David, Leonard. "CIA and NASA Linked During Cold War Space Race." Space.com, 14 Oct. 2002.
In a paper, "Brothers in Arms: The CIA and the American Civilian Space Program, 1958-1968," delivered at the World Space Congress in Houston, Texas, the week of 14 October 2002, Dwayne Day documents "cooperative ties" beween NASA and the CIA during the U.S.-Russian space race in the late 1950s and 1960s.
Devlin, Larry. Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960-67. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.
Lawrence Raymond Devlin died 6 December 2008. Joe Holley, "Larry Devlin, 86; CIA Chief of Station, Congo," Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2008, B5.
Clark comment: This is an invigorating read about a curious corner in the Cold War, written by a man who lived it closely. There is certainly plenty of Devlin's opinion on U.S. foreign policy of the era spread about in his memoir, but such does not represent more than momentary pauses in the narrative of the story he unfolds. This was neither the first nor the last time that officers (whether CIA or State Department) in the field and Washington had different views of developing situations. Devlin writes an easily read brand of English, introduces his colleagues and the Congolese leaders with both candor and sensitivity, and seeks to put to rest canards directed at the CIA institutionally and him personally for such actions as Lumumba's death and Mobutu's coup. It is, perhaps, easy at this late date to wonder "who cares" about these actions of long ago; it is, however, even easier to agree with Devlin's deepseated belief that it really did matter at the time. I am grateful that fate placed Larry Devlin in the Congo at this juncture as Africa began to move beyond its previous colonial existence.
EAB, AFIO WIN 06-07 (12 Feb. 2007), notes that when the author arrived in the Congo in 1960, there was "no central authority ... and local strongmen were struggling for power.... Devlin devotes a large portion of the book refuting his or the agency's part in Lumumba's death." Similarly, a Publisher's Weekly reviewer (via Amazon.com) finds that the author uses his last chapter for "a point-by-point refutation of his or the agency's involvement in Lumumba's death.... Devlin's straightforward, plainly written approach ... lends credence to his assertion of innocence."
For Cassilly, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), "this is the first report written exclusively from the CIA's point of view and, as such, a valuable contribution to the history of the time.... [A]s the Cold War recedes further, the time may soon arrive for a reexamination of the situation in a less emotional context. When doing so, Devlin's book will be required reading, if perhaps not the final word."
Rogers, CIRA Newsletter 32.1 (Spring 2007) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), calls Chief of Station, Congo "an important piece of history about the United States' skirmishes with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries during the Cold War as specifically played out in the Congo.... The Congo experience is a textbook lesson on how CIA can and should work with the Department of State, and how Department of State diplomats can use effectively intelligence resources."
See Scott Shane, "Memories of a C.I.A. Officer Resonate in a New Era," New York Times, 24 Feb. 2008, for the journalist's interview of the 85-year-old Devlin at his home in Virginia.
Ennis, Jerry D.
1. "Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent?" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 26-45.
The answer to the author's question is, "no." It appears that James Angleton's suggestion otherwise was typically Angleton muddying the waters.
2. "What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn?" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 905-909.
The author revisits the conclusions in his earlier article about what Angleton said about Golitsin and why he said it. He argues that Angleton's point was that Golitsin had decided to defect long before he did, and had been gathering information to pass along when he did defect.
Esquire. Editors. "These Men Run the CIA." May 1966, 84-85, 166 ff. [Petersen]
Felix, Christopher [James McCargar]. "The Unknowable CIA: Analysis of Walter Lippmann's Articles in the Washington Post." Reporter, 6 Apr. 1967, 20-24.
Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 291-312.
Clark comment: I have no problems with scholars who stray off the beaten path to provide new insights. However, this article flies too far from the known reality without credible evidence to back it up.
Hathaway, Robert M., and Russell Jack Smith. Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973. Washington DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993. Available at: http://www.foia/cia.gov.
This work, completed under the auspices of the CIA History Staff, was declassified (with redactions) in 2006. The "Editor's Preface" by J. Kenneth McDonald states that it is "organized as a topical study and not as a comprehensive narrative history of Richard Helms's six and a half years as DCI." (vii) Robarge, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), notes that Hathaway's "highly unfavorable chapter on Angleton [was] based not on in-depth archival research but mainly on critical internal surveys ... and on interviews with CIA retirees unfavorably disposed to him."
Helms, Richard, with William Hood. A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. New York: Random House, 2003.
Clark comment: Helms' version of his life in the CIA is worth reading for the perceptive generalizations that he makes about the events of his time. There are certainly no shocking details revealed here, just the judgments of someone who stood close enough to the flame to get burned. His animosity toward Bill Colby is stated plainly and too frequently, and is one of the few sour notes in Helms' presentation. A careful reading of the work in its entirety yields insight and provides perspective on a number of high-level players (including Presidents) and their actions over a substantial part of the last half of the 20th century.
For Troy, Studies 48.1, Helms' book "is always interesting and frequently provocative.... Sometimes [the author] is humorous, but other times he comes across as vindictive and even petty in discussing former colleagues." The reviewer expresses some concerns about Helms' versions of Watergate and the Nosenko Affair and his continued defense of James Angleton. Thomas Twetten, Richard Stolz, and Hayden B. Peake, "Taking Exception: Revisiting Thomas Troy's Review of Richard Helms' Memoir," Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), argue that Troy's "is neither a balanced review of the memoir nor an adequate assessment of Director Helms' career."
Waller, IJI&C 17.1, finds that his former colleague's "description of the CIA's genesis as the U.S.'s first line of defense against the USSR is as fascinating as it is authentic." The work includes an "excellent account of the Cuban missile crisis." A Look Over My Shoulder is "an important and very readable contribution to the history of intelligence in the United States."
To Karabell, FA 82.4 (Jul.-Aug. 2003), Helms' posthumous "defense of the CIA's role in protecting the United States could not be more timely.... [M]uch of his memoir is a breezy potted history of the agency, [but there are] the flashes of anger, pride, and high dudgeon.... Helms was too loyal a cold warrior to attack the White House directly at the time of the [1970s] investigations, but two decades later, he uses his memoir to argue that the agency and its officers were just following orders. The one person who receives Helms' unsparing scorn is Colby."
Bamford, Washington Post, 27 Apr. 2003, finds that because Helms is "[w]riting at such a long remove in time" from the events of his life, "[t]he result is a book with too much flat history and too few new insights and revelations. Nevertheless, the opportunity to at last see much of the 20th century through Helms's probing eyes is well worth the price." Blewett, Library Journal, 1 Apr. 2003, comments that the author provides "background information about some operations but no real secrets.... Helms does let a few tart opinions slip."
For Goulden, Washington Times, 13 Apr. 2003, "Helms gives only terse rehashes of operations on his watch." Nevertheless, the book "is valuable because of its insight into some precepts essential to intelligence." Friedman, CIRA Newsletter, Summer 2003, says that readers "of this book should feel rewarded for the opportunity to have an insider's look into how the intelligence process in the US Government developed over time and how it was conducted during one lengthy and productive career."
According to Bath, NIPQ 19.3, this autobiography "comes across less as self-serving and more as an attempt to bring a sense of balance to a discussion of the proper role for the CIA in events of the past half century." Gustafson, I&NS 19.2, sees Helms' work providing "some keen insight into the political world of the DCI as well as a few tantalising glimpses of CIA covert operations." Rex Rectanus [VADM/USN (Ret.)], NIPQ 19.4/35-36, takes strong exception to Helms' presentation in Chapter 37, "Sihanoukville."
Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967. New York: Dell, 1968. [pb]
Abbot E. Smith, Studies 11.4 (Fall 1967), says that this "is an excellent book, well organized, well written, well worth reading.... There is a great deal about the CIA." Hilsman treats the CIA "fairly and judiciously.... He emphatically denies that the Agency is or was ... an Invisible Government." Pforzheimer finds that the parts of the book on President Kennedy and the CIA and the Cuban Missile Crisis "are of particular interest. Hilsman's comments are highly subjective and frequently very provocative and debatable."
Holland, "The Politics of Intelligence Postmortems: Cuba 1962-1963," IJI&C 20.3 (Fall 2007), p. 426, argues that "Hilsman's position [at the time and in this book] was that of loyalty to the Kennedy administrarion rather than the facts."
Holm, Richard. "A Close Call in Africa." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000): 17-28. CIRA Newsletter 25, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 36-41.
Clark comment: The author recounts the circumstances surrounding his frightful injuries in a plane crash in the Congo in 1965. Loeb, Washington Post, 15 May 2000, uses the publication of Ted Gup's Book of Honor (2000) to tell the story of Holm's crash, recovery, subsequent career, and frightful treatment at the end of his career by then DCI Deutch. See also, Gregory L. Vistica and Evan Thomas, "The Man Who Spied Too Long: The Inside Story of How a Cold-War Hero Became a Fall Guy for a Troubled CIA," Newsweek, 29 Apr. 1996, 26, 31.
Kohli, M.S., and Kenneth Conboy. Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003.
Umansky, Washington Post, 16 Mar. 2003, notes that this book tells the "repeatedly jaw-dropping" story of the efforts of "a joint team of the best American and Indian mountain climbers" to plant high in the Himalayas a device to monitor Chinese nuclear tests. Kohli led the Indian half of the expedition.
For Goodman, I&NS 18.4, this "is effectively a memoir" of Kohli's experiences. It "is a very readable and very enjoyable account of a hitherto heavily classified mission." Wales, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, May 2003 [http://www.h-net.org], says that this "is not a particularly scintillating read," as it is burdened with "plodding prose." In addition, "the story is narrowly focused and there is little historiographic background.... Nevertheless, there are several vignettes in Spies that will fascinate students of intelligence history."
Return to CIA 1960s Table of Contents