ANALYSIS

On China

Dockham, John. "A Sharp Look at Sinosovietology." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): A23-A27.

"The Sinosovietologist, afflicted with the youthful brashness of his new methology and unable to acknowledge that all the answers are not yet available, tends to find answers too readily."

[Gannon, John C.] "China as an Emerging Power." CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 3-7.

Speech by the Deputy Director for Intelligence to Central Intelligence Retirees Association, Ft. Myer, Virginia, 10 October 1996. Selected responses to audience questions, by Marty Peterson, Senior DDI Chinese Specialist, are included (pp. 8-9).

Gertz, Bill. "Panel Finds CIA Soft on China." Washington Times, 6 Jul. 2001. [http:// www.washtimes.com]

"According to U.S. government officials and outside experts close to the panel," a 12-member commission of outside experts "has concluded that CIA reporting on China is biased and slanted toward a benign view of the emerging communist power.... The commission concluded ... that China-related CIA intelligence reports and programs suffered from an 'institutional predisposition' to play down or misinterpret national security problems posed by Beijing's communist regime.... The commission was headed by retired Army Gen. John Tilelli, a former commander of U.S. forces in Korea." See also, William Safire, "The C.I.A.'s China Tilt," New York Times, 9 Jul. 2001.

Kerbel, Josh. "Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 27-35.

The U.S. debate over China "has long been conducted as if single-outcome predictions of China's long-term future are possible and that the United States is capable of promoting or altering a predicted outcome." This article argues that "these two assumptions are largely the result of an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality behaves 'nonlinearly.'" [footnote omitted]

National Intelligence Council. Eds., John K. Allen, Jr., John Carver, and Tom Elmore. Intro., Robert L. Suettinger. Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976. Washington, DC: NIC 2004-05, Oct. 2004.

This hefty volume contains 37 formerly classified NIEs and SNIEs on China. The accompanying CD has an additional 34 such documents. Suettinger's "Introduction" to the collection provides excellent and concise context. The print version is also available on the NIC Public Web site at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_foia_china.html.

Tomlinson, William B. "Chinese Industry from the Air." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 37-50.

The "almost complete blackout of information" from China following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 "would have left the economic-industrial intelligence officer quite desperate had it not been for the arrival on the scene of daring Chinese Nationalist pilots flying used U-2 aircraft." See also, Associated Press, "Taiwanese Spy Plane Pilots Honored for Perilous Cold War Missions," International Herald Tribune, 4 Jul. 2007; and Benjamin Yeh, "Taiwan's Cold War Spy Pilots Reveal Secret Missions," AFP, 23 Aug. 2010.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence.

1. The Chinese Economy in 1990 and 1991: Uncertain Recovery. Washington, DC: July 1991.

2. The Chinese Economy in 1991 and 1992: Pressure to Revisit Reform Mounts. Washington, DC: August 1992.

3. China's Economy in 1992 and 1993: Grappling With the Risks of Rapid Growth. Washington, DC: August 1993.

4. China's Economy in 1993 and 1994: The Search for a Soft Landing. Washington, DC: August 1994.

5. China's Economy in 1994 and 1995: Overheating Pressures Recede, Tough Choices Remain. Washington, DC: December 1995.

Vetterling, Philip, and Avis Waring. "Tonnage Through Tibet." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 1-25.

The author discusses a methodology for estimating "the size of military force that can be supported" in campaigns that are "dependant on supply by road." The central example is the "Communist Chinese threat along the northeastern border of India."

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