Lee, William Thomas.
1. The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures for 1955-1975: An Unconventional Approach. New York: Praeger, 1977.
DIA critic of CIA estimates, who argues that the Soviet defense budget and the defense share of GNP were larger than figures claimed by CIA.
2. Understanding the Soviet Military Threat. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977.
Compare to Lee, The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures..., above.
3. CIA Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures: Errors and Waste. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1995.
The author continues the argument advanced in his Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures for 1955-1975 (above).
Lexow, Wilton E., and Julian Hopyman. "The Enigma of Soviet BW." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 15-20.
"A dearth of information continues to keep open the Soviet germ warfare intelligence gap."
Lindgren, David T. Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
For Seamon, Proceedings 126.11 (Nov. 2000), "[t]he steady development and improvement of aerial intelligence gathering is spelled out here in admirable detail.... Lindgren ... also recalls U.S. politics and diplomacy of the Cold War years and the impact made on policy by imagery analysis. In the absence of most of the parochial bickering among the military services that marred intelligence gathering in World War II, analysts working under civilian control 'provided a series of American presidents with the strategic intelligence they required.'"
Peake, Studies 48.1, notes that author "makes clear he does not agree with th[e] decision," made under DCI John Deutch, to remove CIA from its role in the U.S. satellite programs.
Lowenhaupt, Henry S.
1. "Chasing Bitterfeld Calcium." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 21-30.
2. "The Decryption of a Picture." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 41-53.
"Puzzling out the power supply to Urals atom plants."
3. "On the Soviet Nuclear Scent." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 4 (Fall 1967): 13-29. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000, 53-69.
"Traces of the borrowed German scientists combine with other scraps of information to throw light on the USSR's early atomic program."
4. "Ravelling Russia's Reactors." Studies in Intelligence 16, no. 3 (Fall 1972): 65-79.
Westerfield: "Multidisciplinary intelligence analysis in the late 1950s of how a major nuclear production facility in central Siberia worked."
5. "Somewhere in Siberia." Studies in Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 35-51.
This article describes a late-1950s effort to understand the Soviet atomic weapons program.
Lundberg, Kirsten. The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as Political Football. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989.
Lundberg, Kirsten, ed. The CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of "Getting it Right." Case Study C16-94-1251.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.
Includes a number of CIA documents covering this period.
Haines, Gerald K., and Robert E. Leggett, eds. CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.
This volume includes both declassified documents and informed commentary.
Haines, Gerald K., and Robert E. Leggett, eds. Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.
The core of this volume consists of six papers from a conference at Princeton University on 9 and 10 March 2001, sponsored by Princeton's Center of International Studies and the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The papers were written by Donald P. Steury, James Noren, Douglas F. Garthoff, Clarence E. Smith, Raymond L. Garthoff, and Vladimir G. Treml. They include contemporaneous "Discussant Comments." The editors supply an "Introduction" and some "Concluding Observations." The speeches given at the conference by George J. Tenet, John E. McLaughlin, James R. Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski are included. .
Hofmann, Peter A. "The Making of National Estimates during the Period of the 'Missile Gap.'" Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 336-356.
The author looks at estimates of the Soviet ICBM force made by various NIEs between 1954 and 1963. "The early estimates (1954-55) were fairly cautious and predicted little or no capability.... [But] by 1960 (NIE 11-4-59) a pattern of serious overestimation began to form." Revisions downward began with NIE 11-8-61, issued on 7 June 1961; this trend was reinforced in NIE 11-8/1-61, issued on 21 September 1961. The author associates these revisions with material supplied by Oleg Penkovsky.
Holzman, Franlyn D. "The CIA's Military Spending Estimates: Deceit and Its Costs." Challenge, May-Jun. 1992, 28-39.
Karber, Philip A., and Jerald L. Combs. "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963." Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 399-429.
Kauppi, Mark V. "Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Motives." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1994): 603-632.
The author concludes that JIS 80 (January 1946) "is quite sophisticated and nuanced in that it considered a wide range of possible motivating factors for Soviet foreign policy. By late 1946, however, analysis of motivations in US intelligence documents was replaced by mere assertion and a preoccupation with near-term Soviet intentions." Kauppi attributes this change to the impact of George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of February 1946 and the March 1946 follow-up cable, because "Kennan's analysis essentially foreclosed any perceived need for US intelligence organizations to further assess Soviet foreign policy motivations."
Kennedy, David, ed. Sunshine and Shadow: The CIA and the Soviet Economy. Case Study C16-91-1096.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.
Because this case study was developed in a joint project between the CIA and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, there has been some unwillingness in academe to accept it for the excellent study it is.
Kent, Sherman. "A Crucial Estimate Relived." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 1-18.
Westerfield: "Kent's account of his greatest mistake: the prediction three weeks before the Cuban missile crisis that Moscow would be unlikely to station missiles in Cuba that could reach much of the United States."
Kerr, Richard. "CIA's Record Stands Up to Scrutiny." New York Times, 24 Oct. 1991, A4.
Kerr was Acting DCI at this time.
Klass, Philip J. "CIA Papers Reveal Spy Satellites' Role." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 16 Jan. 1995, 53, 55.
This article looks at what the 80 recently released National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and the discussion at the joint CIA-Harvard conference reveal about the state of U.S. knowledge of Soviet ICBM research and deployment in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Koch, Scott A., ed. CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993.
MacPherson, I&NS 11.2: There are 27 documents assembled here, culled from a larger collection still to be declassified. The reviewer concludes that "it can be inferred from the trends evident in these documents that BNE [Board of National Estimates] assembled its estimates without pandering to policymakers' preconceptions."
Kovner, Milton. "Pricing Soviet Military Exports." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 37-42.
The author reviews the various approaches to establishing the dollar value and components of Soviet military exports, "the ambiguities that the figures embody, and their residual significance and usefulness."
Kuhns, Woodrow J., ed. Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997.
Clark comment: This volume was released to the public at a conference, "Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years," held at CIA Headquarters on 24 October 1997. It contains 208 current intelligence documents that went to President Truman from the analytical components of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The earliest document, from the Weekly Summary, is dated 14 June 1946; the most recent, from the Daily Summary, is dated 17 November 1950.
The volume's editor has supplied a useful and interesting Preface in which he looks at some of the problems faced by the CIG/CIA analysts in the earliest days of U.S. "centralized" intelligence.
Frazier, I&NS 14.1, believes that "[h]istorians will probably be disappointed in examining the [intelligence] summaries pertinent to their special interests, finding them too fragmentary to offer anything new." But the editor's introductory essay is "a significant contribution to the study of an essential and difficult aspect of intelligence dissemination, that of providing an immediate briefing to the commander."
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