O'Brien, Kevin A. "Managing Information Overload." Jane's Intelligence Review 12, no. 3 (Mar. 2000): 50-55.
Odom, William E. "Intelligence Analysis." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 316-332.
This essay seeks "to help both students of intelligence and practitioners appreciate how broad the subject of intelligence analysis is, how dynamic it has become with the influx of new technology, and how misleading it can be to use the term without being specific about what kind of analysis, for what use, and where it is done."
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis." Intelligence Community Directive Number 200 [ICD 200]. Washington, DC: 8 Jan. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-200.pdf.
This directive "establishes the policy framework for the management of national intelligence analysis and the analytic community" by the DNI. "It also delineates the authorities and responsibilites of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDNI/A)."
1. "The Challenge for the Political Analyst: Advice from a DI Careerist." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 51-56.
"Policymakers are political animals," and this "make[s] the credibility hurdle higher for political, leadership, and country analysts." It is the job of the political analyst "to put the political behavior that policymakers see into a larger cultural and historical context -- that they do not see -- with enough sophistication to demonstrate that the context matters."
2. "Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product: Making the Analytic Review Process Work." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005): 55-61.
"The problem with the review process is not the layers of review but rather the quality of the review... My 30-plus years of experience leads me to conclude that there should be three levels of review and three broad areas of review for each piece of finished intelligence."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses: Analysts to Receive Details About Sources." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to officials on 11 February 2004, "[t]he CIA is making changes in how it handles intelligence after identifying specific problems in its disputed prewar assessment that Iraq's Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction." DCI George J. Tenet "has ordered an end to the long-standing practice of withholding from analysts details about the clandestine agents who provide the information that analysts must evaluate."
In a speech on 11 February 2004 to the agency's analysts, DDI Jami A. Miscik said that "[t]he changes were ordered after an internal CIA review revealed several occasions when CIA analysts mistakenly believed that Iraq weapons data had been confirmed by multiple sources, when in fact it had come from a single source.... 'Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the source's access to the information on which they are reporting,' Miscik said, according to a text of her speech given to The Post."
Pincus, Walter. "New Law to Spread the Use Of CIA's Analysis Approach." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The "intelligence reform act requires several key CIA analysis practices to be enforced throughout the entire intelligence community" (IC). The DNI "must pick an 'individual or entity' to be responsible for ensuring that 'elements of the [IC] conduct alternative analysis of the information and conclusions in intelligence products.'... Another CIA practice being spread ... is to have a quality control office or officer make sure that analyses conform to high standards." The DNI must also "appoint an individual [within the director's office] who would provide" the function of the CIA's "ombudsman to whom analysts and others can raise concerns about problems that do not require a full investigation" by the inspector general.
Raschke, Diana M. "Discretionary Time: An Approach to Encouraging Creativity in Intelligence Analysis." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 23-24.
The author argues for "providing analysts the time and incentive to pursue their own professional interests to create original analytical products."
Renfer, Marc A., and Henriette S. Haas. "Systematic Analysis in Counterterrorism: Messages on an Islamist Internet-Forum." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 314-336.
From "Introduction" by Urs Von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Intelligence Service (SAP): "While advanced methods of intelligence analysis, such as the described, cannot replace author identification, they are still useful for a preliminary evaluation of a given situation in order to determine which sites or individuals should be more closely observed or even investigated."
Rodgers, R. Scott. "Improving Analysis: Dealing with Information Processing Errors." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 622-641.
"All human beings make various errors of attribution and inference in their information processing. By extension analysts will tend to make the same errors. But, validated, objective measures and actuarial processes provide an avenue to improve the accuracy of decisions. Yet care must still be taken in their development, validation, selection, and interpretation."
Sands, Amy. "Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments." In Transforming U.S. Intelligence, eds Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber, 63-78. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005.
Segell, Glen M. "Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train Bombings, 2004." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 221-238.
The author looks at the use of (1) trends and patterns, (2) frequency, and (3) probability in antiterrorist intelligence analysis, with the 2004 Madrid train bombings serving as a case study.
Shelfer, Katherine M., and June M. Verner, "Improving Counterterrorism Analysis: Using Scenarios to Support the Development and Use of Integrated Information Systems." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 55-70.
The authors discuss "the need for the development of integrated civilian and military information systems, especially lessons-learned databases." They emphasize "the potential value of using scenarios to support better design and more effective use of such integrated databases."
Smith, Raymond F. "Is It a Pearl or a Kidney Stone? Intelligence Reform and Embassy Reporting, from Moscow to Baghdad." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 836-864.
"Maintaining structures in the intelligence community that promote tension in analysis, while encouraging collaboration on information, ensuring that embassy reporting offers an independent point of view, and encouraging risk management perspectives in analysis ... are steps that would reduce the probability of [major intelligence] failures, and should mitigate their risk if they do occur."
Swenson, Russell G., ed. Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dia/bring_intel_about.pdf.
From "Introduction": "This book is the product of studious self-reflection by currently serving [italics in original] intelligence professionals, as well as by those who are in a position, with recent experience and continuing contacts, to influence the development of succeeding generations of intelligence personnel. Contributors ... represent eight of the fourteen organizations that make up the National Foreign Intelligence Community."
Wheaton, AIJ 30.1 (2012), finds that "many of the articles in this edited volume still resonate."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis. Washington, DC: 2001. [https://www.cia.gov]
Warren, Ward. "Analysis of Analyses." Periscope 26, no.1 (2004): 3-4.
Warren makes an important point in this "opinion" piece: In the plethora of analysis shops in the U.S. Intelligence Community, "[i]t is only the CIA that has no constituency. It was established to avoid the natural tendency of other analytical fora to present unconsciously (consciously in some cases) a view skewed by the institution."
Wastell, Colin A., Graeme Clark, and Piers Duncan. "Effective Intelligence Analysis: The Human Dimension." Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism 1 (2006): 36-53.
Wheaton, Kristan J. "Analysis in Crisis Prevention." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 223-233.
The author analyses the Greece-Turkey situation in 1994 using defined analytic phases.
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