Vander or Van der


Vanderbrook, Michael. "UNCTAD V: Intelligence Support at a Major International Economic Conference." Studies in Intelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 47-56. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 366-376. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

The focus is on intelligence support by an on-site team to the U.S. delegation at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, fifth session, held in Manila in May-June 1979. The redactions from this article blur the role that Humint collection played in the support effort.


van der Meulen, Michael. "Cryptology in the Early Bundesrepublik." Cryptologia 20, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 202-222.

Abstract: "A brief overview of German Intelligence Services and their relation to cryptography is given.... This paper deals with many intelligence services, but the emphasis is on those involved in electronic warfare where cryptography and cryptanalysis are shouded under the foggy cover of Electronic Warfare."


van der Meulen, Michael. "German Air Force Signal Intelligence 1956: A Museum of COMINT and SIGINT." Cryptologia 23, no. 3 (Jul. 1999): 240-256.

Abstract: "A survey of the development of the German Air Force Intelligence organization is given. Included is a description of the first public German Museum of Air Force Signal Intelligence located at the General von Seidel Kaserne (Garrison) at Trier-Euren."


van der Meulen, Michael. "German WW II Documents on Cryptography and Cryptanalysis." International Intelligence History Study Group Newsletter 6, no. 1 (Summer 1998). [http://]

"At the end of April 1998, the FOIA Office of the NSA submitted a list of translated German World War II documents related to cryptography and cryptanalysis.... Footnote 1 of the document DF 210 ... reveals the origin of the 'DF'-series as a collection of miscellaneous translations of German documents which were received by the early TICOM section of the Signal Security Agency and kept within a special folder for documents related to TICOM material... The introduction to the listing further states that early translations made at Army Security Agency ... were not numbered but sent to GCHQ, England w[h]ere they were issued in the TICOM/D series."

[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Eur/Ger]

van der Meulen, Michael. "The Road to German Diplomatic Ciphers -- 1919 to 1945." Cryptologia 22, no. 2 (Apr. 1998): 141-166.

The German Foreign Office developed two main systems (both hand ciphers) for its codes and ciphers after the Zimmermann Telegram disaster. The foreign office used only one machine cipher system and this only for messages classified up to Secret on the Berlin-Madrid diplomatic link.


van der Rhoer, Edward. Deadly Magic: A Personal Account of Communications Intelligence in World War II in the Pacific. New York: Scribner's, 1978. London: Robert Hale, 1979.

Constantinides: The author served in U.S. naval communications intelligence (in OP-20-G) as a Japanese linguist. It would have been better if van der Rhoer had dwelled more on cryptologic aspects of the war than on general strategic, tactical, and battle concerns.


van der Rhoer, Edward. Master Spy: A True Story of Allied Espionage in Bolshevik Russia. New York: Scribner's, 1981.

van der Rhoer, Edward. The Shadow Network. New York: Scribner's, 1983.

van der Vat, Dan. Atlantic Campaign: World War II's Great Struggle at Sea, 1939-1945. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988.

According to Sexton, the author "relates the roles played by B-Dienst and GC and CS in the Battle of the Atlantic. Closure of the mid-Atlantic air gap ... is viewed as the decisive element in the defeat of the U-boats."


van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign, World War II: The U.S. Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Surveillant 2.4: "Provides fresh coverage of cryptologic role throughout the war."


van der Vink, Gregory, et al. "False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty." Arms Control Today, May 1998, 7-13.

The authors argue that despite the false accusation of a Russian underground nuclear weapons test, the surprise nuclear tests by India, and the lack of seismic information on some of the Indian and Pakistani tests, "the technical capability of the United States to detect underground nuclear weapons tests is remarkably good." However, in today's information environment, "the technological challenge may no longer be the acquisition of data, but rather the coherent integration of the vast and continually evolving network of global information sources."


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