ANALYSIS

Estimative Intelligence

Iran NIE (2007)

Mazzetti, Mark. "New Data and New Methods Lead to Revised View on Iran." New York Times, 5 Dec. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on 3 December 2007 "concludes with 'high confidence' that Iran halted work on its nuclear weapons program in 2003." An NIE in 2005 had found that "Iran's leaders were working tirelessly to acquire a nuclear weapon." Current and former intelligence officials "said that the 2007 estimate was an attempt by spy agencies to examine the Iran problem in a new light, and that in the process they recast many of their principal judgments about Iran's weapons programs that might have relied on outdated information."

McCreary, John, and Richard A. Posner. "The Latest Intelligence Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 371-380.

Using the 2007 NIE on Iran's "suspension" of the development of nuclear weapons as a pivot for their commentary, the authors argue that "[w]hen security concerns preclude publication of the key evidence on which an intelligence finding is based, the publication of the finding itself becomes doubly questionable." They conclude that there are better ways (less sensational art forms) for conveying this kind of information to a President.

Warrick, Joby, and Walter Pincus. "Lessons of Iraq Aided Intelligence on Iran: Officials Cite New Caution and a Surge in Spying." Washington Post, 5 Dec. 2007, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The starkly different view of Iran's nuclear program that emerged" from a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on 3 December 2007 "was the product of a surge in clandestine intelligence-gathering in Iran as well as radical changes in the way the intelligence community analyzes information.... Former and current intelligence officials say the new NIE reflects new analytical methods ordered by [DNI Mike] McConnell."

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