Winnett, Robert, and David Leppard. "Terror in London: Leaked No 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaedas British Recruits." Sunday Times (London), 10 Jul. 2005. [http://www.timesonline.co.uk]
According to a joint Home Office and Foreign Office dossier prepared for the prime minister last year, "Al-Qaeda is secretly recruiting affluent, middle-class Muslims in British universities and colleges to carry out terrorist attacks in this country.... A network of 'extremist recruiters' is circulating on campuses targeting people with 'technical and professional qualifications', particularly engineering and IT degrees."
Winning, Nicholas. "U.K. Appoints New Chief of GCHQ Spy Agency." Wall Street Journal, 15 Apr. 2014. [http://online.wsj.com/news]
On 15 April 2014, the British government "appointed Robert Hannigan as the new chief" of GCHQ. Hannigan is "a senior civil servant who has advised Prime Minister David Cameron on counterterrorism and security issues."
Winstone, H.V.F. Gertrude Bell. London: Barzan, 2004.
According to Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), the author tells the story of a "most remarkable upper-class, privileged, eccentric Victorian lady." She was "the first women officer in British military intelligence," serving in the Arab Bureau, headquartered in Cairo, during World War I. Bell "was subsequently transferred to Basra, where she remained until the British army took Baghdad."
Winstone, H.V.F. The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898-1926. London: Cape, 1982. Frederick, MD: UPA, 1982.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: "A first-rate work on the development of countries in the Middle East, highlighting intrigue and intelligence. Wonderful bibliography is included."
[Israel/Historical; UK/Historical & Interwar/To29]
Winter, Barbara. The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in Australia, 1913-1945. Brisbane, Australia: Boolarong Press, 1995.
Clark comment: Commander Rupert Basil Long was effectively the leader of Royal Australian Naval intelligence after 1934; from 1939 until his retirement in 1946, Long held the title of Director, Australian Naval Intelligence. Bates, NIPQ, Spring 1997, found the book less than easy to read, noting that it "is lengthy, in fine print, with a myriad of facts and much trivia, done in a rather choppy style." Nonetheless, it will be "a treasure trove for researchers."
According to Unsinger, WIR 15.1, "Winter tells the story not only of Commander Long's career but also of the fledgling years of Australian Naval Intelligence." Long's contribution to the lore of intelligence was the development of the coastwatchers, the basis for which was laid in 1921. The coastwatchers later became the foundation stone for the Allied Intelligence Bureau. The author, "who devoted ten years preparing the manuscript, has produced an excellent book." For Cain, I&NS 12.3, Winter provides a "great amount of detail," but fails "to analyse the more important details of the intelligence events."
Winter, Gordon. Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police. London: Penguin, 1981. [Chambers]
1. "British Intelligence and the July Bomb Plot of 1944: A Reappraisal." War in History 13, no. 4 (Nov. 2006): 468-494.
2. "Churchill, British Intelligence, and the German Opposition Question." War in History 14, no. 1 (2007): 109-112.
Winter, P.R.J. "A Higher Form of Intelligence: Hugh Trevor-Roper and Wartime British Secret Service." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 847-880.
From abstract: This article highlights "the fact that, contrary to the impression engendered by F.H. Hinsley's dry and depersonalized multi-volume official history..., Major H.R. Trevor-Roper ... not only had a 'good war', but a rich and colourful one."
Winter, P.R.J. "Libra Rising: Hitler, Astrology and British Intelligence, 1940-43." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 394-415.
The British used an astrologer from 1940 to 1943 in their efforts to figure out Hitler's strategic intentions. This reflected a mistaken belief that Hitler was into astrology, but had the support of the head of British naval intelligence, Admiral Godfrey.
Winterbotham, Frederick W.
Winters, Edward G. [RADM/USN] "Adapting Across the Spectrum of Conflict: The Role of Naval Special Warfare." Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 76-79.
The author is Commander, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command. "The U.S. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command ... has changed to move faster and more precisely against th[e] new enemy. There are no longer operations and intelligence; instead, we face 'intelligence-operations' or 'operations-intelligence.' Additionally, there is no single organization that can defeat this enemy; it requires joint intelligence operations at a level that surpasses anything we have done previously."
[MI/Navy/SpecOps & SpecOps/2010]
Winton, Harold R. "The Battle of the Bulge." Military Review 75, no. 1 (1994-1995): 107-115, 118-123.
Winton, John [pen name of John Pratt]. ULTRA in the Pacific: How Breaking Japanese Codes and Cyphers Affected Naval Operations Against Japan, 1941-45. London: Leo Cooper, 1993. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993.
Kruh, Cryptolog 15.3, finds that this book combines a "well written, chronological format" with a "detailed examination of the practical applications of Ultra intelligence." The material on British FECB work against JN-25 "is basically a rehash" of Rusbridger and Nave. Overall, this is a "fine work that shouldn't be marred by a rash comment."
The MI 21.1 reviewer says that the reader comes "away with a real sense of the skill and devotion that code breakers brought to their work." This is a "balanced work that will appeal to the crypto fan and the historian" and is a "quickly read presentation." Best, I&NS 10.1, concludes that ULTRA in the Pacific "is an entertaining and well written piece of work.... [W]hat separates Winton's book from its peers is its accessibility. This is not a dry academic tome; it is a book that communicates its interest in the subject and shows very clearly both the benefits to be gained from a superior intelligence-gathering capacity and the limits to its utility."
According to Bates, NIPQ 10.3, Winton "does not subscribe to the conspiracy theory that Churchill knew about Pearl Harbor ... but did not tell Roosevelt." He "does, however, say that '...there had been plenty of intelligence in the months before Pearl Harbor which, with hindsight, can clearly be shown to have revealed Japanese intentions'.... Regarding the shootdown of Admiral Yamamoto, Winton states that Admiral Nimitz '... obtained approval from everyone from President Roosevelt downwards.'" The reviewer take issues with these conclusions: "I ... do not believe there was plenty of intelligence before Pearl Harbor to predict the attack.... I also do not believe the decision to shoot Yamamoto down went any higher than Nimitz.... I have some problems with this one, I suggest you approach it with skepticism. But, it's a readable, interesting book that provides some new information and clearly identifies the contribution of radio intelligence in the Pacific in WW II."
Barnhart, I&NS 11.2, says that the "most original parts of ULTRA in the Pacific deal with Great Britain's role ... and its intelligence contributions.... Unfortunately, as Winton admits, Britain left most of the intelligence work to the Americans.... Winton is curiously silent upon the role of the Commonwealth services.... [R]eaders concerned with the role of intelligence in the Pacific would do better to consult John Prados' latest work, Combined Fleet Decoded."
[WWII/FEPac/Gen; WWII/MAGIC; WWII/PearlHarbor/Gen]
Winton, John [pen name of John Pratt]. ULTRA at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy During World War II. London: Leo Cooper, 1988. New York: Morrow, 1988. London: Heinemann, 1988. [pb]
Winton/Pratt's obituary is carried in Telegraph (London), 3 May 2001.
[UK/WWII/Services/Navy & Ultra]
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