Michael Warner

A - Q

 

Warner, Michael. "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 93-101.

The author argues that neither the IG's Survey nor the DDP's response (drafted by Tracy Barnes) presented "clear insights that could instruct Agency leaders and planners." The DDP could "have served the CIA better by drafting a careful analysis of the operation" and its underlying assumptions. On Kirkpatrick's side, the IG "approved a rambling report and then bungled its presentation to CIA's principals."

[CIA/90s/98/BoP][c]

Warner, Michael. "The CIA's Office of Policy Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 211-219.

"OPC grew because State and Defense wanted it to grow. Covert action was viewed by State, by Defense, and, by extension, the Truman administration, as a routine instrument of cold war foreign policy. OPC followed the trajectory plotted by NSC 10/2. The office had built a permanent covert action structure and prepared itself for an expanded cold war mission even before the exigencies of NSC-68 and the Korean War caused it to grow even faster than its creators and administrators had envisioned."

[CIA/40s/Gen][c]

Warner, Michael. "The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group: Salvage and Liquidation." Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 111-120.

"Thanks in part to [Assistant Secretary of War John J.] McCloy's order to preserve OSS's SI [Secret Intelligence] and X-2 [Counterintelligence] Branches, the 'cloak and dagger' capability ... was waiting in the War Department for transfer to the new CIG."

[CIA/40s/Gen]

Warner, Michael. "Did Truman Know about Venona?" Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000): 2-4. .

Given the existence of information implicating Harry Dexter White, passed by the FBI in "carefully paraphrased" form to Admiral Souers in October 1950, the author concludes that "there are two possibilities. Either Truman was not informed about the Venona messages that implicated White, or he disregarded them. In light of the timing and circumstances of this 17 October FBI report to Adm. Souers, this author votes for the former interpretation."

[SpyCases/U.S./Venona][c]

Warner, Michael. "The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 483-492.

"Sun Tzu presented a marvelously concise treatment of espionage that gives us a window on the nature of intelligence writ large."

[Historical/Ancient]

Warner, Michael. "Intelligence Transformation and Intelligence Liaison." SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 77-89.

[Liaison]

Warner, Michael. "Protecting the Homeland the First Time Around: The Kaiser Sows Destruction." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 3-9.

"Few today remember the Black Tom explosion or the Kingsland fire, but incidents like these made a deep and lasting impression on the minds of two generations of American leaders."

[WWI/U.S.]

Warner, Michael. The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2000. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/index.htm]

This is an excellent brief overview of the contribution of OSS to the waging of World War II, and of its heritage for intelligence in the years that followed.

[WWII/OSS/Gen]

Warner, Michael. "Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50." Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 89-98. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/pdf/v38i5a10p.pdf]

The author credits Michael Josselson (and covert CIA funding) with establishing and maintaining this "daring and effective" covert operation. When the Congress convened for the first time, in Berlin on 26 June 1950, the North Koreans had just invaded the South, an event which highlighted that the time had come to choose sides. When the organization was formally established in November 1950, Josselson became the Congress' Administrative Secretary, a post he would hold for the next 16 years.

[CA/Eur; CIA/40s/Gen][c]

Warner, Michael. "Prolonged Suspense: The Fortier Board and the Transformation of the Office of Strategic Services." Journal of Intelligence History 2, no. 1 (Summer 2002). [http://www. intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

Abstract: "American intelligence faced major challenges at the end of World War II. Organizations and practices hurriedly established during the war seemed to many Washington decisionmakers to be deficient as bases for peacetime intelligence. In evaluating the remnants of the Office of Strategic Services, Truman administration officials found that the leaders of OSS had developed a sophisticated understanding of how a permanent intelligence service could work. Declassified records of their discussions illuminate that understanding and the ways in which it guided the reform of American intelligence that culminated in the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency."

[CIA/40s/Gen]

Warner, Michael, ed. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Origin_and_Evolution.pdf]

"[A] decentralized Intelligence Community may be the only kind of system that can maintain public and military support for an independent, civilian foreign intelligence arm in America's non-parliamentary form of government.... Decentralization assures the Pentagon of military control over its tactical and joint intelligence programs. It also assures members of Congress of both parties that the President's chief intelligence adviser cannot acquire a dangerous concentration of domestic political power or monopolize the foreign policy advice flowing into the White House. Thus we are likely to live with the decentralized intelligence system -- and the impulse toward centralization -- until a crisis re-aligns the political and bureaucratic players or compels them to cooperate in new ways."

[CIA/Overviews/00s]

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