Andre, Louis E. "Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based Future." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): 33-45.
The author is DIA Research Director for Intelligence Production. He states that to be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps."
Barry, James A., Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan. "Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 1-8.
This article documents "a clear trend toward an increasingly close relationship between intelligence and policy." While there is broad support for the new trend, "there also is continuing validity in the traditional" view that intelligence should be kept "at arm's length from policy."
Brei, William S. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure. Occasional Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1996.
Burris, William C. "The Uses of History in Intelligence Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 297-301.
See William Hood's negative response in "Reader's Forum," IJI&C 6.4.
Caldwell, George. Policy Analysis for Intelligence. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.
Charters, David A., A. Stuart Farson, and Glenn P. Hastedt, eds.
1. "Special Issue on Intelligence Analysis and Assessment." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): Entire edition.
The individual articles from this special issue are listed in this bibliography under their authors.
2. Intelligence Analysis and Assessment. London: Frank Cass, 1996.
This book was first published as a special issue of the journal Intelligence and National Security, vol 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995) (see above).
Cohen, David. The CIA's Evolving Analytical Program. Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series, Monograph No. 12. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.
Defense Intelligence Journal. "Intelligence Analysis." 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): Entire edition.
1. John E. McLaughlin [CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence], "New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis," pp. 11-21.
Changes in the world around us and in the expectations of consumers "add up to a fundamental shift in the analytical priorities for CIA and others in the [Intelligence] Community.... Tapping into analytic expertise across the Community and coordinating on collection activity will be essential to overcome budget and personnel constraints."
2. William R. Grundmann [DIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Production], "Reshaping the Intelligence Production Landscape," pp. 23-33.
The "viability of the Intelligence Community will depend on the seamless integration of the separate intelligence organizations and the functional elements within those organizations." One problem area is that "[w]e are, increasingly, upping the pace of current intelligence production and allotting the commensurate level of analytic manpower to meet the requirements of continuous contingencies and crises. At the same time, we have incurred significant reductions in analytic resources as a result of funding cuts over the last five years."
3. Louis E. Andre [DIA Research Director for Intelligence Production], "Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based Future," pp. 33-45.
To be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps."
4. Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, "On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst," pp. 47-59.
The authors seek to describe the "set of talents, skills and personal characteristics required of the successful all-source intelligence analyst."
5. Robert D. Gourley, "Intuitive Intelligence," pp. 61-75.
In times of crisis, analysts "are expected to do what they have been taught their whole career to avoid; they must make rapid assessments of enemy intentions and well developed projections based on intuition." The author makes some suggestions on how analysts might be better prepared to respond to requirements for instananeous assessments.
Doran, Charles. "Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics." International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (1999): 11-41.
Goodman, Allan E. "Shifting Paradigms and Shifting Gears: A Perspective on Why There Is No Post-Cold War Intelligence Agenda." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 3-9.
Goodman argues that analysts "need more direct exposure to the national security decision-making process. They need to see how the process actually works and how the policy makers use their products."
Hanson, Steven M. "Results of an Experiment Comparing the Spatial Ability of Imagery Analysts and Non-Imagery Analysts." Defense Intelligence Journal 8, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 120-134.
The experiment used "the Minnesota Spatial Relations Test (MSRT) to compare the visuospatial ability of imagery analysts to a control group.... The MSRT demonstrates that imagery analyst spatial accuracy is much higher than that of non-imagery analysts.... [T]his study does not address the reasons for this enhanced performance."
Lamberson, Eric L. "The Tactical Analysis Team." Military Intelligence 21, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1995): 12-17.
This article looks at the use by U.S. Southern Command of Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) for intelligence support to counterdrug operations. The focus is on analytical support to operational teams.
Marshall, Mark G. Round Peg, Square Holes: The Nature of Imagery Analysis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1997.
McDowell, Don. Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practicioners, Managers and Users. Cooma, NSW, Australia: Istana Enterprises, 1998. Rev. ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009.
Swenson, IJI&C 16.1/130/fn55, calls this "the definitive source for ideas about how to bring 'police intelligence' to the level of strategic intelligence." Oleson, Studies 53.3 (Sep. 2009), says that the author "provides an interesting, non-American perspective on the doctrine of doing strategic analysis." Along the way, "McDowell offers sage advice to analysts and managers of analysts alike."
Omestad, Thomas. "Psychology and the CIA: Leaders on the Couch." Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 104-122.
The article focuses first is on the work of and the methods of psychological profiling developed and practiced by Jerrold Post before and after he left the CIA in 1986. It notes that academic political psychologists have moved away from Post's "clinically based psychodynamic orientation" and toward more quantitative-based techniques. "The hottest topic in the field is 'psycholinguistics,' in which oral and written rhetoric is scrutinized in an effort to map out the mind of a leader." In general, officials at the operational level are more skeptical of psychological profiling than are the higher ranks in government. The author also raises the problem of factual errors in the leader biographies, which transcend methodological issues. This problem was reflected in the Aristide profile.
Scalingi, Paula L. "Proliferation and Arms Control." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 149-161.
"Because policy drives intelligence requirements, analysts whose 'accounts' focus on the proliferation threat or arms control support are facing an increasing array of challenges [footnote omitted] -- at a time when many countries are cutting defense and intelligence resources due to budgetary constraints."
Sharfman, Peter. "Intelligence Analysis in an Age of Electronic Dissemination." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 201-211.
"Electronic dissemination will fundamentally change the relationship between the intelligence analyst and his or her customer...; moreover, in doing so electronic dissemination will bring significant changes in the ways in which intelligence analysts work."
Sofranac, Paul. "Data Mining and Intelligence Outsourcing." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar. 1999, 45-46.
"Automated intelligence gathering mechanisms, while impressive, should not replace the human element of intelligence analysis."
Theodorou, Jerry. "Political Risk Reconsidered." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 147-171.
Definition: "[P]olitical risk analysis [is] an assessment of prospects for unanticipated changes in the disposition of business enterprise abroad arising from politically-induced or politically-related sources."
Turner, Michael A. "Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 313-327.
"In reality, agenda-setting in U.S. intelligence is an interactive bargaining process among three environments: the policy, the bureaucratic process, analyst/collector environments."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Analysis: Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century (Strategic Plan). Washington, DC: Aug. 1996.
This is primarily glossy boilerplate in a style that probably came over from the Pentagon with DCI Deutch. The inside cover has the (then) latest DI wiring diagram.
Watanabe, Frank. "How to Succeed in the DI: Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts." Studies in Intelligence (1997): 45-47. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/axioms.html]
The author has "tried to codify general rules that guide what we in the DI do on a daily basis, and ... would not presume to invent new tradecraft. But the new DI analyst, and more than a few old hands, would be well served by remembering these 15 principles in their everyday conduct, as I suspect that many will never be adopted officially."
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