Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The Espionage Scandal." 19 Aug. 1999, A20. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
It is "very difficult to know what to think of Mr. Lee -- especially in light of mounting evidence that the case against him was thin from the beginning.... This is not to contend that Mr. Lee is innocent -- something we simply cannot know.... [T]he larger problem of security lapses and espionage does not go away if Mr. Lee is not a spy, nor does the need for greater vigilance, and not just at the labs. That's true whether or not we learn any time soon what the exact extent of the Chinese nuclear espionage was -- or is."
Washington Post. "Ex-Associate Testifies Against Spy Suspects." 16 Oct. 1998, B9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
A couple "charged with conspiring to spy for East Germany told a friend that they had received training in using miniature cameras and deciphering Morse code sent by radio from Cuba, the friend testified [on 15 October 1998]. But James Michael Clark also testified in U.S. District Court that Theresa Maria Squillacote and Kurt Alan Stand did not tell him that they had photographed specific documents. Clark, 50, has already pleaded guilty in the case."
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The Facts of the Pollard Case." 25 Jan. 1999, A20. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"We always have thought of Jonathan Pollard, and still do, as a contemptible and duplicitous mercenary whose misdeeds were reckless and threatening to American security, his motives uninteresting and immaterial and his word unreliable.... [Nevertheless, the] review of the Pollard sentence is inhibited by secrecy.... [T]he uncomfortable fact remains that [Pollard] has not been able to test in court the official assertions that put him away.... The requirement here is not for relief for a loathsome and guilty spy but for some degree of greater openness for the American people."
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Fair Trial for a Rogue." 13 Nov. 2003, A30. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"[R]ecently a federal judge in Texas threw out one of [Edwin Paul] Wilson's convictions.... In the main, the decision by U.S. District Judge Lynn N. Hughes seems a justified response to astonishing prosecutorial misconduct.... But Judge Hughes does not stop there. He seems as well to validate the substance of the former spy's trial defense and even compares him to Japanese Americans interned during World War II. Such victimhood Mr. Wilson's history will not bear."
Washington Post. "For the Record." 27 Oct. 1998, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Poland is to pay around $366,000 to Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, one of the United States' top Cold War spies, to compensate him for property confiscated under Communist rule."
Washington Post. "From the Top . . ." 1 Aug. 2004, B1, B4, B5.
Stansfield Turner, William S. Cohen, John Deutch, Robert C. McFarlane, Phyllis Oakley, William E. Odom, and John J. Devine react to the 9/11 commission recommendations.
Turner: "We don't need a new layer of bureaucracy. What we do need is a review of what authority a coordinator of intelligence should have, whether we call him or her an NID or a DCI.... [A] fixed term is a bad idea."
Cohen: "One of my principal concerns ... is making sure that the NID office, however it is structured, is prohibited from having any advocacy role on operational matters.... I also suggest that the director have a fixed term, rather than be subject to the political fortunes of any given president."
Deutch: "Establishing a cabinet-level position -- a national intelligence director (NID) -- is no substitute for properly aligning authority with responsibility.... [T]he proposal for a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism works better for counterterrorism than for managing intelligence regarding other security issues."
McFarlane: "The military's unified command structure ... is a sound model for the new director's office.... Giving the new director a fixed term that overlaps administrations ... is the right way to go to avoid the post's becoming politicized."
Oakley: "With an intelligence czar and a unified intelligence center, the system would lose the competitiveness that's been an important element of its successes until now.... Not everything about the present situation is bad."
Odom: "[S]ome [organizational] designs prevent competent incumbents from performing well. [This is what] the 9/11 commission's design for a new national intelligence director (NID) is sure to accomplish.... [A] fixed term for the NID ... [i]s a bad idea."
Devine: The "recommendations [of the 9/11 commission] regarding the intelligence community -- and specifically the CIA -- are potentially destructive.... The establishment of a national intelligence director and the national counterterrorism center (NCTC) would add a cumbersome bureaucracy without improving performance on the core issue.... [T]he DCI should be given the broad authority to direct the priorities and budgets of the other agencies in the intelligence community."
Washingon Post. "House Passes Intelligence Bill." 28 Jun. 2003, A7.
On 27 June 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by a vote of 410 to 9 the bill authorizing intelligence programs for FY 2004. The House version still must "be reconciled with a bill awaiting action in the Senate. Most of the bill remains classified, including its cost, estimated around $40 billion."
Washington Post. "House-Senate Panel Starts Probing 9/11 Intelligence Failure." 5 Jun. 2002, A1. [http//www.washingtonpost.com]
On 4 June 2002, a House-Senate panel opened its "inquiry into the intelligence failure" surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The 37-member panel is co-chaired by Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL) and Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL). "The panel began by setting ground rules and hearing from members of a specially formed staff who have begun sifting through a massive cache of highly classified documents.... Panel members heard from their new staff director, Eleanor Hill, a former Defense Department inspector general who is in her first week on the job. She was hired belatedly in a staff shake-up, and her arrival was delayed until she received a security clearance."
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Indefensible Secrecy." 17 Feb. 2004, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The CIA last week "managed to convince a federal court in Washington that if the public learned the total amount the United States spent on intelligence in fiscal 2002, intelligence sources and methods could be compromised.... We don't buy it."
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Intelligence Gaps." 3 Apr. 2005, B6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The report of the WMD commission is "a wake-up call" to President Bush: "he should respond quickly."
Washington Post. "[Editorial]: Intelligence Lapse?" 6 Sep. 1998, C6.
The editorial writer worries about the lack of hard information to support/justify the U.S. attack on the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory.
Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The Intelligence Mess." 10 Jul. 2004, A18. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
"The Senate intelligence committee has added considerable authority and detail to the judgment that the U.S. intelligence community's estimates about Iraq were badly wrong, both in their conclusions and in the way they were prepared.... The [CIA] says it has already made changes in response to Iraq and to the failure to foresee the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But its response remains defensive and inadequate -- and a broader rethinking of the intelligence community may be necessary to tackle the problems the report describes in the CIA's relationship with other agencies. Mr. Bush is weighing the appointment of a new CIA director; he should look for someone capable of revitalizing the agency and forging a bipartisan consensus on its structure and priorities."
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