Wohlstetter, Roberta. Wolf, Jim. "CIA Inquest Finds U.S. Missed Indian 'Mindset.'" United Press International, 3 Jun. 1998.
On Jeremiah news conference. See Pincus report above.
[CIA/90s/98/IndianNukes]
Wolf, John B. Fear of Fear. New York: Plenum, 1981.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: "A survey of terrorist operations and controls in open societies. A comprehensive look with significant focus on antiterrorism."
[Terrorism/80s]
Wolf, John B. "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups." Terrorism: An International Journal 1, no. 2 (1978): 169-186. [Calder]
[Terrorism/70s]
Wolf, Markus. "From Spy to Statesman." New York Times, 4 Sep.1999. [http://www. nytimes.com]
"Can a former spy make a good prime minister? As the longtime head of East Germany's foreign intelligence service, my answer is yes. In any case, all of us should hope I'm right, since Vladimir Putin, Russia's latest Prime Minister, is, like the two who immediately preceded him, a former intelligence operative."
[Russia/99]
Wolf, Markus, with Anne McElvoy. Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster. New York: Times Books, 1997. Toronto: Random House, 1997.
Markus Wolf died on 9 November 2006 at the age of 83. See Adam Bernstein, "Markus Wolf, 83, East German Espionage Chief: Spymaster Riddled the West with Agents," Washington Post, 10 Nov. 2006, B6.
David E. Murphy, IJI&C 11.1, faults Wolf more for what he does not say as for what he does: "Missing from his memoir are the insights Wolf could have given us into Soviet-East German relations, particularly in the fields of intelligence and state security, by virtue of his Soviet background.... Many details concerning the Soviet environment in Berlin, with which Wolf was continuously associated, are either absent or factually inaccurate." For example, Wolf's version of the Otto John affair "is nonsense."
Liqueur, Washington Post Book World, 29 Jun. 1997, and Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 14 Jul. 1997, notes that Wolf's book "has no sensational revelations," but "there are many interesting insights.... Compared with other such autobiographies, this book is not only well-written but almost revealing." Similarly, Friedman, Parameters, Autumn 1997, comments that "the author's consistent discretion ... ensures there will be no surprises or startling disclosures" in his discussion of espionage cases that once made world headlines.
For Cohen, FA 76.6, Wolf "tells an intriguing tale" that is marred by his "selective memory, continual attempts at self-exculpation, and specious resort to the argument that the West behaved as badly as the communists." Peake, History 26.1, believes that Wolf has made "a valuable contribution to the literature both for the professional insights [he] offers and the picture [he] draws of a complex, cultured, sophisticated lifelong communist whose career in intelligence has no peer."
Sarotte, I&NS 12.4, is surprised to find "numerous differences" between the English and German-language versions of Wolf's memoirs. The English edition is shorter but also contains material not present in the German version. In any event, this is "an intriguing and readable book illuminating many previously unknown anecdotes and particulars from the darker side of postwar German politics.... Whether or not Wolf's renditions of these events are reliable must, however, await archival confirmation."
To Tusa, New Statesman, 18 Jul. 1997, this autobiography is charming and disarming, but he also notes that Wolf "alters the more repugnant details in outsiders' pictures, sets incontrovertible facts in a more becoming perspective, then varnishes with the best available gloss on his life."
Powers, NYRB (23 Oct. 1997) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 141-158, notes that "this is an important work, but its usefulness is undermined by the difficulty of knowing when the language is really Wolf's and when it is that of his co-author.... There are many small errors about dates and facts certainly known to Wolf, and occasional misuse of intelligence concepts and terms."
See also, essay by Roger Draper, "The Man in the Mask," New Leader, 11-25 Aug. 1997, 13-14; and Nina Planck, "The Spy Who Loved It," Time, 9 Jun. 1997.
[Germany/East/Wolf][c]
Wolfe,
James R. Secret Writing: The Craft of the Cryptographer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. [Petersen]
[Cryptography/Gen]
Wolfe, Thomas W. "Obstacle Course for Attachés." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 71-77. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 35-40. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
The author discusses his experiences with "obstructive techniques over and above the formal restrictions" as U.S. Air Attaché in the Soviet Union from October 1956 to October 1958.
[MI/Attaches]
Wolfert, Ira. American
Guerrilla in the Philippines. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945.
[Petersen]
[WWII/FE/Pac/Philippines]
Wolin, Simon, and Robert M. Slusser, eds. The Soviet Secret Police. New York: Praeger, 1957. London: Methuen, 1957. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1964.
Pforzheimer says this is "one of the better books on the Soviet intelligence and security services and a 'core' book essential to further study of the subject."
[Russia/Overviews]
Wolowicz, George S., "Medical Intelligence: A Case Study of Azerbaijan." Military Intelligence, Jan.-Mar. 1996.
[GenPostwar/Medical]
Wolske, J. Alan. "Jack, Judy, Sam, Bobby, Johnny, Frank...: An Investigation into the Alternate History of the CIA-Mafia Collaboration to Assassinate Fidel Castro, 1960-1997. Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 104-130.
"If the words of the CIA Inspector General and the Church Committee are to be believed, these assassination efforts were a scatterbrained collection of adventures that were thrown together by a small group of mid-level Agency officials.... I agree that the Inspector General's interpretation of the situation is correct."
[CIA/Accusations/Gen]
Wolters, Jo.
1. Dossier Nordpol: Het Englandspiel onder de loep [The Nordpol Case: The Englandspiel under the Microscope]. Amsterdam: Boom, 2003.
Moore, I&NS 19.1, notes that "the German capture and execution of at least 42 agents dropped into the occupied Netherlands by SOE between 1941 and 1943 represents perhaps the greatest British espionage disaster, at least in human terms, of World War II.... The central thesis of this book is that the Engelandspiel was really a deception carried out by the Double Cross or Twenty Committee, designed to convince the Germans that there was a 'Plan for Holland' to organise an underground army in preparation for an invasion."
2. "Remarks Concerning a Research Note on The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 459-466.
The reference in the title of this article is to M.R.D. Foot, "Research Note: The Dutch Affair," Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 341-343. Wolters takes issue with Foot's (and the official) position that SOE's dropping of more than 40 agents into the lap of the German security forces in the Netherlands in 1942-1943 involved incompetence, not perfidy. Wolters argues for "a 'purposeful policy' by some British authority, other than Dutch Section SOE, bearing on the deployment of Dutch agents like 'shock troops'.... Such a policy ... was [aimed at] keeping as many German troops as possible in the West in 1942 to relieve the Russian front."
[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/Eur/Resistance/Dutch]
Wolton, Thierry. Le KGB en France. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986.
[Russia/Overviews]
Womack, Sarah. "Fears over Spy Committee that Never Meets." Electronic Telegraph, 3 Nov. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
A report from Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee on 2 November 2000 "warned of the soaring costs of the new GCHQ building"; "called for the greater use of psychological testing of recruits to the intelligence agencies to identify 'adverse character traits'"; "suggest[ed] 'fingerprint technology' to prevent classified information being accessed on stolen Whitehall laptops"; and "rebuked Mr Blair for failing to take a more direct approach to the work of the intelligence agencies. A high-level ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister, which sets the intelligence gathering priorities for MI6 and GCHQ, had never met since Labour came to power, the committee said. It had dealt with all its work in correspondence between ministers."
[UK/PostCW/00]
Wong, Edward. "New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels." New York Times, 31 Jan. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Iraqi and American officials said on 30 January 2004 that "[t]he Iraqi authorities, with the help of American intelligence agencies, are creating an intelligence service [in Iraq] that will focus on rooting out guerrilla fighters, especially those from outside the country.... The service will employ some former agents of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and will probably receive financing from the American government, the officials said.... The Central Intelligence Agency is taking the lead in helping put together the new service, American officials said."
[CIA/00s/04; MI/Ops/Iraq]
Wonus, M. C. "The Case of the SS-6." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 25-31.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/author-combine.htm: "The author argues that the intelligence community badly misunderstood the propellant system of the Soviet space rocket booster, the SS-6, because analysts engaged in mirror imaging, assuming wrongly the applicability of US design criteria."
[GenPostwar/Issues/S&T]
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