Zoglin, Richard. "Not-so-Hot Copy in San Jose: A Newspaper Backs Off a Big Scoop, but Rivals Shouldn't Gloat." Time, 26 May 1997. [http://www.time.com]
Mercury News executive editor Jerry Ceppos's editorial has stated that Webb's series "did not meet our standards" in several respects. However, the paper's confession is not "likely to change the minds of those who want to believe that the U.S. government was behind the introduction of crack into the inner city.... [T]he lure of talk-show celebrity, maybe even a Hollywood deal, may have played a role in letting a promising investigative piece get out of control."
Zopette, Glenn. "The Edison of Secret Codes." American Heritage of Invention & Technology 10, no. 1 (1994): 34-43.
Concerns Edward Hebern, inventor of a cipher machine later used by U.S. military and diplomatic services.
Zorn, E.L. "Israel's Quest for Satellite Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter-Spring 2001): 33-38.
The Israelis' belief in the need for their own spy satellite capability was the "result of the failure of the United States to provide satellite intelligence to Israel just when it was required most," that is, in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War. After that time, the Israelis continued to perceive inconsistencies in U.S. policy in supplying satellite imagery and information. Consequently, "Israeli officials committed to the development of a space program and a reconnaissance satellite" in November 1982. Israel's first space launch took place in September 1988.
1. "Soviet Expert Thinks 'Penkovsky Papers' Are a Forgery." Washington Post, 15 Nov 1965.
2. "Soviet Expert Doubts Validity of Controversial 'Papers'; Usage in 'Penkovsky' Said to Prove Forgery." Washington Post, 16 Nov 1965.
Zuber, Terence. "The German Intelligence Estimates in the West, 1885-1914." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 177-201.
Newly discovered documents offer some insights into German intelligence estimates and war planning pre-World War I.
Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
Goulden, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that this "work is an absolutely fascinating study of Moscow's view of the long-running confrontation." The author "makes a strong case that the collapse came about because of a series of strategic blunders by the USSR's 'own leadership,' and that the Soviets have only themselves to blame." Although there is "a residual pro-Soviet bias," Zubok "makes his material exciting, and he depicts brilliantly the last days of the fading Soviet empire."
Zubok, Vladislav M. "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-1962." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994): 22-33.
This article is well worth reading. The author's thesis is that "in the years of Cold War tension the intelligence services were more than just 'eyes,' they were powerful weapons in propaganda warfare between the ideological blocs." The focus of the article is on a group of documents sent by the KGB to the Secretariat and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Nevertheless, Zubok urges that these documents should "be treated with a great deal of caution," because much within the documents is uncorroborated and needs to be cross-checked. Also, "readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a superior."
The article includes a 7 June 1960 document with Shelepin's extensive plan to discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA and a 29 July 1961 strategic deception plan. Zubok concludes that "the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global stability." In an excess of zeal, to be even-handed, he suggests without elaboration or documentation that the effect of similar activities by the U.S. side was probably equally negative.
Zubok, Vladislav M.
1. Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The "Small" Committee of Information, 1952-53. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #4. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1992. [Surveillant 3.4/5]
2. "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952." Diplomatic History, 19, no.3 (1995): 453-472.
Zubok, Vladislav M., and Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
For Legvold, FA 75.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1996), this book is "the most significant addition to the literature on Soviet foreign policy to have appeared since the end of the Cold War." It is "not a complete history of events but concentrates instead on the calculations of Stalin and the other principals at critical turning points." The authors' central thesis is that, beyond their "aggressive, power-seeking" side, the Soviet leaders "were also genuinely captured by the lingering revolutionary urges of the past, which the West never quite fathomed."
Good, WPNWE, 24-30 Jun. 1996, believes that "Cold War veterans could benefit from this first inside look at the personalities of the men who directed Soviet strategies." To Kelley, Parameters, Summer 1998, "this fine book presents a revealing interpretation of the struggle through Russian eyes.... Zubok and Pleshakov offer pointed, profoundly Russian insights, some of which will startle Western readers with their simplicity and cynicism.... The caliber of this work and the authors' willingness to confront their recent history so directly provide optimism for future Russian analyses of the Cold War."
Although Shryock, History 26.3, finds this work "thought provoking and in many respects enlightening," he also sees it as suffering "from a number of serious weaknesses, including ... a variety of inconsistencies regarding the origins of Soviet conduct and policy and excessive reliance on sources of doubtful or questionable authority." The reviewer is particularly bothered by the authors' "excessive sympathy for Soviet leaders -- including Joseph Stalin -- and for Soviet positions on Cold War issues."
Zuckerman, Fredric S.
1. "Vladimir Burtsev and the Tsarist Political Police in Conflict, 1907-14." Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1977): 193-219.
2. "Political Police and the Revolution: The Impact of the 1905 Revolution on the Tsarist Secret Police." Journal of Contemporary History 27, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 279-300.
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. "[Editorial:] It's Time to Fight Back." U.S. News and World Report, 7 Sep. 1998, 92.
The United States "will need to become even more energetic in intelligence gathering so that we can mount pre-emptive action when the threshold of evidence is compelling.... Given the transnational character of terrorist groups," ensuring the confidentiality of intelligence sources "may well require scrapping the legal barrier that now exists between foreign and domestic operations."
Zurcher, Anthony. "Roman Empire to the NSA: A World History of Government Spying." BBC News Magazine, 31 Oct. 2013. [http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24749166]
A light-weight walk through surveillance history.
Zwerling, Philip, ed. The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011.
Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012), notes that the material collected in this volume "is not new, and the authors' interpretations of their data are dubious."
Return to Z Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents