Dockham, John. "A Sharp Look at Sinosovietology." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): A23-A27. Dockham, John. "A Sharp Look at Sinosovietology." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): A23-A27.
"The Sinosovietologist, afflicted with the youthful brashness of his new methology and unable to acknowledge that all the answers are not yet available, tends to find answers too readily."
Gertz,
Bill. "Panel Finds CIA Soft on China." Washington Times,
6 Jul. 2001. [http:// www.washtimes.com]
"According to U.S. government officials and outside experts close to the panel," a 12-member commission of outside experts "has concluded that CIA reporting on China is biased and slanted toward a benign view of the emerging communist power.... The commission concluded in a final report that China-related CIA intelligence reports and programs suffered from an 'institutional predisposition' to play down or misinterpret national security problems posed by Beijing's communist regime.... The commission was headed by retired Army Gen. John Tilelli, a former commander of U.S. forces in Korea."
Kerbel, Josh. "Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 27-35.
The U.S. debate over China "has long been conducted as if single-outcome predictions of China's long-term future are possible and that the United States is capable of promoting or altering a predicted outcome." This article argues that "these two assumptions are largely the result of an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality behaves 'nonlinearly.'" [footnote omitted]
National Intelligence Council. Eds., John K. Allen, Jr., John Carver, and Tom Elmore. Intro., Robert L. Suettinger. Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976. Washington, DC: NIC 2004-05, Oct. 2004.
This hefty volume contains 37 formerly classified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) on China. The accompanying CD has an additional 34 such documents. Robert L. Suettinger's "Introduction" to the collection provides excellent and concise context. The print version is also available on the NIC Public Web site at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_foia_china.html.
Safire, William.
"The C.I.A.'s China Tilt." New York Times,
9 Jul. 2001. [http://www. nytimes.com]
"Following up Gertz's story [Bill Gertz, "Panel Finds CIA Soft on China," Washington Times, 6 Jul. 2001], I find support for a new 'Team B'" on the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence; DCI George J. "Tenet, once its staff director, knows he can grumble but must go along."
Tomlinson, William B. "Chinese Industry from the Air." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 37-50.
The "almost complete blackout of information" from China following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 "would have left the economic-industrial intelligence officer quite desperate had it not been for the arrival on the scene of daring Chinese Nationalist pilots flying used U-2 aircraft."
Vetterling, Philip, and Avis Waring. "Tonnage Through Tibet." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 1-25.
The author discusses a methodology for estimating "the size of military force that can be supported" in campaigns that are "dependant on supply by road." The central example is the "Communist Chinese threat along the northeastern border of India."
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