Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Aides Say U.N. Team Helped to Install Spy Device in Iraq." New York Times, 8 Jan. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In March 1998, the United States sent "a U.S. spy into Baghdad to install a highly sophisticated electronic eavesdropping system. The spy entered Iraq in the guise of a U.N. weapons inspector and left the eavesdropping device behind. For 10 months, the device let the United States and a select elite within the ... inspection team monitor the cell phones, walkie-talkies and other communications instruments used by the military and intelligence officers who protect Saddam and conceal Iraq's weapons." See also, Thomas W. Lippman and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Says It Collected Iraq Intelligence Via UNSCOM," Washington Post, 8 Jan. 1999, A1.
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs." New York Times, 26 Jul. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"After spending more than two years and tens of millions of dollars preparing missions, training commandos and gathering intelligence, the United States has dropped its secret plans to arrest Bosnia's two most wanted men accused of war crimes.... Plans for clandestine missions to seize the men ... have been scuttled by U.S. commanders who fear a blood bath, by French officers who are reluctant to act and by U.S. government officials who share a growing sense that the mission could rekindle Serbian aggression."
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Intelligence Under Fire in Wake of India's Nuclear Test." New York Times, 13 May 1998. [http://nytimes.com]
DCI George Tenet has named retired Adm. David Jeremiah "to lead a 10-day investigation into the intelligence community's failure to detect preparations at the test site in the Indian desert. The site has been under periodic surveillance by photoreconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping satellites, which recorded increasing activity. But the images and activities they recorded in recent days were not interpreted clearly or quickly by the CIA [Clark comment: Note needs to be made that since 1996, the CIA has not been in the photographic interpretation business; that responsibility rests with NIMA], officials said."
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Now Tells of Much Deeper Damage by Pollard." New York Times, 11 Jan. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
U.S. military and intelligence officials say Pollard did more damage to national security than the public has been told. An article in The New Yorker on 11 January 1999, written by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, "cites those officials as saying that Pollard, who was arrested in 1985 and is now serving a life sentence, gave Israel invaluable American intelligence secrets in exchange for payments of $50,000 and promises of $540,000 more."
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Official Leaves Austria After Being Caught Wiretapping." New York Times, 6 Nov. 1997, A7 (N).
An apparent CIA officer who was earlier arrested and released under claim of diplomatic status has left Austria. The Austrian newspaper Kurier says the arrest took place on 29 October 1997 after police discovered and traced a tap on the residence telephone of the first secretary of the North Korean embassy.
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Plan to Oust Iran's Government Is an Open Secret." New York Times, 26 Jan. 1996, A1, A5 (N).
As conceived by Speaker Gingrich, an $18 million CIA "covert" operation to "change the nature of the Government of Iran" is provided for in the FY 1996 intelligence authorization bill. Iran has announced plans to mount a $20 million counter-campaign
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Played Key Role in Capture of Kurd Rebel, Officials Say." New York Times, 20 Feb. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The capture by Turkish commandos in Nairobi on 15 February 1999 of Kurdistan Workers Party leader Abdullah Ocalan was aided by the United States. "U.S. diplomatic pressure backed by intelligence gathering helped to put Ocalan in flight from a safe haven in Syria, to persuade nation after nation to refuse him sanctuary and to drive him into an increasingly desperate search for a city of refuge." Officials insist that "the United States had no 'direct involvement' in the Ocalan case," but surveillance information from U.S. "intelligence officers and law-enforcement agents ... gave Turkish commandos the chance to capture Ocalan with the help of Kenyan security officers."
Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Under U.N. Cover, Officials Now Say." New York Times, 7 Jan. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
U.S. officials have said "that American spies ... worked undercover on teams of United Nations arms inspectors ferreting out secret Iraqi weapons programs." The officials added that "American intelligence agencies provided information and technology to the United Nations Special Commission, known as Unscom. In turn, they said, the United States and other nations received information on Iraqi weapons programs from the inspectors."
Weiner, Tim. "Veteran C.I.A. Official Quits, But Will Finish Investigations." New York Times, 3 Oct. 1997, A9 (N).
Fred Hitz, who has held the job since October 1990, will leave the Inspector General's job for a teaching position at Princeton University.
Weiner, Tim. "Why I Spied: Aldrich Ames." New York Times Magazine, 31 Jul. 1994, 16-19.
Weiner, Tim. "A Windfall from Long Ago Holds Up Nominee for CIA Director." New York Times, 3 Jul. 1997, A23.
Weiner, Tim, and James Risen. "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise." New York Times, 21 Sep. 1998, 1.
"[W]ithin days of the attack, some of the administration's explanations for destroying the factory in Sudan proved inaccurate. Many people inside and outside the U.S. government began to ask whether questionable intelligence had prompted the United States to blow up the wrong building. Senior officials now say their case for attacking the factory relied on inference as well as evidence that it produced chemical weapons for bin Laden's use."
Weiner, Tim, and David Cay Johnston. "Roadblocks Cited in Efforts to Trace bin Laden's Money." New York Times, 20 Sep. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to federal officials, "[a] six-year struggle to uncover Osama bin Laden's financial network failed because American officials did not skillfully use the legal tools they had, did not realize they needed stronger weapons, and faced resistance at home and abroad."
Weiner, Tim, David Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis. Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, An American Spy. New York: Random House, 1995.
Powers, NYRB (10 Aug. 1995) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 321-332, says that this work "is distinguished by some beautifully written passages, by a lucid structure that makes sense of the many complications of the investigation, and by a keen appreciation of the ways the case destroyed the career of R. James Woolsey." However, Wise's Nightmover is even better. In a similiar vein, Arana-Ward, WPNWE (19-25 Jun. 1995), notes that Betrayal "cannot claim the detail on Ames's CIA career that 'Nightmover' manages to include," but the book delivers context expertly ... and ends up as far more satisfying to read." Jeanne Vertefeuille is depicted as "part of the clog in the flow of the investigation."
Peake, CIRA Newsletter 22.2, comments on "interesting detail not found in the other books" on the Ames case. Nevertheless, the book "also has some strange errors." To Cohen, FA 74.5 (Sep.-Oct. 1995), this is "an excellent journalistic account of the Ames saga, relying on the public record and interviews."
According to Robbins, CIRA Newsletter 20.4 (reprinted from the Palm Beach Post), "Betrayal is by far the most complete and objective rendering" of the story of Ames' treachery among the initial four books on the subject. "It is a thorough, straightforward attempt to probe the mind of Ames, as well as explain why things went so terribly wrong with the Agency.... Betrayal's comprehensive examination of the complexities of Ames's interplay with the KGB is outstanding. The portrait of the personal drives and failings in the private life of Ames and his second wife, Rosario, is profound and penetrating."
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