Yale Professor H. Bradford Westerfield died on 19 January 2008. His students included President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Senators John Kerry and Joseph I. Lieberman, and assorted cabinet officers, White House advisers and intelligence officials. Douglas Martin, "H. Bradford Westerfield, Influential Yale Professor, Is Dead at 79," New York Times, 27 Jan. 2008.
Westerfield, H. Bradford. "American Exceptionalism and American Intelligence." Freedom Review 28 (Summer 1997): 27-36.
Westerfield, H. Bradford. "America and the World of Intelligence Liaison." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 523-560.
"Post-Cold War national security requirements are plastically amorphous and ambiguous.... Much of diplomacy can be open and conciliatory; but ... this is only one sector of a conceptual spectrum of policy instruments that also ranges further through increasingly secret diplomacy, clandestine intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action; these are elements of a 'secret international relations' sector, and they each utilize liaison; together (liaison included) they all conceptually flow yet further to merge with a sector of military preparedness and possible war."
Westerfield, H. Bradford. "Bans on Faculty-CIA Links May Endanger Academic and Personal Freedom." Chronicle of Higher Education, 7 Sep. 1988, A44.
Westerfield's argument is simple: "academics have a legitimate right to privacy and the freedom to engage in outside activities that have no adverse impact on the performance of their professional roles."
Westerfield, H. Bradford, ed. Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
Clark comment: Studies in Intelligence has been the CIA's in-house quasi-academic journal for over 40 years. The editor has chosen his 32 selections well. A number of well-known names appear as authors, and some of the articles qualify as "classics" in the field. Westerfield provides a 16-page introduction that includes a short history of the CIA, comments on process and criteria in selecting the articles for publication, and the organizational outline into which the articles have been placed. The introductory history is reasonably balanced and will be useful to those coming to the book without an extensive background in intelligence. However, Westerfield goes to slightly annoying lengths to prove that he was not coopted by the Agency during his association with the project. Click for a full-length review.
For Chambers, Westerfield's introduction "includes what must be the best nutshell history of the CIA ever written." The articles themselves "are written to a high standard by experienced professionals still active in their fields when they wrote. They give insights into practicalities and problems, into the challenges of collection and analysis, on how to keep up with demanding consumers in a way that no other open-source material ever has before. Every article will repay reading by anyone who is serious about intelligence, and anybody who is serious about their study of intelligence should read this book." Click for Chambers' full-length review.
Cohen, FA 75.3 (May-Jun. 1996), calls Inside CIA's Private World "engrossing and fascinating. The articles include some of the best treatments of intelligence issues ever written.... Westerfield's commentary is spare, precise, and penetrating, his editorial judgment acute."
For Warren, Surveillant 4.2, Westerfield has made "excellent selections" that "run the gamut of the intelligence collection cycle with a fair and balanced representation.... [T]his is a book that should be in the library of every intelligence officer." Jonkers, AIJ, 17.3/4, also remarks on Westerfield's "outstanding selection" of articles that address intelligence issues "in a thoughtful and intelligent manner" and his "excellent introduction." This "is a book for the contemplative and intellectual professional."
Westerfield, H. Bradford.
1. "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part I." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 407-424.
The author looks at the dilemma created in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) by "the struggle for the DI's soul" beginning in the mid-1970s between two groups: the "objective analysis" school (also called "traditionalists" or disciples of Sherman Kent) and the "actionable analysis" school (also called "opportunity-oriented analysis"). Somewhat to his surprise, Westerfield concludes that both types will be needed in the future, although with the "actionables" in a distinct minority.
2. "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part II." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 19-54.
Westerfield concludes the development of his argument for creating a "dual functional differentiation" within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence: "a large human infrastructure," devoted to "objective analysis"; and "a much smaller suprastructure," supplying "actionable analysis."
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