Rafalko, Frank J., ed.
1. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II, Volume One. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
2. A Counterintelligence Reader: World War II, Volume Two. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
3. A Counterintelligence Reader: Post-World War II to Closing the 20th Century, Volume Three. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
Clark comment: These three volumes provide almost 900 pages of information on counterintelligence covering the entire span of U.S. history. Many cases mentioned have not previously been discussed widely.
4. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millenium, Volume Four.Washington, DC: NACIC, .
From "Preface": "We have taken material from official government documents, indictments from several espionage cases, and articles written by professors, scholars and counterintelligence officers. We have abridged some selections while trying not to change the sense of the original but we have not altered the original usage of the English language.... At the end of each chapter is a selected bibliography.... The reader is not all-inclusive and people may disagree with our selections, but at least we hope to have provided sufficient material to entice our colleagues to do further research."
All four volumes are available at: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps54742/counterintelligencereader/ci/docs/ and http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/index.html.
[Redmond, Paul.] "Remarks by Paul Redmond: CIRA Luncheon, 1 February 2002." CIRA Newsletter 27, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 3-7.
Counterintelligence is not nice; Americans do not like to do it; and we do it badly.
Reed, Roy L., Jr. "Clandestine or Covert Threats on a Strategic Level." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): 24-32.
The author argues that the Defense Department should be paying greater attention to counterintelligence matters.
Risen, James. "Clinton Creates Post to Protect Nation's Secrets." New York Times, 5 Jan. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
President Clinton has signed a directive creating "a National Counterintelligence Executive charged with bringing a forward-looking, post-cold-war mentality to counterintelligence" (CI). Officials say the post is designed as the CI "equivalent to the nation's drug czar.... Administration officials and others familiar with the plan say that the czar will not be in charge of managing individual spy cases" and that the FBI "will retain its lead role in counterespionage investigations."
Clark comment: The reference here is to President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), entitled "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness for the 21st Century" (CI-21).
The PDD establishes (1) a National CI Board of Directors, chaired by the FBI Director and comprised of the Deputy Defense Secretary, DDCI, and a senior representative of the Justice Department; (2) an NSC Deputies Committee, to include the FBI Director; (3) the position of National Counterintelligence Executive, selected by the Board of Directors with the concurrence of the Attorney General, DCI, and the Defense Secretary and reporting to the FBI Director, as Chairman of the Board of Directors, but responsible to the Board of Directors as a whole; (4) the National CI Policy Board, chaired by the CI Executive and including senior CI officials from State, Defense, Justice, Energy, JCS, CIA, FBI, and the NSC Staff, at a minimum.
The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive assumes the functions and resources of the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). AFIO WIN 02-01, 15 Jan. 2001.
Sims, Jennifer E., and Burton L. Gerber, eds. Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), notes that this work "is not about CI cases or operations, but rather considers questions of CI policy, organizational relationships and strategy, the connection between CI, civil liberties and culture, and the need for greater congressional oversight." The need for a new national CI strategy "is assumed -- but not demonstrated -- nor is the difference with the current national CI strategy made clear.... [T]he authors have identified problems, but they have neither fully substantiated their existence nor proffered solutions for them."
For Nolte, I&NS 25.2 (Apr. 2010), this is "an important starting point for a national conversation the American people and their leaders must pursue." Prout, International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 1.1 (Spring 2010), finds that the editors "have assembled a thought-provoking group of essays that examine the theory and practice of counterintelligence." The book "is a must-read for anyone who is serious about intelligence reorganization, and the use of counterintelligence for more than just spy catching."
Shaffer, AIJ 28.2 (2010), is much more directly negative about this work than many other reviewers. He declares that the book "is an academic examination of the issue, short on real ground-level experience." The contributors provide "questionable conclusions which, if followed, will result in no change and perpetuation of the do-nothing status quo."
Slawson, Thomas M. In Pursuit of Shadows: A Career in Counterintelligence. London: Athena Press, 2008.
According to Peake, Studies 55.1 (Mar. 2011), this book tells the story of the author's "career as an Air Force CI officer." It "paints a good picture of everyday military CI, its adventurous cases, and its less stimulating administratrive duties. It is a first-rate introduction to the profession."
Thompson, Terry. "Security and Motivational Factors in Espionage." Intelligencer 11, no. 1 (Jul. 2000): 1-9. American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 47-56.
The author addresses the "why" question in CI -- why would an individual risk everything in a crime that carries maximum penalties and an intense stigma? In the 1930s, 1940s, and the Cold War period, ideology was often the dominant motivation for commiting treason. Today, "recent trends indicate that pursuit of money is the most common motivation in espionage." Other motivations include anger/revenge, ego, and ethnicity.
Van Cleave, Michelle K.
The former National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) has emerged as a vocal (and, perhaps, the best informed) critic of the current U.S. counterintelligence effort.
Wannall, W. Raymond. "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 321-329. Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 19-23.
The author argues that there has been "a progressive loss of ability on the part of the intelligence agencies to carry out their functions, particularly in the domestic aspects of subversion and terrorism, dating back to, at the very least, the Watergate event of 1972 and the congressional hearings of 1973-1975."
West, Nigel [Rupert Allason]. Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2007.
Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy), 16 Feb. 2007, finds "many intriguing nuggets" in this work of "brief, capsule summaries of key topics, terms and events in the turbulent history of cold war counterintelligence." However, entries "are not sourced or annotated." Maret, DIJ 16.2 (2007), says that this work provides "an international perspective to CI, with brief but detailed entries." However, the reviewer wonders "whether the dictionary format is the ideal arrangement for presentling highly complex historical and biographical material."
For Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), this work "has an impressive selection of cases, some little known, and a valuable bibliographic essay covering the evolution of books during the Cold War." Nonetheless, the volume has a number of factual errors; "the editorial practice of leaving the fact-checking and source determination to the reader diminishes the utility" of this work.
Wettering, Frederick L. "Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 265-300.
The argument here is that CI "is not being effectively conducted" by U.S. CI agencies. This assessment is true for all three of the primary CI functions: "protecting secrets, frustrating attempts by foreign intelligence services to acquire those secrets, and catching Americans who spy for those foreign intelligence services."
Wise, David. Cassidy's Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas. New York: Random House, 2000.
Macartney, AFIO WIN 18-00 (5 May 2000), notes that this is the story of U.S. Army Master Sergeant Joseph Cassidy who "spent 23 years as an FBI double agent, feeding misleading information to his GRU handlers about US chemical weapons programs." According to Vernon Loeb, "IntelligenCIA: A Spy War Exposed," Washington Post, 1 May 2000, Operation SHOCKER was "the FBI's longest running [CI] case of the Cold War," lasting 21 years. Cassidy "exposed 10 Russian spy handlers and surfaced three 'illegal' Russian agents," while passing thousands of pages of "carefully vetted classified documents" to the Russians.
For Naftali, New York Times, 30 Apr. 2000, this work "is a meticulous reconstruction of a hitherto unknown counterespionage case.... Wise raises the possibility that the Cassidy deception operation backfired with horrendous consequences. Citing circumstantial evidence, he suggests that it compelled the Soviets to expand production of chemical weapons.... But lacking any rich sources in the chemical and biological weapons programs of the former Soviet Union, Wise is not able to build a persuasive case.... Wise has done readers a service in bringing Cassidy's remarkable tale to life."
See also, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Polyakov's Run," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 56, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2000): 37-40, which discusses the deception/disinformation aspects of the Cassidy operation in connection with a similar operation run through Soviet Col. Dmitri Polyakov (Top Hat/Bourbon).
Yim, Samuel. "Counterintelligence and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Process." National Intelligence Journal 1, no. 1 (2009): 147-163.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is "the U.S. Government's mechanism that monitors threats to national security posed by foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies.... CFIUS is an inter-agency committee consisting of 12 U.S. Government agency members, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury."
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