Garthoff, Raymond L. "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions." International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32.
It is in this article that the author lays out his 10 common fallacies made in estimating and imputing intentions within the context of the Cold War, specifically in doing so with regard to the Soviet Union.
The author was head of Israeli military intelligence (A'man), 1974- 1978.
1. "Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work." International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 36-56.
2. "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 261-287.
Includes an Appendix, "Operation Peace for Galilee" (pp. 282-287), which deals with three decisions made in the Israeli war in Lebanon.
Hastedt, Glenn. "Estimating Intentions in an Age of Terrorism: Garthoff Revisited." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (2005): 47-62.
The author does a fine (if at times strained) job of stretching Raymond Garthoff's "10 common fallacies made in estimating and imputing intentions" during the Cold War to cover the war on terrorism. [See Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32.]
Hastedt, Glenn. "Intelligence Estimates: NIEs vs. the Open Press in the 1958 China Straits Crisis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 104-132.
"Differences are most stark in discussing the conflict[']s underlying dynamics. Public source reporting ... gave attention to a broader array of factors than did the NIE analysis.... Another area of difference ...involved the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship, with the NIEs holding to a view that emphasized unity of effort to a much greater degree than did the open source reporting.... The NIEs ... were far more opaque than were open source writings. They did not identify either the source of the analysis ... or the source of the information used for analysis."
Herman, Michael. "Assessment Machinery: British and American Models." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 13-33.
British "assessments" and American "estimates" are the same beast. Herman identifies two basic models for production of community assessments. One model emphasizes "interdepartmental arrangements that enable departments to cooperate collegially" (emphasis in original). The paradigm here is the British JIC. The second model utilizes "forms of central intelligence that supplement or supplant the departmental system" (emphasis in original). In the United States, this form is represented by the DCI and the CIA's Intelligence Directorate. Nonetheless, "both national systems have elements of both collegiality and centralism."
Hess, Pamela. "Spy Chief to Restrict Intel Estimates." Associated Press, 26 Oct. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to David Shedd, a deputy to DNI Mike McConnell, the DNI "has reversed the recent practice of declassifying and releasing summaries of national intelligence estimates."
Hofmann, Peter A. "The Making of National Estimates during the Period of the 'Missile Gap.'" Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 336-356.
The author looks at estimates of the Soviet ICBM force made by various NIEs between 1954 and 1963. "The early estimates (1954-55) were fairly cautious and predicted little or no capability.... [But] by 1960 (NIE 11-4-59) a pattern of serious overestimation began to form." Revisions downward began with NIE 11-8-61, issued on 7 June 1961; this trend was reinforced in NIE 11-8/1-61, issued on 21 September 1961. The author associates these revisions with material supplied by Oleg Penkovsky.
Honig, Or Arthur. "The Impact of CIA's Organizational Culture on Its Estimates Under William Casey." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 44-64.
"[T]he intelligence failures during Casey's tenure were rooted in the Agency's flawed intelligence processes and cannot be solely attributed to his belief systems or management style."
Jackson, Wayne. "Scientific Estimating." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 7-11.
Estimators "have a troublesome time with the problem of incorporating scientific or technical contributions into a finished estimate."
Kehm, Harold D. "Notes on Some Aspects of Intelligence Estimates." Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 2 (Winter 1956): 19-37.
Both the intelligence officer and the military commander or policymaker "are in the estimating business."
Kent, Sherman. "A Crucial Estimate Relived." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 1-18.
Westerfield: "Kent's account of his greatest mistake: the prediction three weeks before the Cuban missile crisis that Moscow would be unlikely to station missiles in Cuba that could reach much of the United States." See Michael Douglas Smith, "The Perils of Analysis: Revisiting Sherman Kents Defense of SNIE 85-3-62." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 3 (2007). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/index.html]
Kent, Sherman. "Estimates and Influence." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 11-21.
It is the wish of intelligence analysts that their "knowledge and wisdom" about foreign trouble spots will "show itself so deep and so complete that it will perforce determine the decision." In truth, intelligence is only "one of a score of forces at work." The goal for the intelligence analyst is not to influence but "to be relevant within the area of our competence, and above all ... to be credible."
Kent, Sherman. "Words of Estimative Probability." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 49-65.
An NIE "should set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key judgment."
Kent, Sherman. "The Yale Report." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973): 7-21.
An outside "estimate" intended to further a discussion about estimating intentions produces a flap about openness and classification.
Kerlin, Julie O. "Military-Economic Estimating: A Positive View." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 4 (Fall 1966): 35-44.
The author argues that economic-military research on the Soviet Union is done using "an intelligent methodology [that] provides a logical ordering for data which are indeed sparse but which can be used to advantage in place of an otherwise unknown, intuitive input into military judgments."
Khalsa, Sundri. Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2004.
Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), notes that the author, a U.S. Air Force captain "wrote this book while attending the Joint Military Intelligence College and working as a DIA analyst." Khalsa suggests that the "solution to the forecasting problem ... is a structured, computerized methodology.... [A] CD is provided that illustrates the procedures in the text. The quality of the CD is not good and that does not help when trying to follow the often complicated instructions in the book.... Khalsa has developed an interesting approach to forecasting acts of terror but it needs considerable real-world testing and refinement before its operational value can be assessed."
Knorr, Klaus. "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles." World Politics 16, no. 3 (Apr. 1964): 455-467.
Kreps, Sarah E. "Shifting Currents: Changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the Iran Nuclear Threat." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (Oct. 2008): 608-628.
The author finds a parallel between the debate about the NIEs on Iran and a series of NIEs on the ballistic missile threat in the 1990s. She concludes that policy makers who accept "an estimate as the last word on any given threat" ignore "the fact that NIEs are, at best, informed guesses based on incomplete information about future capabilities and intentions."
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