. New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.
Powers reviews Bill Colby's Honorable Men (1978).
Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1979. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980. New York: Pocket Books, 1981. [pb]
Clark comment: This is one of the best books written about American intelligence by a non-intelligence-trained individual. It reads easily and amuses in the author's clear desire to denigrate his subject and his frustration in his failure to be able to do so. In one of the limited cases where we agree on something, NameBase notes that "[w]hen it first appeared in 1979, this book was widely regarded as one of the best ever written about the CIA."
Pforzheimer says The Man Who Kept the Secrets is simultaneously one of the most comprehensive books on the CIA and "seriously flawed with errors of fact and concept." A serious shortcoming is Powers' "failure to weave the world situation into his CIA tapestry.... The author does not understand Helms and is sometimes very unfair to him. This is a book ... which should be approached ... with a full recognition of its many errors, although it should be read by the professional."
Constantinides advises a careful reading of Powers' notes, which "often contain more revealing, comprehensive, and perceptive comments or explanations than the main text." Whatever Powers may have missed or misinterpreted -- and the list is long -- this book "can be classified as outstanding, especially for an intelligence outsider."
Also, see Kenneth L. Adelman, "A Clandestine Clan," International Security 5 (Summer 1980): 152-171. This is a review essay on The Man Who and Roosevelt's Countercoup. Adelman was Director of ACDA, 1984-1987.
An adaptation of Powers' work was published as: Thomas Powers, "Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks," Atlantic Monthly 244, no. 2 (Aug. 1979): 33-64. [http://www.theatlantic.com]
Prados, John. Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Click for reviews.
Rafalko, Frank J. MH/CHAOS: The CIA's Campaign Against the Radical New Left and the Black Panthers. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, [forthcoming in October] 2011.
Goulden, Washington Times, 9 Dec. 2011, and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), notes that this book "relies on CIA documents gathered during the course of MH/CHAOS, plus the author's personal experience. It will perhaps stand as the ultimate objective study of a program that proved highly controversial." The author argues that Presidents Johnson and Nixon "had legal authority to order the CIA to keep tabs on the threats" even if domestic.
A well-reasoned take on MHCHAOS is provided by Fischer, IJI&C 26.4 (Winter 2013-2014), in a review of Rafalko's book. Fischer finds that "Rafalko's combined memoir and history" of MHCHAOS "suffers from inadequate editing and fact-checking, with much repetition." Nevertheless, it is "a valuable look at a very contentious period" in CIA history.
Rositzke, Harry. "Revamping the CIA: Easier Said Than Done." Washington Post, 18 Jan. 1976, F3.
Shackley, Theodore, and Richard A. Finney. Spymaster: My Life in the CIA. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.
Theodore (Ted) G. Shackley, retired CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations, died on 9 December 2002 at the age of 75. He was a three-time recipient of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. J.Y. Smith, "Theodore Shackley Dies; Celebrated CIA Agent," Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2002, B8.
Peake, CIRA Newsletter 30.4 (Winter 2005) and Studies 49.4 (2005), notes that Shackley comments "selectively on various aspects of his career.... For those who expected a more expansive tale of clandestine operations, Spymaster may be something of a disappointment. On the other hand, what Ted Shackley was able to give us is extremely valuable -- a first hand account with lessons for all."
For Schecter, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), "Shackley's first-person account is rich in remarkable detail.... They take CIA memoirs to a new level of specificity and revelation of tradecraft that makes for fascinating, and at times hilarious and bizarre reading." Huck, Periscope (Summer 2006), feels that much was left out of this work, first by Shackley's death (not to denigrate the "tireless and faithful" work of Richard Finney to complete the book) and by the publisher's requirement that the manuscript be reduced in length.
Stern, Laurence. "Intelligence Network Overhaul Suggested." Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1975, A3.
Szulc, Tad. Compulsive Spy: The Strange Career of E. Howard Hunt. New York: Viking, 1974.
Constantinides notes that "Szulc managed to pull together much material that had reached the public domain, but questions have arisen about ... the book.... [T]here is no documentation. Certain items on CIA and its organization are quite wrong."
Troy, Thomas F. "Writing History in CIA: A Memoir of Frustration." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 397-411.
This is the marvelously told story of how the CIA bureaucracy handled Troy's biography of Donovan -- written on Agency time and with OTR support, but without the "official" sanction often given the book in reviews.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/president-carter-and-the-camp-david-accords/index.html.
"This collection consists of more than 250 previously classified documents, totaling over 1,400 pages, including some 150 that are being released for the first time. These documents cover the period from January 1977 through March 1979 and were produced by the CIA to support the Carter administrations diplomatic efforts leading up to President Carters negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978. The declassified documents detail diplomatic developments from the Arab peace offensive and President Sadats trip to Jerusalem through the regionwide aftermath of Camp David."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/index.html.
A collection of documents highlighting "the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community's (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 ... Yom Kippur War.... Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack.... Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war -- even at the risk of losing -- to pursue political objectives."
Wicker, Tom. "Destroy the Monster." New York Times, 12 Sep. 1975, 33.
Woodward, Bob. "CIA Paid Millions to Jordan's King Hussein." Washington Post, Feb. 18, 1977, A1.
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