Michael Warner

R - Z

 

Warner, Michael. "Reading the Riot Act: The Schlesinger Report, 1971." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (Jun. 2009): 387-417.

The report completed in March 1971 by a group working under the leadership of OMB Assistant Director James Schlesinger "marked a watershed for the American Intelligence Community (IC), helping the Nixon Administration to conceive and enact reforms that were both consequential in themselves and presaged the findings of later surveys and investigations (and thus more thorough changes in later years)."

Text of the Schlesinger Report ("OMB/NSC Report") and associated materials are available as "A Review of the Intelligence Community," 10 March 1971, Document 229, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol II, Organization and Management of US Foreign Policy, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), pp. 494-513, and at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02.

See comments on article by Sir David Omand, "How Many Schlesingers Would It Take to Change a Light-Bulb?" Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (Jun. 2009): 418-421; and Glenn Hastedt, "The Schlesinger Report: Its Place in Past, Present and Future Studies of Improving Intelligence Analysis," Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (Jun. 2009): 422-428.

[GenPostwar/70s/Gen; Reform/70s]

Warner, Michael. "Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 133-153.

The literature on "the influence of technological change per se on intelligence systems" pays "surprisingly little attention to larger trends and their meaning." This "means we have an incomplete understanding of what happened in the past.... [And] it leaves us with few clues for understanding another wave of technological change washing over the intelligence profession at this time .... Looking at the second [digital] revolution in the light of the first [analog] can give us important clues to what to watch for in coming years."

[GenPostCW/10s/Gen]

Warner, Michael. The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: A International Security History. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014.

For Maffeo, Proceedings 140.7 (Jul. 2014), the author provides "a marvelous historical sweep, ranging from Sumer in 3,200 BCE to Edward Snowden." Warner focuses on "the revolution in information accessibility." From this, he builds his thesis of the "fall" of the "state monopoly on sophisticated intelligence capabilities, surveillance, and espionage.... [T]he Internet and other technological advancements have made intelligence power vast and ubiquitous."

Peake, Studies 59.1 (Mar 2015), notes that in his discussion of "the dramatic expansion of intelligence services among the major participants during the First World War," Warner "spends little time on  specific intelligence operations.... [H]is is a top-down view of how intelligence influences geopolitical and economic maneuvering among the major powers." This book is "[e]xtensively documented," and provides the reader "important context about the role of intelligence in international relations." Díaz, IJI&C 28.3 (Fall 2015), sees this as "a valuable addition to the literature of Intelligence Studies."

[Overviews/Gen/10s]

Warner, Michael. "Sophisticated Spies: CIA's Links to Liberal Anti-Communists, 1949-1967." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 425-433.

This is a useful review of the issues surrounding the Ramparts (and subsequent) "revelations" in February 1967 about the CIA's subsidizing of the National Student Association and other private organizations. The CIA took flack from both sides of the political spectrum for its activities, as did the anti-Communist left.

[CA/To79; CIA/60s/Subsidies][c]

Warner, Michael. "Two Steps Backward: The Collapse of Intelligence Support for Air Power, 1944–52." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).

"[F]rom the closing of World War II through the Korean conflict ... American military intelligence lost, rather than gained, organizational sophistication and analytic proficiency.... The military's wartime progress in command and control ... was not matched by progress in intelligence capabilities. The decline was particularly jarring in air intelligence.... [I]n the very years when strategic airpower was being advocated and recognized as a key component of national security, intelligence to guide strategic bombing campaigns, especially at the operational-level, faced institutional jeopardy and professional stagnation."

[MI/AF/To89]

Warner, Michael. "'US Intelligence and Vietnam': The Official Version(s)." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 5 (Oct. 2010): 611-637.

"The picture emerging from the declassified official histories is one of a crowd of largely independent intelligence campaigns working simultaneously against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets.... Intelligence miscues did not lose the Vietnam War for the Americans and South Vietnamese, and good intelligence staved off collapse and defeat, but much better intelligence is required to win 'asymmetric' wars."

[Vietnam/Gen]

Warner, Michael. "Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence.'" Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 15-22.

After a useful discussion, Warner offers the following: "Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities."

[WhatIsIntel?]

Warner, Michael, ed. CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Truman. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.

MacPherson, I&NS 10.2, notes that this collection "is comprised of 81 documents numbering over 460 pages, most of which could be termed 'sign-posts' in the creation and history of CIA during the formative Truman years.... This edited collection obviously implies ... support for the Montague version of CIA's paternity, but there is no clear resolution of the Darling-Montague debate.... The editor in fact places more emphasis on the influence of the Pearl Harbor experience combined with the rise of a Soviet threat during the birth of modern American intelligence."

[CIA/40s/Gen][c]

Warner, Michael, and Robert Louis Benson. "Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 1-13.

The authors state their goal as follows: "Venona, incomplete as it is, opens large areas for research. This essay is intended to point scholars toward various records, individuals, and issues that need closer scrutiny." Clark comment: This goal is admirably achieved, as numerous potential research matters (some, perhaps, never knowable with certainty) are raised.

[SpyCases/U.S./Venona]

Warner, Michael, and J. Kenneth McDonald. US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947. Washington, DC: Strategic Management Issues Office, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Apr. 2005.

This work examines "the origins, context, and results of 14 significant official studies that have surveyed the American intelligence system since 1947." It explores "the reasons these studies were launched, the recommendations they made, and the principal results that they achieved. It should surprise no one that many of the issues involved -- such as the institutional relationships between military and civilian intelligence leaders -- remain controversial to the present time."

[Reform/00s/Gen]

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