Warren, Ward. "Analysis of Analyses." Periscope 26, no.1 (2004): 3-4.
Warren makes an important point in this "opinion" piece: In the plethora of analysis shops in the U.S. Intelligence Community, "[i]t is only the CIA that has no constituency. It was established to avoid the natural tendency of other analytical fora to present unconsciously (consciously in some cases) a view skewed by the institution."
[Warren, Ward W.] "Inspector General: Master of All He Surveys." Periscope 22, no. 2 (1998): 6-7.
Warren's essay assessing the Inspector General's report on the Bay of Pigs operation deserves to have appeared in a forum with wider dissemination than the house organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Warren writes directly to the point, not to justify mistakes that were made, but to balance the wealth of misanalysis that has accompanied the release of the report. As Warren points out, "the report and its author do not represent the vessel of absolute truth.... The Bay of Pigs was a CIA blunder, but Kirkpatrick's report is a misleading description of the causes and the lessons of that blunder." Text of Warren's essay is available by clicking here.
A letter from Tom Polgar, Periscope 22.3, takes issues with Warren's assessment of the IG report. To Polgar "[t]he report was accurate in all its essential elements.... Kirkpatrick's report highlighted the errors of omission and of commission which continued to plague CIA's Cuban operations."
Warren, Ward. "Politics, Presidents, and DCIs." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 337-344.
From the CIA's beginning "up to the end of Bush's tenure in January 1977, directors and lower officers alike took the agency's non-political and non-ideological approach as a point of pride.... Jimmy Carter changed all this when he refused George Bush's offer to stay on through the change of administration.... For the first time, the director was replaced at the beginning of a new regime, and by someone who was chosen purely for his political ideology."
Reagan followed by nominating "the most overtly political director possible." However, Webster, Gates, and Woolsey were non-ideological appointments, "at least to the extent that party affiliation was not an issue." Warren notes that the "political" directors (Dulles, Turner, and Casey) have involved -- or failed to prevent involvement of -- their presidents and the CIA in some sort of difficulty that should have been anticipated. Warren concludes that "excessive political influence within an administration is not a quality that enhances a Director of Central Intelligence." (At the time this article appeared, Warren was the Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, Central Intelligence Agency.)
Warren, Ward, and Emma Sullivan. "The Historical Intelligence Collection." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 91-94.
Established by Allen Dulles in 1954.
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