ANALYSIS

Analysis on the Soviet Union

L - M

Lee, William Thomas.

1. The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures for 1955-1975: An Unconventional Approach. New York: Praeger, 1977.

DIA critic of CIA estimates, who argues that the Soviet defense budget and the defense share of GNP were larger than figures claimed by CIA.

2. Understanding the Soviet Military Threat. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977.

Compare to Lee, The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures..., above.

3. CIA Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures: Errors and Waste. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1995.

The author continues the argument advanced in his Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures for 1955-1975 (above).

Lexow, Wilton E., and Julian Hopyman. "The Enigma of Soviet BW." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 15-20.

"A dearth of information continues to keep open the Soviet germ warfare intelligence gap."

Lindgren, David T. Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

For Seamon, Proceedings, Nov. 2000, "[t]he steady development and improvement of aerial intelligence gathering is spelled out here in admirable detail.... Lindgren ... also recalls U.S. politics and diplomacy of the Cold War years and the impact made on policy by imagery analysis. In the absence of most of the parochial bickering among the military services that marred intelligence gathering in World War II, analysts working under civilian control 'provided a series of American presidents with the strategic intelligence they required.'"

Peake, Studies 48.1, notes that author "makes clear he does not agree with th[e] decision," made under DCI John Deutch, to remove CIA from its role in the U.S. satellite programs.

Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "Chasing Bitterfeld Calcium." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 21-30.

Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "The Decryption of a Picture." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 41-53.

"Puzzling out the power supply to Urals atom plants."

Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "On the Soviet Nuclear Scent." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 4 (Fall 1967): 13-29. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000, 53-69.

"Traces of the borrowed German scientists combine with other scraps of information to throw light on the USSR's early atomic program."

Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "Ravelling Russia's Reactors." Studies in Intelligence 16, no. 3 (Fall 1972): 65-79.

Westerfield: "Multidisciplinary intelligence analysis in the late 1950s of how a major nuclear production facility in central Siberia worked."

Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "Somewhere in Siberia." Studies in Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 35-51.

This article describes a late-1950s effort to understand the Soviet atomic weapons program.

Lundberg, Kirsten. The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as Political Football. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989.

Lundberg, Kirsten, ed. The CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of "Getting it Right." Case Study C16-94-1251.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.

Includes a number of CIA documents covering this period.

MacEachin, Douglas J. CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges -- An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.

"[C]harges that CIA did not see and report the economic decline, societal deterioration, and political destabilization that ultimately resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union are contradicted by the record." The monograph includes excerpts from various CIA presentations from June 1977 to May 1991 to make the point.

Marchio, James D. "Will They Fight? US Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–89." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 4 (2007): 13-27.

This article is the author's "reconstruction of the story of the US Intelligence Community's (IC) efforts to address one of the central analytical questions of the Cold War -- whether and how well Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military forces would fight for their Soviet masters in the event of a conflict."

Return to Analysis Table of Contents