ANALYSIS

Generally

O - Q

O'Brien, Kevin A. "Managing Information Overload." Jane's Intelligence Review 12, no. 3 (Mar. 2000): 50-55.

Odom, William E. "Intelligence Analysis." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 316-332.

According to the author, this essay seeks "to help both students of intelligence and practitioners appreciate how broad the subject of intelligence analysis is, how dynamic it has become with the influx of new technology, and how misleading it can be to use the term without being specific about what kind of analysis, for what use, and where it is done."

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis." Intelligence Community Directive Number 200 [ICD 200]. Washington, DC: 8 Jan. 2007. [http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-200.pdf]

This directive "establishes the policy framework for the management of national intelligence analysis and the analytic community" by the DNI. "It also delineates the authorities and responsibilites of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDNI/A)."

Omestad, Thomas. "Psychology and the CIA: Leaders on the Couch." Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 104-122.

The article focuses first is on the work of and the methods of psychological profiling developed and practiced by Jerrold Post before and after he left the CIA in 1986. It notes that academic political psychologists have moved away from Post's "clinically based psychodynamic orientation" and toward more quantitative-based techniques. "The hottest topic in the field is 'psycholinguistics,' in which oral and written rhetoric is scrutinized in an effort to map out the mind of a leader." In general, officials at the operational level are more skeptical of psychological profiling than are the higher ranks in government. The author also raises the problem of factual errors in the leader biographies, which transcend methodological issues. This problem was reflected in the Aristide profile.

Pechan, Bruce L. "The Collector's Role in Evaluation." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): 37-47. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 99-107. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1995.

The field collector is already performing, for his own purposes, a number of evaluative activities, and should be a part of the process of producing an in-depth or definitive Evaluation (with a capital "E") of the significance of the information collected.

Petersen, Martin. "The Challenge for the Political Analyst: Advice from a DI Careerist." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 51-56.

"Policymakers are political animals," and this "make[s] the credibility hurdle higher for political, leadership, and country analysts." It is the job of the political analyst "to put the political behavior that policymakers see into a larger cultural and historical context -- that they do not see -- with enough sophistication to demonstrate that the context matters."

Petersen, Martin. "Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product: Making the Analytic Review Process Work." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 55-61.

"The problem with the review process is not the layers of review but rather the quality of the review... My 30-plus years of experience leads me to conclude that there should be three levels of review and three broad areas of review for each piece of finished intelligence."

Pincus, Walter. "CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses: Analysts to Receive Details About Sources." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to officials on 11 February 2004, "[t]he CIA is making changes in how it handles intelligence after identifying specific problems in its disputed prewar assessment that Iraq's Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction." DCI George J. Tenet "has ordered an end to the long-standing practice of withholding from analysts details about the clandestine agents who provide the information that analysts must evaluate."

In a speech on 11 February 2004 to the agency's analysts, DDI Jami A. Miscik said that "[t]he changes were ordered after an internal CIA review revealed several occasions when CIA analysts mistakenly believed that Iraq weapons data had been confirmed by multiple sources, when in fact it had come from a single source.... 'Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the source's access to the information on which they are reporting,' Miscik said, according to a text of her speech given to The Post."

Pincus, Walter. "New Law to Spread the Use Of CIA's Analysis Approach." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The "intelligence reform act requires several key CIA analysis practices to be enforced throughout the entire intelligence community." For example, the national intelligence director "must pick an 'individual or entity' to be responsible for ensuring that 'elements of the intelligence community conduct alternative analysis of the information and conclusions in intelligence products.'...

"Another CIA practice being spread to the entire community is to have a quality control office or officer make sure that analyses conform to high standards." The law also requires the intelligence director "to appoint an individual [within the director's office] who would provide" the function of the CIA's "ombudsman to whom analysts and others can raise concerns about problems that do not require a full investigation" by the inspector general.

Platt, Washington [BGEN/USA]. Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles. New York: Praeger, 1957.

Pforzheimer: "Platt describes working level performance from the perspective of the analyst.... Difficult reading at times, but of value because of the few books on the subject."

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