Bagley, Tennent H. "Bane of Counterintelligence: Our Penchant for Self- Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1-20.
The focus here is deception and its interplay with self-deception. A number of cases are discussed.
Benenson, Bob. "Senate Bill Gives FBI Power in Counterespionage Cases." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13 Aug. 1994, 2370.
On 12 August 1994, the Senate passed a fiscal 1995 intelligence authorization bill. SSCI Chairman Dennis DeConcini "told the Senate that the bill authorizes $300 million less than President Clinton had requested." Over President Clinton's opposition, the bill includes a provision that "would require that the FBI take the lead on all counterespionage probes. The FBI would have to be notified and given access to the employees and records of an agency when that agency determines that classified information is being, or may have been, deliberately disclosed to a foreign entity." The bill also requires establishment of a presidential commission "to examine the roles and missions of the intelligence agencies in the post-Cold War era."
Clark comment: And thus did the CIA lose the authority to investigate its own CI cases in the wake of the Ames debacle. The FBI chuckled all the way to the Hanssen case.
Constantinides, George C. "Security Slip-Ups: Ultra, Magic, Bigot & Other Secrets." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 173-195. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
Cooper, H.H.A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Catching Spies: Principles and Practice of Counterespionage. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1988. New York: Bantam, 1990. [pb]
For Peake, IJI&C 4.1, it is a "depressingly flawed book." The authors "often use the wrong terminology and inaccurate definitions, coupled with trite analogies and erroneous basic concepts." Catching Spies "contains different distortions [than Making Spies] and atrocious errors of fact." There is an "under supply of merit ... in both books." Chambers notes that this is a "popular account" and is "horribly verbose."
Cram, Cleveland C.
Cleveland C. Cram died on 8 January 1999 at the age of 81: J.Y. Smith, "CIA Official Cleveland C. Cram: Specialist in Counterintelligence; Conducted Influential Study of Legendary Agency Spymaster," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, B6.
1. Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977-1992, An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993. Available as PDF file (1993) at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html.
Clark comment: Although it remains the object of considerable ire from Angleton supporters, Cram's monograph is a great read for anyone interested in the literature of intelligence. Readers need not take Cram's opinions as the gospel, but they will learn about more things than "merely" Angleton. For an antidote to Cram's view of Angleton, see Hood, Nolen, and Halpern, Myths Surrounding James Angleton (1993).
For the Surveillant 3.4 reviewer, this monograph is an "opinionated, literate, fresh look at some items in the CI literature from an Agency insider." It offers a "terrific, though brief, historical review ... [and is] well worth reading." Bates, NIPQ 10.2, saw things differently: The "title is, at best, misleading because the monograph is really an attack on ... Angleton, blaming him for so many things I can't chronicle them here.... [T]his is not the way to write history."
Robarge, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), calls this "a unique and valuable historiographical survey of counterintelligence publications from the late 1970s to the early 1990s."
2. "Of Moles and Molehunters: Spy Stories." Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 129-137.
"Editor's note: The following background essay first appeared in a monograph published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence in October 1993." (See above)
deGraffenreid, Kenneth E.
1. "Hostile Intelligence Activities: Can We Counter Them?" National Security Law Report 12, no. 1 (1990): 1-3.
2. A National Counterintelligence and Security Assessment Center. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1990.
The author proposes that counterintelligence be centralized in the interest of countering the threat from hostile (and nonhostile) intelligence services.
3. "Tighter Security Needed to Protect U.S. Intelligence." Signal 45, no. 1 (1990): 101-104. [Petersen]
Dobbs, Michael, and R. Jeffrey Smith. "The KGB's Keystone Kops: How the FBI Penetrated Moscow's Washington Spy Ring." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 8-14 Mar. 1993, 11-12.
This article keys off interviews with Yuri Shvets, a former KGB officer who served in Washington 1985-1987. "A combination of treachery, bureaucratic incompetence and effective FBI penetration of the [Washington 'residency'] enabled U.S. authorities to smash long-standing Soviet spy rings and carry out a spectacular expulsion of KGB officers in October 1986.... Over the past few years, the KGB has managed to put its Washington operation back together, but it lacks the aggressive bite it once had, according to sources in Washington and Moscow."
Godson, Roy. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995. JK468I6G62 New intro. Washington, DC: Transaction, 2001.
Clark Comment: Godson defines covert action as "influencing events in other parts of the world without revealing or acknowledging involvement." He defines counterintelligence as "identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting the intelligence activities of others." (p. xii) In this book, he traces the evolution of the practice of covert action and counterintelligence in the United States since 1945, develops some "ideal" principles and techniques for such practices, and analyzes the ongoing gap between principle and practice. The most disconcerting aspect of the book is the author's unusual packaging together of covert action and counterintelligence, two very different intelligence disciplines.
Nonetheless, Friedman, Parameters, Summer 1997, finds that "the combination does no violence to either. In fact the unusual combination supports the author's conclusion that appropriate use of 'dirty tricks' and effective counterintelligence enabled the United States to accomplish many important objectives that might otherwise have been unattainable by more conventional means." Cogan, I&NS 11.2, adds that the "unusual bracketing together of covert action and counterintelligence offers a different perspective from the conventional division in the intelligence business as between information-seeking on the one hand and direct action on the other."
Richelson, Proceedings 122.7 (Jul. 1996), finds the book "disappointing in its failure to confront directly the future of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence activities.... [T]here is no detailed discussion of the international environment in which future U.S. covert action and counterintelligence operations will be conducted.... Godson's book, while useful as background, unfortunately does not take the reader into the future."
For Cohen, FA 74.5 (Sep.-Oct. 1995), much of Godson's effort "is taxonomic -- describing principles of both covert action and counterintelligence -- and necessarily general." Similarly, the AIJ 16.2/3 reviewer calls the work "a methodical, rational and most informative overview." It is "an excellent primer for those who wish to study the topic[s] in context. Highly recommended."
Breckinridge, WIR 15.2, sees Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards as "a valuable contribution to writing on the unusually complex fields of counterintelligence and covert action." The author provides a "focused bibliography," but has a "tendency to cite sources uncritically." The concluding chapter on reform has been "somewhat by-passed so far as practical application is concerned."
According to Sulc, IJI&C 9.1, the "United States sorely needs strong counterintelligence and covert action capabilities as it makes its way through the post-Cold War bush. Roy Godson has taken a giant step in the right direction by producing a very readable, eminently clear explanation of the subjects." In the same vein, Barrett, APSR 91.4, is impressed by the author's "knowledge of political and intelligence history," and finds that "his treatment of the nuts and bolts of counterintelligence and covert action has great depth."
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 08-01 (26 Feb. 2001), reports the publication of a new edition of this work. Godson has added "a substantial introduction ... that looks at ways in which counterintelligence and covert action might be adapted to the new security environment, in particular the growing political-criminal nexus in many strategic regions."
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