ANALYSIS

Generally

2000s

I - M

Ignatius, David. "The CIA's Dissidents." Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The author comments on a CIA-sponsored conference in Rome, which he attended as an invited journalist. The conference, "New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis," was arranged by a small CIA group called the Global Futures Partnership. The members of the group "see their role as in-house dissidents and agents of change, and the very fact that they are in business suggests that top CIA officials know they have a problem and want to fix it."

Johnson, Loch K. "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 333-370.

The following are a few of the salient observations in this article: "The PDB is more than a document; it is a process, allowing intelligence officers to interact with decision-makers and provide useful supportive information.... Even if NIEs are less than perfect instruments for predicting future events, they at least have the virtue of marshaling together in one place a reliable set of facts about a situation abroad of interest to the United States.... Regarding the value of PDBs and NIEs, the verdict is clear: they contribute. Improvements are necessary, though."

Kauppi, Mark V. "Counterterrorism Analysis 101." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 39-53.

Expectations with regard to performance and accountability "should be based on a realistic appraisal of the challenges faced by counterterrorism analysts who on a daily basis deal with amorphous and fragmentary information."

Lamanna, Lawrence J. "Documenting the Differences Between American and British Intelligence Reports." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 602-628. Also, in Strategic Intelligence, 5 vols, ed. Loch K. Johnson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.

A comparison of released British and American documents relating to the prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction "reveals significant differences between British and American approaches to intelligence concepts, structures, methods, purposes, and philosophies."

Lanir, Zvi, and Daniel Kahneman. "Speaking to Policymakers: An Experiment in Decision Analysis in Israel in 1975." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 4 (2006): 11-19.

The authors revisit a study done for Israeli Foreign Minister Yigael Alon in 1975.

Lefebvre, Stéphane. "A Look at Intelligence Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 231-264.

The author discusses some of the views as to what intelligence analysis is and should be, and touches on some of the "many proposals floating around to improve the analytic performance of the intelligence community."

Lowenthal, Mark M. "Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How Right, How Often on Which Issues?" Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 303-315.

The author suggests that there is a need for "a recalibrating of expectations or ... a lowering of expectations of what intelligence can do.... [This] means accepting the fallibility of intelligence and -- when considering the terrorists' war against us -- the fact that we will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is difficult."

Marrin, Stephen. "Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence (Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age)." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 25-36.

This is a general overview of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), with some broad discussion of the analytical process and its products.

Marrin, Stephen. "Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 131-146.

"In the end, the professionalization of intelligence analysis will change what intelligence educators do in two different ways: they will be required to do a better job proving that the programs produce better analysts.... And they will be required to work harder at creating a cumulative literature that provides the conceptual and theoretical foundation for the emergence of a more formal and improved intelligence profession."

Marrin, Stephen, and Philip H.J. Davies. "National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968-80: An American Experiment in a British Style of Analysis?" Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 5 (Oct. 2009): 644-673.

"[H]istory demonstrates that the US National Security Council staff implemented a process in 1968 through 1980 that approximated the British style of analysis [that is, "a closer relationship between intelligence producers and consumers"], and this may provide US policymakers with a model for bridging the gap between intelligence analysis and decision-making."

Matthias, Willard C. America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

According to Peake, Studies 48.1, the author was a "charter member of the CIA's Office of National Estimates.... The bulk of the book concentrates on the Cold War.... Matthias faults the United States for the Cold War's unnecessary length and vitality.... The reader learns much about the behind-the-scenes exchanges within the Board of National Estimates, the use of their product by the government, and the relationship between CIA analysts and academic experts.... [T]he book gives a unique look at strategic analysis from the inside and is worth serious attention by today's analysts and policymakers alike."

May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow, eds. Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.

Barnhill, Air & Space Power Journal (2008), notes that this work "is a collection of case studies developed for the intelligence and policy course offered between 1986 and 2002 at Harvard University to senior government and military intelligence officials.... [T]he authors present six case studies.... Arranged chronologically, the cases include the collapse of China, the United Nations intervention in the Congo, the removal of the Shah of Iran, the US relationship with Nicaragua's Somozas, the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and the run-up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.... Assuming a competent instructor, these scenarios will serve as the basis for raising awareness of how much harder it is to handle a crisis in real time than in retrospect."

McCreary, John, and Richard A. Posner. "The Latest Intelligence Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 371-380.

Using the 2007 NIE on Iran's "suspension" of the development of nuclear weapons as a pivot for their commentary, the authors argue that "[w]hen security concerns preclude publication of the key evidence on which an intelligence finding is based, the publication of the finding itself becomes doubly questionable." They conclude that there are better ways (less sensational art forms) for conveying this kind of information to a President.

McDowell, Don. Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practicioners, Managers and Users. Cooma, NSW, Australia: Istana Enterprises, 1998. Rev. ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009.

Swenson, IJI&C 16.1/130/fn55, calls this "the definitive source for ideas about how to bring 'police intelligence' to the level of strategic intelligence." Oleson, Studies 53.3 (Sep. 2009), says that the author "provides an interesting, non-American perspective on the doctrine of doing strategic analysis." Along the way, "McDowell offers sage advice to analysts and managers of analysts alike."

Medina, Carmen A., and Rebecca Fisher. "Thinking About the Business of Intelligence: What the World Economic Crisis Should Teach Us." Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 3 (Sep. 2009): 11-16.

"In terms of the global financial crisis, complexity is clearly the key theme that runs through the economists' post-mortems and it serves as an important analogue for the intelligence profession."

Miller, Bowman H. "Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 337-354.

"Filling intelligence gaps and avoiding 'intelligence failures' (policy decisions[] somehow never account for failures) demand more than adding analytic manpower and creating new tools; first and foremost, they require more expertise."

Moore, David T.

1. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2007. Occasional Paper No. 14. 2d ed. Available at: http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Critical_Thinking.pdf.

Wheaton, AIJ 30.1 (2012), comments that "while Moore more than adequately defends critical thinking skills for intelligence analysis, he provides little practical guidance for analysts seeking to improve their critical thinking skills with specific techniques."

2. "Species of Competencies for Intelligence Analysis." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 97-119. American Intelligence Journal 23 (2005): 29-43.

3. and Lisa Krizan. "Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National Security Agency." In Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices, ed. Russell Swenson, 105-123. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002.

4. and Lisa Krizan. "Intelligence Analysis: Does NSA Have What It Takes?" Cryptologic Quarterly 20, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001): 8-25. [cited p. 218/fn. 2 below]

5. Lisa Krizan, and Elizabeth J. Moore. "Evaluating Intelligence: A Competency-Based Model." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 204-220.

Muller, David G., Jr. "Intelligence Analysis in Red and Blue." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 1-12.

The author argues that the Red-Blue dichotomy in American culture reflects "two different and incompatible understandings of how the world works.... So an analyst's worldview has a fundamental impact on the accuracy of his or her analysis."

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