Whitlock, Duane L. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "Station 'C' and Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMMEL) [FRUMEL] Revisited." Cryptolog 14, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 1, 7-8, 19.
Commenting on the importance of traffic analysis to the cryptanalytic effort, Whitlock states: "[I]t was the cryptanalytic success scored against the Japanese Navy callsign system, not the reading of JN-25, that allowed Nimitz to draw up his estimate of enemy strength and to muster as best he could the forces he needed to oppose it." Whitlock finds no credibility to Rusbridger and Neve's Betrayal at Pearl Harbor.
Whitlock, Duane L. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "The Silent War against the Japanese Navy." Naval War College Review 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 43-52.
Clark comment: This is an excellent review of the Navy's traffic analysis and cryptanalytic efforts from 1921 to 1942. It encompasses both the establishment and the work of Stations ABLE, BAKER, CAST, and HYPO.
"[A]t the outset of the war, traffic analysis was, as it had been for many years, the only source of current intelligence bearing upon the strategic posture and the disposition of the surface, subsurface, and air elements of the Japanese navy.
"As cryptanalysis began to catch up with current events in 1942, it started to add to the traffic analysis picture the timely and precise details essential to achieving tactical advantage.... However, as has not been well understood by historians who have highlighted the many tactical successes, cryptanalysis made a rather limited contribution to 'the big picture' in the 'silent war' against the Japanese navy. Had it not been for the considerable number of victories mutually achieved by these two analytical methods in the silent war, the shooting war in the Pacific would have taken a far different and much more painful course."
[WWII/Magic & Services/Navy]
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