Gardiner, L. Keith.
"Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects." Studies in
Intelligence 33, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 1-9. In Inside CIA's Private
World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992,
ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 344-356. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1995. Also published as, "Squaring the Circle: Dealing with Intelligence-Policy
Breakdowns." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan.
1991): 141-153.
This article really should be titled, "Dealing with Intelligence Analyst-Policymaker Disconnects." The differences in the personality types of policymakers and analysts are certainly not "scientifically" proven, but they still appear to be quite real. If that is true, then, divergencies between the goal-needs of each group can be shown. The author offers some thoughts on bridging the gap.
Garthoff, Raymond L.
Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1984.
Gates, Robert M. "The
CIA and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987-1988): 215-30.
Gates describes broadly the role of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process. He also addresses some of the issues with regard to "politicized" intelligence.
Gates, Robert M. "Is
the CIA's Analysis Any Good?" Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1984,
A25.
George, Roger Z. "Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no.3 (Fall 2004): 385-404.
"Knowing when a mind-set is becoming obsolete and in need of revision can test the mettle of the best expert.... Alternative Analysis (AA) seeks to impose an explicit self-review by using specific techniques to reveal unconscious analytical assumptions or challenge weak evidence or logic, and consider alternative hypotheses or outcomes, even in the absence of convincing evidence."
Goodman, Allan E. "Shifting Paradigms and Shifting Gears: A Perspective on Why There Is No Post-Cold War Intelligence Agenda." Intelligence and National Security
10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 3-9.
Goodman argues that analysts "need more direct exposure to the national security decision-making process. They need to see how the process actually works and how the policy makers use their products."
Gravalos, Mary Evans O'Keefe. "The Pitfall of a Latin Quirk." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 4 (Fall 1963): 31-32.
"The Latin tendency to express the most nebulous of ideas in an extremely positive fashion and describe dreams as if they were reality makes it difficult for the analyst ... to assess an unexpected report."
Hall, Arthur. B. "Landscape Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 65-75.
"The earth-related view is [the landscape analyst's] unique contribution to intelligence analysis."
Hanig, Rachel K., and Mark E. Henshaw. "Needed: A National Security Simulation Center." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 11-18.
"The authors argue that creation of a National Security Simulations Center would strengthen the accuracy and insight of intelligence analysis, improve IC collaboration, and create a testing ground for new analytic tools and methods."
Hanson, Steven M. "Results
of an Experiment Comparing the Spatial Ability of Imagery Analysts and Non-Imagery
Analysts." Defense Intelligence Journal 8, no. 1 (Summer 1999):
120-134.
The experiment used "the Minnesota Spatial Relations Test (MSRT) to compare the visuospatial ability of imagery analysts to a control group.... The MSRT demonstrates that imagery analyst spatial accuracy is much higher than that of non-imagery analysts.... [T]his study does not address the reasons for this enhanced performance."
Harris, Shane. "Intelligence Veteran Aims to Motivate Young Analysts." GovernmentExecutive.com, 24 Sep. 2007. [http://www.govexec.com]
Mike Wertheimer, assistant deputy director of national intelligence for analytic transformation and technology, has the task of transforming "the massive intelligence bureaucracy into a collaborative network." A key element "is a suite of new information-sharing and collaborative technologies that look and feel a lot like ... the networking and search tools that younger analysts grew up using." Wertheimer "and his bosses are betting that collaboration is the way to fix what's broken with intelligence."
Hastedt, Glenn. "Intelligence
and U.S. Foreign Policy: How to Measure Success?" International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 1 (Spring 1991):
49-62.
How do you assess the value of intelligence analysis? Hastedt plays around with several measures, and concludes that accuracy alone is not a sufficient basis for evaluation.
Haus, Lance. "The
Predicament of the Terrorism Analyst." Studies in Intelligence
29, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 13-23.
Hendrickson, Noel. "Critical Thinking in Intelligence Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 679-693.
The author offers what he describes as "an ambitious new definition of critical thinking designed specifically to address the unique challenges of intelligence analysis."
Hess, James [CW3/USA], and Curtis R. Friedel. "Applying Critical Thinking to Intelligence Analysis." American Intelligence Journal 26, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 31-44.
This article presents "Facione's (1990) critical thinking skills and how they may be applied to the processes used for intelligence analysis."
Herbert, Matthew. "The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 666-684.
"Intelligence analysis is about coping with epistemic complexity. Its core imperative is to develop a clear estimate of the sum of knowledge derived from partial, multivariate information, and to balance that estimate against a postulate of what ought, in ideal circumstances, to be known in order to support a rational decision."
Hubbard, Robert L. "Another Response to Terrorism: Reconstituting Intelligence Analysis for 21st Century Requirements." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 71-80.
The Intelligence Community needs to "return to requirements-based resourcing and develop realistic force level planning and acquisition based on the requirements that are being laid upon it."
Hunter, Helen-Louise. "Zanzibar Revisited." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 1-7.
An after-the-fact "reconstruction of the events of the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964 shows particularly well the usefulness of going back for an unhurried reexamination of a crisis after all the returns are in: it reaches conclusions about both events and causes quite different from what was generally believed at the time." (footnote omitted)
Ignatius, David. "The CIA's Dissidents." Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The author comments on a CIA-sponsored conference in Rome, which he attended as an invited journalist. The conference, "New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis," was arranged by a small CIA group called the Global Futures Partnership. The members of the group "see their role as in-house dissidents and agents of change, and the very fact that they are in business suggests that top CIA officials know they have a problem and want to fix it."
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