Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Strike Kills Six in al Qaeda." Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2002, A1. [http:// www.washingtonpost.com] Materials presented in chronological order.
Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Strike Kills Six in al Qaeda." Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2002, A1. [http:// www.washingtonpost.com]
"A missile fired by a U.S. Predator drone over Yemen killed six suspected al Qaeda terrorists in a vehicle about 100 miles east of the nation's capital..., sources familiar with the action said" on 4 November 2002. "A senior administration official said Yemeni defense officials had identified one of the men killed as Abu Ali al-Harithi,... one of the suspected planners of the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole."
Risen, James, and Judith Miller. "U.S. Is Reported to Kill Al Qaeda Leader in Yemen." New York Times, 5 Nov. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The CIA, "using a missile fired by an unmanned Predator aircraft, killed a senior leader in Al Qaeda and five low-level associates traveling by car in Yemen" on 3 November 2002.
Johnston, David, and David E. Sanger. "Yemeni Killing Based on Rules Set Out by Bush." New York Times, 6 Nov. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"The lethal missile strike that killed a suspected leader of al Qaeda in Yemen was carried out under broad authority that President Bush has given the C.I.A. over the past year to pursue the terror network well beyond the borders of Afghanistan, senior government officials said [on 5 November 2002].... The decision to approve the missile launch was made by 'very senior officials' below the level of the president..., the officials said.... The strike was authorized under the same set of classified presidential findings, legal opinions and policy directives ... that have set the rules for the administration's campaign to prevent terror. The orders gave the C.I.A. wide powers to pursue Qaeda terrorists anywhere in the world. But the Predator strike was the first known use of lethal military force outside Afghanistan."
Pincus, Walter. "Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni." Washington Post, 6 Nov. 2002, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The U.S. missile attack launched from a Predator drone aircraft that killed six suspected al Qaeda terrorists traveling in a vehicle in Yemen on [3 November 2002] was carried out with the cooperation and approval of that country's leadership, U.S. sources said [on 5 November 2002].... Yememi officials privately told reporters in that country that their intelligence agents were watching and communicating to U.S. intelligence the movements of Abu Ali al-Harithi, the senior al Qaeda operative who was the prime target in the attack."
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] A Strike in Yemen." 6 Nov. 2002, A20. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
"TheYemen operation did not target political or criminal figures, but trained combatants of an organization that has declared war against the United States, that itself has defined the battlefield as global and that recently has landed its own military blows in Yemen.... Al Qaeda has no conventional cause, no homeland, no purely political leaders; there is no territory at stake in its fight with the United States, and no possibility of negotiations or settlement. The only course, chosen not by the United States but by al Qaeda, is a scattered and unconventional military conflict across continents, lasting until one side is eradicated. There is no way to treat al Qaeda's members other than as combatants, because they have no other understanding of themselves."
Priest, Dana. "CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike." Washington Post, 8 Nov. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"A U.S. citizen was among the people killed in the pilotless missile strike on suspected al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen.... Ahmed Hijazi ... held U.S. citizenship and was also a citizen of an unidentified Middle Eastern country, a senior administration official confirmed....
"The CIA ... has become a much more central tactical tool in the terrorism war than in any previous conflict.... The CIA's separate targeting process ... is quicker, more fluid and involves fewer decision-makers in its 'trigger-pulling' chain of command than even the nimblest military operation, intelligence experts said."
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