Vicini, James. "CIA Director to Retire from Military and Stay at CIA." Reuters, 23 Apr. 2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Vicini, James. "CIA Director to Retire from Military and Stay at CIA." Reuters, 23 Apr. 2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
In a note to CIA employees on 23 April 2008, "CIA Director Michael Hayden said ... he will retire from the U.S. Air Force [on 1 July 2008] but continue at the intelligence agency."
[CIA/00s/08]
Vick, Alan J., et al. Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.
Westermann, JFQ 48 (1st Quarter 2008), sees this as "a work of critical importance for Air Force senior leadership and the rank and file. It offers a prescient analysis of COIN warfare and strategy and provides trenchant recommendations for enhancing the Service’s capability in the long war against Islamic extremism."
[MI/AF/SpecOps & SpecOps/00s]
Vick, Karl. "U.S., Sudan Trade Claims on Factory." Washington Post, 25 Aug. 1998, 1.
[Terrorism/98/Air Attacks]
Vickers, Robert D., Jr. "The Intelligence Reform Quandary." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 356-364.
"Whether the 2004 act will be as successful in helping to wage the war on terrorism as was the 1947 act in helping win the Cold War remains to be seen."
[Reform/00s/06]
Vickers, Robert D. "The State of Warning Today." Defense Intelligence Journal 7, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 9-15.
The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning and Chairman of the Intelligence Community's Warning Committee notes the "decimation" of warning staffs in an era of tight budgets. He argues, however, that "Warning is not broken and the process doesn't need major restructuring."
[Analysis/Surprise]
Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2007.
Brooks, Proceedings 133.5 (May 2007), finds it sad that the author "rests his book on the unproven -- and almost surely unprovable -- contention that FDR knew Pearl Harbor to be the target.... It is a shame that Victor did not limit his argument to Roosevelt knowing that an attack was imminent.... The unbalanced result greatly diminishes the book and relegates it to the pile of not-to-be-taken-seriously revisionist histories."
[WWII/Pearl Harbor]
Vidino, Lorenzo. Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2006.
Peake, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), labels this work as "[w]ell documented, well told, and alarming."
[Terrorism/00s]
Villa, Brian, and Timothy Wilford. "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 520-556.
The authors examine recent writings on Pearl Harbor, challenge Philip Jacobsen's criticisms and methodology, and argue that the revisionist thesis merits further scholarly attention.
Clark comment: It is difficult to argue with the authors' point that it is the nature of history to be rewritten as new information is discovered or becomes available. To put it differently, revising our interpretations of historical events is not a loathsome sin, but the obligation of those who would call themselves historians. Regrettably, too much of the ongoing dispute between the authors (both as themselves and as stand-ins for other revisionists) and Philip Jacobsen has taken on a personal tone -- now, seemingly on both sides of the argument. Serious researchers (a status easily granted to Villa and Wilford) might better avoid the type of "personal contest" in which a portion of this article engages. As interesting and tightly argued as this article is, the main "revisionist" theories remain unproven to this follower of the debate. Nonetheless, the idea that further study remains warranted seems logical and normal.
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Villa, Brian, and Timothy Wilford. "Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai." The Northern Mainer/Le Marin du nord 11, no. 2 (Apr. 2001): 1-17.
The authors argue that the pre-Pearl Harbor reports of Leslie Grogan, 2d Radio Officer aboard the SS Lurline, deserve much greater credence than they have previously been given. They believe that "it is virtually unarguable that Grogan heard the signals" of Japan's Strike Force and "communicated this information to USN intelligence in Hawaii three days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack."
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Village Voice (New York).
1. "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," 16 Feb. 1976, 69-92.
2. "How Ford, Kissinger and the CIA Obstructed the House Probe," 23 Feb. 1976, 59-68.
These two articles are a bootlegged draft copy of the "Pike Committee" Report. See U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Intelligence [Pike Committee]. Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. House Report No. 94-833. Washington, DC: GPO, 1976.
[CIA/70s/Investigations]
Villadsen, Ole R. "Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 81-94.
The author argues that "European intelligence cooperation is likely to improve in fundamental ways, although not without overcoming difficulties such as sovereignty, interoperability, and the relationships already established with NATO and the US."
[GenPostCW/00s/Gen][c]
Villamizar, Andres. La Reforma de la Inteligencia: Un Imperativo Democratico [The Reform of Intelligence: A Democratic Imperative]. Colombia: Editorial Kimpres, 2004.
Orellana, Studies 50.4 (2006), notes that the author "calls for political transparency and increased effectiveness in the Colombian intelligence reform process." Villamizar presents the view that "Colombia lacks a functional intelligence community.... [I]ntelligence agencies operate independently, are routinely assigned to carry out intelligence functions under vague control mechanisms, and suffer through repeated instances of duplication of effort, inter-service jealousies and professional rivalries.... . Lacking are clearly defined missions and roles, foreign collection capabilities, and the trust of the country’s highest political and military circles."
[LA/Other/Colombia]
Villatoux, Marie-Catherine, and Paul Villatoux. "Aerial Intelligence during the Algerian War." Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 2 (Jun. 2002): 65-78
From abstract: Aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering "had a highly significant role in supporting French military operations in Algeria.... Initially, however, the Air Force effort was handicapped" by a number of problems, including a lack of "sufficient suitable aircraft types. Gradually, improved aircraft and photographic techniques permitted systematic and detailed aerial mapping and intelligence work.... Better integration of air and ground forces, along with more coordinated command and control, arrived from 1959 onwards when an air general, Maurice Challe, became inter-service commander-in-chief in Algeria. This permitted an authentic and mostly effective combined-arms and joint service approach to the locating, tracking, engagement and destruction of Algerian nationalist bands."
[France/Postwar]
Villeneuve, Daniel, in collaboration with Marc-André Lefebvre. "Intelligence and the United Nations: Lessons from Bosnia - A Canadian Experience." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 22-25.
The primary author was the intelligence officer for the 3d Battalion, Royal 22d Regiment, deployed in Bosnia 30 April-30 October 1995.
[Canada; MI/Ops/Bosnia][c]
Vincent, David. The Culture of Secrecy: Britain 1832-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
According to Gill, I&NS 15.3, the author concentrates "on state practices, in particular the role of the civil service, interception of communications and the impact of welfare policies on privacy." The reviewer sees this work as "well-written, [with] each chapter end[ing] with some vignette of the period that encompasses [his] themes."
[UK/Overviews/Other]
Vise, David A. [Washington Post].
Visner, Samuel S. "e-SIGINT in an Age of Transformation." Defense Intelligence Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 51-62.
The author discusses how the experience of industry relates to the development of an acquisition strategy that can bring about an e-SIGINT capability.
[NSA/SIGINT]
Vital, David. "Images of Other Peoples in the Making of Intelligence and Foreign Policy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 16-33.
"[F]oreign policy decisionmaking begins and ends with the actual makers of policy -- invariably to be found weltering in an imperfectly charted sea of data, some constituents of which are hard, others soft, but virtually all tainted in one way or another as regards precision and reliability."
[GenPostwar/Policy/00s]
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