Noren, James. "CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Economy." In Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.
From "Introduction": The author "provides a first-hand account of the work the DI produced" during the Cold War. Noren's "paper chronicles an array of intelligence assessments of the Soviet economy and a record of significant achievements by CIA and the US Intelligence Community.... The accuracy of CIA's analysis of the Soviet economy ... has become the subject of substantial debate.... Noren's analysis buttresses the assessments of a number of other analysts who maintain that the Agency did as well as could be expected in anticipating the collapse of the Soviet economy in the early 1990s."
Perl, Matthew. "Comparing US and UK Intelligence Assessment in the Early Cold War: NSC-68, April 1950." Intelligence and Nationa; Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 119-154.
The author compares NSC-68 (April 1950) with JIC (51) 6 (January 1951). The American and British utilized "dissimilar assumptions and interpretive approaches" in their intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union. It was on the "subjective questions -- the 'mysteries' -- that US and UK analysts disagreed throughout the early years of the Cold War, America's view of Communist doctrine leading them to ascribe aggressive intentions to the USSR long before Britain was prepared to do so."
Pitzer, John S. "The
Tenability of the CIA Estimates of Soviet Economic Growth: A Comment."
Journal of Comparative Economics 14 (1990): 301- 319.
Powers, Thomas. "Soviet Intentions and Capabilities." The Atlantic, Apr. 1982. Chapter 15 in Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 235-242. Rev. & exp. ed. New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.
Using John Prados' The Soviet Estimate (1982), Powers discusses issues surrounding intelligence analysis.
Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982.
Although he believes that some of the author's assertions and even his general treatment of the material can be questioned, Pforzheimer still accepts Prados' treatment as "a timely, relevant, and informative book. Unfortunately, it must be read with some caution because of some errors of fact."
Lowenthal notes that the book is based solely on open sources. Nevertheless, it is "a useful history and analysis of the estimative process."
For Powers, The Atlantic (Apr. 1982) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 235-242, this is a "fine history" that "is certain to become a standard work in the field.... Intelligence professionals will consult [t]his book to find out what's in the public domain and what's still secret.... [O]rdinary readers ... will find it too hard, too dense, too filled with numbers, tables, and acronyms, too dull, too obsessive in its attempt to gather in one place every fact and echo of contention in the strategic intelligence business.... Prados's excellent bibliography, the most comprehensive I have seen, lists hundreds of items."
Price, Victoria S.
The DCI's Role in Producing Strategic Intelligence Estimates. Newport, RI: Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, 1980.
Lowenthal finds this to be "an extremely useful analysis of the roles played by successive DCIs (through DCI Turner) on strategic estimates of the Soviet Union."
Riemann, Robert H.
"The Challenge of Glasnost for Western Intelligence." Parameters
20, no. 4 (1990): 85-94. [Petersen]
Rosefielde, Stephen.
False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982.
Rubenstein, Henry.
"DC Power and Cooling Towers." Studies in Intelligence
16, no. 3 (Fall 1972): 81-86. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified
Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 3-7. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
This article concerns the analytical work surrounding an effort to project the number of thermonuclear weapons available to the Soviets after they concluded atmospheric nuclear testing in 1962 and signed the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
Rush, Myron. "A Neglected Source of Evidence." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 117-125.
The author discusses Soviet "esoteric communications": that is, hidden messages in "published texts whose surface meaning does not reveal their political significance.... Western observers underestimate the refinement and subtlety of Soviet esoteric communications."
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