Wheeler, Douglas L. "The Archives of Portugal: A Guide to an Intelligence Treasure Trove." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 539-550.


Wheeler, Douglas. "The Azores, Allied Secret Operations and World War II, 1939-1944." British Historical Society of Portugal Annual Report 32 (2005), 103-107.


Wheeler, Douglas L. "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II." Luso-Brazilian Review 23, no. 1 (Summer, 1986): 107-127.

"At great expense the Allies' preemption campaign worked to erode German wolfram amounts acquired, while the Germans stubbornly tried to hold the line by means of increasing production in their mines and pressuring Portugal to fulfill agreements and manipulate the Regulatory Commission by all means possible, includlng cajoling, threat, demand, and bribery."


Wheeler, Douglas L. "Spy Mania and the Information War: The Hour of the Counterspy 1914/15." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1993): 41-45.


Wheeler, Mark C. Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940-43. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/OSS/Balkans/Yugo]

Wheeler, Mark C. "The SOE Phenomenon." Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (1981): 513-519.


Wheeler, Richard. A Rising Thunder: From Lincoln's Election to the Battle of Bull Run -- An Eyewitness History. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. [pb] 1995.

Surveillant 4.4/5 notes that the author's coverage of Allan Pinkerton will be of interest to Civil War intelligence scholars.


Wheeler, Warren C. [CDR/USN]

1. "Naval Intel Must (Re)Acquire Core Skills." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 2004, 42-47.

Winner, 2003 Naval Intelligence Essay Contest. Naval intelligence officers lack "commonly accepted, clearly articulated core competencies -- specific, measurable, verifiable skills all members are expected to perform at a consistently high level." During the Cold War, "providing operational intelligence to war fighters" was the consistent focus of naval intelligence; but "[t]he rationale for a global operational intelligence effort faded with the Soviet threat." A new central organizing purpose and associated core competencies should be built on the basis of the ongoing communications revolution and on the role of precision strikes in the new warfighting mode.

2. "Transforming Naval Intelligence Means (Re-)Acquiring Core Competencies." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 3-7.

This is "a slightly expanded version" of the article published above. NIPQ 20.1 also carries "Comments on Winning Essay" from Keith Dunbar (LTCDR/USN), pp. 7-8; and Lawrie Smith, p. 8.


Return to Wf-Whh