Abbott, Sebastian. "The Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Analysis: Will It Make Us More or Less Safe?" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Sep. 2007): 12-15. Abbott, Sebastian. "The Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Analysis: Will It Make Us More or Less Safe?" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Sep. 2007): 12-15.
Although the author does not really answer the question raised in his title, he has produced an interesting look at the current tidal wave of outsourcing activities previously reserved mostly for government workers. Abbott suggests that "the intelligence community itself is divided about outsourcing intelligence analysis. There are disputes over everything from cost to quality."
Ackerman, Gary, Molly James, and Casey T. Getz. "The Application of Social Bookmarking to the National Intelligence Domain." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 678-698.
This article discusses "the development of a software tool [tag|Connect] ... designed to enhance the creation of collective knowledge spaces within the Intelligence Community (IC)."
Agrell, Wilhelm. "When Everything Is Intelligence - Nothing Is Intelligence." Occasional Papers 1, no. 4. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Oct. 2002. [https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no4.htm]
"[T]he rapid development of the concept and profession of intelligence analysis ... is facing serious problems and hazards. One of my concerns is the far too broad application of the concept of intelligence.... [I]ntelligence has become regarded as a key element not only in business but virtually in all fields of public and private affairs.... The problem is ... in the application of intelligence analysis in fields where its specific virtues are not adequate, not actually needed, or even might become counter-productive."
Anderson, Dwayne S. "What Makes a Good Intelligence Analyst?" Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 74-75.
A former analyst looks at the question he asks in the title. Brief and representing informed opinion, this is well worth a read.
Andre, Louis E. "Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based Future." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): 33-45.
The author is DIA Research Director for Intelligence Production. He states that to be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps."
Armstrong, Fulton T. "Ways to Make Analysis Relevant but Not Prescriptive." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 37-43.
The job of the intelligence analyst "is to remain outside the policy and political process, not to be ignorant of it."
Barry, James A., Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan. "Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 1-8.
This article documents "a clear trend toward an increasingly close relationship between intelligence and policy." While there is broad support for the new trend, "there also is continuing validity in the traditional" view that intelligence should be kept "at arm's length from policy."
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Learning to Break the Rules." New York Times, 19 Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"President Bush made special mention of our intelligence analysts in his address after the capture" of Saddam Hussein. In large part, the mission was successful "because analysts were allowed to ignore many long-held beliefs about how intelligence is 'supposed' to work.... Everyone involved in finding Saddam Hussein should pay close attention to the changes in strategy that allowed the achievement -- such practices should be the routine, not the exception."
Betts, Richard K. "Intelligence
for Policymaking." Washington Quarterly 3, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 118-129
Betts, Richard K. "Policymakers
and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate or Indifference?" Intelligence
and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 184-189.
Borum, Randy, et al. "The Role of Operational Research in Counterterrorism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 420-434.
"Research analyses of past plans, operations, and attacks can assist" in the effort to meet the terrorism threat with a response that is intelligence-driven and uses information effectively, "but only if the studies are planned and conducted with an emphasis on operational relevance."
Bovey, Robert.
1. "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis." American Intelligence Journal (Winter 1980-1981): 6-11.
2. "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis." Analytical Methods Review, Feb. 1980, 1-16. [Petersen]
Bowie, Robert. "Analysis
of Our Policy Machine." New York Times Magazine, 9 Mar. 1958,
16, 68-71. [Petersen]
Brei, William S. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure. Occasional Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1996.
Burris, William C.
"The Uses of History in Intelligence Analysis." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993):
297-301.
See William Hood's negative response in "Reader's Forum," IJI&C 6.4.
Caldwell, George. Policy Analysis for Intelligence. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.
Carey, Warren, and
Myles Maxfield. "Intelligence Implications of Disease." Studies
in Intelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 71-78.
Westerfield: "How to track internationally communicable and dangerous diseases spreading in 'denied areas' countries."
Charters, David A.,
A. Stuart Farson, and Glenn P. Hastedt, eds.
1. "Special Issue on Intelligence Analysis and Assessment." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): Entire edition.
The individual articles from this special issue are listed in this bibliography under their authors.
2. Intelligence Analysis and Assessment. London: Frank Cass, 1996.
This book was first published as a special issue of the journal Intelligence and National Security, vol 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995) (see above).
Clark, Robert M. Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004.
For Wirtz, IJI&C 18.4 (Winter 2005-2006), the author "has written a wonderfully concise handbook for intelligence analysts." This work is "not for the novice," but "is of great interest to scholars because it describes both the strengths and limitations of the wide variety of analytic techniques used to understand and predict social, military, and political phenomena."
Kramer, AIJ 25.1 (Summer 2007), finds that in the second edition "[s]ome chapters have been rewritten"; "[t]here are also several new sections [and] chapters"; and "[t]he concluding chapter ... is also new." To Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this work "is a fine treatment of contemporary analytic tradecraft that makes clear why the analyst has one of the toughest jobs in the profession."
Clark, Robert M. "Scientific
and Technical Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence
19, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 39-48. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified
Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford
Westerfield, 293-304. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
Modern S&T intelligence began when R.V. Jones was assigned to the Intelligence Branch of the British Air Staff. It was also Jones who laid down "the cardinal principle of scientific intelligence": that is Occam's Razor -- "Use the least number of hypotheses to explain your observations." The author offers some further maxims for S&T intelligence: "Suspect all crusaders," "experts can be wrong," "never trust a contractor," and "look at the whole picture."
Cline, Ray S. "Intelligence: The Problem of Accurate Assessment." In Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security, ed. William W. Whitson. New York: Praeger, 1976. [Petersen]
Cline, Ray S. "Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?" Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 11-18.
In the intelligence community, it "has not been the operational conduct of business or the anaytical procedures followed by the intelligence agencies" that have been coordinated tirelessly, "but purely their verbal product in the form of written reports and estimates."
Cohen, David. The CIA's Evolving Analytical Program. Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series, Monograph No. 12. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.
Collier, Michael W. "A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 2 (2005): 17-35.
The author argues that "intelligence analysis is first and foremost a science," but hastens to add that there is a "need for analysts to use creativity, imagination, and innovation in their work." He "suggests that the research problem or question should determine which analytic methods are used."
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