CHINA

General

2010s

Blancke, Stephan, and Jens Rosenke. "Blut ist dicker als Wasser. Die chinesisch-nordkoreanische Militär und Geheimdienstkooperation." [Blood Is Thicker than Water. Military and Intelligence Cooperation Between China and North Korea] Z Außen Sicherheitspolit 4 (2011): 263-294.

From Abstract: Although "there has been a sharp drop-off in bilateral armaments cooperation" betwween the PRC and the DPRK, "intelligence cooperation is persistent and intensive, notably in the realm of signals intelligence and in infiltrating political opposition movements."

Chambers, David Ian. "The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography." Studies in Intelligence 56, no. 3 (Sep. 2012): 31-46. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/pdfs/Chambers-Chinese%20Intel%20Historiography.pdf]

"Chinese intelligence historians freely admit that they still have some way to go before they are able to complete microstudies of particular pre-1949 operations and write individual biographies that would allow CCP intelligence history to be incorporated accurately into histories of CCP leadership decisionmaking."

Chan, Minnie. "Military Spy Chief Held in Graft Inquiry." South China Morning Post, 5 Mar. 2015. [http://www.scmp.com]

Maj. Gen. "Xing Yunming, the former liaison office head of the People's Liberation Army's General Political Department, was taken away by the army's anti-graft watchdog" on 17 February 2015. Xing "is under investigation for alleged corruption.... Xing's detention follows that of Ma Jian, former executive deputy minister of the ... Ministry of State Security. Ma is closely linked to Ling Jihua , who was detained last month on corruption charges and was an aide to former president Hu Jintao. Ma is the highest-ranking national security official to be investigated since the downfall of Zhou Yongkang, the former security tsar who was detained in July over alleged corruption."

Erickson, Andrew S. "Eyes in the Sky." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 4 (Apr. 2010): 36-41.

The author reviews PRC surveillance satellite capabilities in considerable detail. His conclusion is: "With 15 new satellites launched in 2008 alone and an ambitious program to produce more space-based surveillance technology, China is increasing its ability to monitor its near seas with deadly precision."

Mattis, Peter. "The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services." Studies in Intelligence 56, no. 3 (Sep. 2012): 47-57. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/pdfs/Mattis-Understanding%20Chinese%20Intel.pdf]

Chinese national "interests will put pressure on the intelligence services to be more active abroad against a wide variety of targets, both official and not. How intelligence performs missions in support of [China's] goals will also serve as indicators of Chinese national policy."

Mattis, Peter. "Assessing the Foreign Policy Influence of the Ministry of State Security." China Brief 11, no. 1 (14 Jan. 2011). [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37368]

"Changes in both competency and necessity appear to favor rising MSS influence in foreign policymaking. When political power is absent..., influence usually relates to merit and necessity.... The second major change is the expansion of Chinese interests abroad, which would require better intelligence to monitor effectively."

Mattis, Peter L. "Assessing Western Perspectives on Chinese Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 4 (Winter 2012-2013): 678-699.

"[T]he data clearly indicates that analysts should not be so quick to assume substantial Chinese-Western differences in operational methods or goals in intelligence collection."

Mattis, Peter. "China's Misunderstood Spies." The Diplomat, 31 Oct. 2011. [http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/31/china%E2%80%99s-misunderstood-spies/]

Characterizations of Chinese intelligence as "a giant vacuum cleaner ... provide no insight into what Beijing demands of its intelligence services, and no guidance for counterintelligence officials working against the Chinese services or trying to counter economic espionage."

Mazzetti, Mark, and Dan Levin. "Obama Administration Warns Beijing About Covert Agents Operating in U.S.." New York Times, 16 Aug. 2015. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The Obama administration has delivered a warning to Beijing about the presence of Chinese government agents operating secretly in the United States to pressure prominent expatriates -- some wanted in China on charges of corruption -- to return home immediately, according to American officials."

Newman, Alex. "China's Growing Spy Threat." The Diplomat, 19 Sep. 2011. [http://the-diplomat.com/2011/09/19/chinas-growing-spy-threat/]

"The Chinese government's 'vacuum cleaner' approach to espionage is worrying foreign governments, companies and overseas dissidents. They're right to be concerned."

Poreba, John. "Neutralizing China's Student-Spy Network." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 260-291.

"The nature and vulnerabilities of China's student-spy network present unique opportunities to improve cooperation between universities and security personnel, despite their long history of mutual suspicion."

Sibeck, Gary. "Chinese Corporate Espionage." American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 2 (2010): 66-71.

This article presents some of the leading cases brought against the Chinese before and after passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.

Wise, David. "China's Spies Are Catching Up." New York Times, 10 Dec. 2011. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"China's success in stealing American secrets will provide a continuing challenge to the spy catchers. And Washington's counterintelligence agents, accustomed to the comfortable parameters of the cold war and more recent battles against Al Qaeda, must rethink their priorities and shift their focus, resources and energy eastward to counter China's spies."

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