Raschke, Diana M. "Discretionary Time: An Approach to Encouraging Creativity in Intelligence Analysis." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 23-24. Raschke, Diana M. "Discretionary Time: An Approach to Encouraging Creativity in Intelligence Analysis." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 23-24.
The author argues for "providing analysts the time and incentive to pursue their own professional interests to create original analytical products."
Renfer, Marc A., and Henriette S. Haas. "Systematic Analysis in Counterterrorism: Messages on an Islamist Internet-Forum." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 314-336.
From "Introduction" by Urs Von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Intelligence Service (SAP): "While advanced methods of intelligence analysis, such as the described, cannot replace author identification, they are still useful for a preliminary evaluation of a given situation in order to determine which sites or individuals should be more closely observed or even investigated."
Rodgers, R. Scott. "Improving Analysis: Dealing with Information Processing Errors." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 622-641.
"All human beings make various errors of attribution and inference in their information processing. By extension analysts will tend to make the same errors. But, validated, objective measures and actuarial processes provide an avenue to improve the accuracy of decisions. Yet care must still be taken in their development, validation, selection, and interpretation."
Sands, Amy. "Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments." In Transforming U.S. Intelligence, eds Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber, 63-78. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005.
Scalingi, Paula L.
"Proliferation and Arms Control." Intelligence and National
Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 149-161.
"Because policy drives intelligence requirements, analysts whose 'accounts' focus on the proliferation threat or arms control support are facing an increasing array of challenges [footnote omitted] -- at a time when many countries are cutting defense and intelligence resources due to budgetary constraints."
Schreckengost, R. C. "Some Limitations in Systems Analysis in Intelligence Activities." Studies in Intelligence 14, no. 2 (Fall 1970): 79-86.
"[T]he multitudinous values generally required to explore fully the optimum allocation of resources among diverse intelligence tasks and responsibilities" are critical to the process but difficult to capture, "assuming that a suitable set of values even exists."
Schweitzer, Nicholas. "Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence: Some Focus on the Middle East." Studies in Intelligence 20, no. 2 (Summer 1976): 31-44. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/author-combine.htm]
"The article describes Bayesian analysis, using the Delphi (expert) technique and applying it to calculating the probabilities that a war will break out between Israel and Arab states within the next 30 days."
Segell, Glen M. "Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train Bombings, 2004." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 221-238.
The author looks at the use of (1) trends and patterns, (2) frequency, and (3) probability in antiterrorist intelligence analysis, with the 2004 Madrid train bombings serving as a case study.
Sharfman, Peter. "Intelligence
Analysis in an Age of Electronic Dissemination." Intelligence and
National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 201-211.
"Electronic dissemination will fundamentally change the relationship between the intelligence analyst and his or her customer...; moreover, in doing so electronic dissemination will bring significant changes in the ways in which intelligence analysts work."
Shelfer, Katherine M., and June M. Verner, "Improving Counterterrorism Analysis: Using Scenarios to Support the Development and Use of Integrated Information Systems." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 55-70.
The authors discuss "the need for the development of integrated civilian and military information systems, especially lessons-learned databases." They emphasize "the potential value of using scenarios to support better design and more effective use of such integrated databases."
Sofranac, Paul. "Data
Mining and Intelligence Outsourcing." Marine Corps Gazette,
Mar. 1999, 45-46.
"Automated intelligence gathering mechanisms, while impressive, should not replace the human element of intelligence analysis."
Solin, Gail. "The Art of China Watching." Studies in Intelligence 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 23-33
The focus here is on the state of the art of China watching. It deals with the problems that China analysts face; with the analysts' available tools, techniques, and assets; and with the confidence level the analysts may have in their product.
Swenson, Russell G., ed. Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003.
Theodorou, Jerry. "Political Risk Reconsidered." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 147-171.
Definition: "[P]olitical risk analysis [is] an assessment of prospects for unanticipated changes in the disposition of business enterprise abroad arising from politically-induced or politically-related sources."
Turner, Michael A.
"Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996):
313-327.
"In reality, agenda-setting in U.S. intelligence is an interactive bargaining process among three environments: the policy, the bureaucratic process, analyst/collector environments."
U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency. The Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence
Community Analysis. Washington, DC: 2001. [https://www.cia.gov]
U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Analysis: Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century (Strategic Plan). Washington, DC: Aug. 1996.
This is primarily glossy boilerplate in a style that probably came over from the Pentagon with DCI Deutch. The inside cover has the latest DI wiring diagram.
U.S. Congress. Senate.
Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Analysis and the Oil Issue, 1973-1974. Committee Print. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977. [Petersen]
Warren, Ward. "Analysis of Analyses." Periscope 26, no.1 (2004): 3-4.
Warren makes an important point in this "opinion" piece: In the plethora of analysis shops in the U.S. Intelligence Community, "[i]t is only the CIA that has no constituency. It was established to avoid the natural tendency of other analytical fora to present unconsciously (consciously in some cases) a view skewed by the institution."
Watanabe, Frank. "How to Succeed in the DI: Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts." Studies in Intelligence (1997): 45-47. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/axioms.html]
The author has "tried to codify general rules that guide what we in the DI do on a daily basis, and ... would not presume to invent new tradecraft. But the new DI analyst, and more than a few old hands, would be well served by remembering these 15 principles in their everyday conduct, as I suspect that many will never be adopted officially."
Wheaton, Kristan J.
"Analysis in Crisis Prevention." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 223-233.
The author analyses the Greece-Turkey situation in 1994 using defined analytic phases.
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