Betts, Richard K.
1. "Intelligence for Policymaking." Washington Quarterly 3, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 118-129
2. "Policymakers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate or Indifference?" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 184-189.
1. "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis." American Intelligence Journal (Winter 1980-1981): 6-11.
2. "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis." Analytical Methods Review, Feb. 1980, 1-16. [Petersen]
Bowie, Robert. "Analysis of Our Policy Machine." New York Times Magazine, 9 Mar. 1958, 16, 68-71. [Petersen]
Carey, Warren, and Myles Maxfield. "Intelligence Implications of Disease." Studies in Intelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 71-78.
Westerfield: "How to track internationally communicable and dangerous diseases spreading in 'denied areas' countries."
Clark, Robert M. "Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 39-48. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 293-304. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
Modern S&T intelligence began when R.V. Jones was assigned to the Intelligence Branch of the British Air Staff. It was also Jones who laid down "the cardinal principle of scientific intelligence": that is Occam's Razor -- "Use the least number of hypotheses to explain your observations." The author offers some further maxims for S&T intelligence: "Suspect all crusaders," "experts can be wrong," "never trust a contractor," and "look at the whole picture."
Cline, Ray S.
1. "Intelligence: The Problem of Accurate Assessment." In Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security, ed. William W. Whitson. New York: Praeger, 1976. [Petersen]
2. "Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?" Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 11-18.
In the intelligence community, it "has not been the operational conduct of business or the anaytical procedures followed by the intelligence agencies" that have been coordinated tirelessly, "but purely their verbal product in the form of written reports and estimates."
Drell, Bernard. "Intelligence Research -- Some Suggested Approaches." Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 79-95.
The object of "intelligence research is not encyclopedic information; it must be limited to information that answers questions of intelligence interest.... [N]o one method is appropriate to all kinds of intelligence research. Techniques and methods must be adapted to the problem, its scope, its urgency, and to the nature of the evidence."
Dunleigh, Lowell M. "Spy at Your Service, Sir." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 2 (Spring 1959): 81-93.
The author surveys the mutuality of the relationship between analyst and collector.
Ford, Harold P. "Piety and Wit: The Bad Effects of Covert CIA Activity." America, 11 Jan. 1975, 10-11. [Petersen]
Gardiner, L. Keith. "Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects." Studies in Intelligence 33, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 1-9. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 344-356. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. Also published as, "Squaring the Circle: Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Breakdowns." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 141-153.
This article really should be titled, "Dealing with Intelligence Analyst-Policymaker Disconnects." The differences in the personality types of policymakers and analysts are certainly not "scientifically" proven, but they still appear to be quite real. If that is true, then, divergencies between the goal-needs of each group can be shown. The author offers some thoughts on bridging the gap.
Garthoff, Raymond L. Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1984.
Gates, Robert M.
1. "The CIA and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987-1988): 215-30.
Gates describes broadly the role of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process. He also addresses some of the issues with regard to "politicized" intelligence.
2. "Is the CIA's Analysis Any Good?" Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1984, A25.
Gravalos, Mary Evans O'Keefe. "The Pitfall of a Latin Quirk." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 4 (Fall 1963): 31-32.
"The Latin tendency to express the most nebulous of ideas in an extremely positive fashion and describe dreams as if they were reality makes it difficult for the analyst ... to assess an unexpected report."
Hall, Arthur. B. "Landscape Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 65-75.
"The earth-related view is [the landscape analyst's] unique contribution to intelligence analysis."
Haus, Lance. "The Predicament of the Terrorism Analyst." Studies in Intelligence 29, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 13-23.
Hunter, Helen-Louise. "Zanzibar Revisited." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 1-7.
An after-the-fact "reconstruction of the events of the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964 shows particularly well the usefulness of going back for an unhurried reexamination of a crisis after all the returns are in: it reaches conclusions about both events and causes quite different from what was generally believed at the time."
Return to Analysis/Generally Table of Contents