Johnson, Loch K. "Analysis
for a New Age." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4
(Oct. 1996): 657-671. Johnson, Loch K. "Analysis
for a New Age." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4
(Oct. 1996): 657-671.
Working from his base on the staff of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (the "Aspin-Brown Commission"), Johnson reviews the state of U.S. intelligence analysis and offers his thoughts on how it might be made better. He argues that intelligence analysis must be "consumer-driven"; that is, analysts "must design the intelligence product to suit the informational -- though certainly not the political -- needs of the consumer." He also urges more attention to "marketing" of its product on the part of the Intelligence Community.
Johnson, Loch K. "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 333-370.
The following are a few of the salient observations in this article: "The PDB is more than a document; it is a process, allowing intelligence officers to interact with decision-makers and provide useful supportive information.... Even if NIEs are less than perfect instruments for predicting future events, they at least have the virtue of marshaling together in one place a reliable set of facts about a situation abroad of interest to the United States.... Regarding the value of PDBs and NIEs, the verdict is clear: they contribute. Improvements are necessary, though." (footnote omitted)
Johnson, William R.
1. "Clandestinity and Current Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 15-69. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 118-184. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
Clark comment: The argument that "the production of current intelligence and the conduct of espionage are incompatible" cannot be better made. Whether you agree or disagree with Johnson's thesis, it is necessary to either remake or refute the points he makes.
In essence, Johnson looks at "the effect of anti-clandestine or semi-clandestine or non-clandestine collection for production in volume on the ability of the Clandestine Service to conduct espionage for strategic coverage" and finds that effect to be totally negative. This article should be mandatory reading for anyone seriously interested in "reforming" American intelligence.
2. "The Elephants and the Gorillas." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 42- 56.
Clark comment: This is a succinct rendition of the conclusions reached in Johnson's classic article in Studies in Intelligence, "Clandestinity and Current Intelligence" (see above). He argues that "production of current intelligence and the conduct of espionage ... are not compatible and should not be conducted by the same organization."
Katz, Ytzhak, and Ygal
Vardi. "Strategies for Data Gathering and Evaluation in the Intelligence
Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 313-328.
Kauppi, Mark V. "Counterterrorism Analysis 101." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 39-53.
Expectations with regard to performance and accountability "should be based on a realistic appraisal of the challenges faced by counterterrorism analysts who on a daily basis deal with amorphous and fragmentary information."
Kees, Terry. "Advanced
Information Processing and Analysis." American Intelligence Journal
13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 53-58.
The author is Deputy Director, Office of Research and Development, CIA.
Kent, Sherman. "Death of a Hypothesis." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 21-24.
"[T]he destruction of an interesting hypothesis is often as important a part of our trade as its confirmation."
Kerr,
Richard. "CIA's Record Stands Up to Scrutiny." New York Times,
24 Oct. 1991, A4.
Kerr was Acting DCI at this time.
Knapp, Frank A., Jr. "Styles and Stereotypes in Intelligence Studies." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964): A1-A5.
The author argues against extreme uniformity of style and cliched language in intelligence products.
Lacey, Edward J.
1. "Game Theory in Intelligence Analysis." American Intelligence Journal 6, no. 3 (Oct. 1984): 20-25.
2. "Intel Analysis in Academic Research." American Intelligence Journal 5, no. 1 (Feb. 1983): 12-13.
Lamanna, Lawrence J. "Documenting the Differences Between American and British Intelligence Reports." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 602-628. Also, in Strategic Intelligence, 5 vols, ed. Loch K. Johnson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
A comparison of released British and American documents relating to the prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction "reveals significant differences between British and American approaches to intelligence concepts, structures, methods, purposes, and philosophies."
Lamberson, Eric L.
"The Tactical Analysis Team." Military Intelligence 21,
no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1995): 12-17.
This article looks at the use by U.S. Southern Command of Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) for intelligence support to counterdrug operations. The focus is on analytical support to operational teams.
Lanir, Zvi, and Daniel Kahneman. "Speaking to Policymakers: An Experiment in Decision Analysis in Israel in 1975." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 4 (2006): 11-19.
The authors revisit a study done for Israeli Foreign Minister Yigael Alon in 1975.
Lefebvre, Stéphane. "A Look at Intelligence Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 231-264.
The author discusses some of the views as to what intelligence analysis is and should be, and touches on some of the "many proposals floating around to improve the analytic performance of the intelligence community."
Lowenthal, Mark M. "Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How Right, How Often on Which Issues?" Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 303-315.
The author suggests that there is a need for "a recalibrating of expectations or ... a lowering of expectations of what intelligence can do.... [This] means accepting the fallibility of intelligence and -- when considering the terrorists' war against us -- the fact that we will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is difficult."
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