U.S. Department of State

Foreign Relations of the United States

1964 - 1968

From Vol. XI


U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968.

Vol. XII. Western Europe. Ed., James E. Miller. Washington,DC; GPO, 2001. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12]

See "Note on U.S. Covert Action Programs," pp. XXXI-XXXV, at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/actionsstatement.

[CA/Eur; GenPostwar/60s/Gen]

Vol. XVI. Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Ed., James E. Miller. Washington, DC: GPO, 1999. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16]

[OtherCountries/Cyprus, Greece, & Turkey]

Vol. XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. Ed., Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington, DC: GPO, 2004. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19]

A number of documents pertaining to the attack by Israeli forces on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) are contained intermittantly in this volume between Document 199 and Document 258. Polmar, Proceedings 130.7 (Jul. 2004), says that this FRUS volume is "important," "well-produced," and "highly recommended." He maintains that the work "should answer any remaining questions" about whether the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was intentional or an accident of war. This volume "provides what must be considered the definitive U.S. government accounts and opinions of the attack." And the conclusion is that "the attack was one of mistaken identity."


Vol. XXVI. Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines. Ed., Edward C. Keefer. Washington, DC: GPO, 2001. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26]

From "Overview": This "volume covers covert political action policy in general, especially in the Indonesia compilation.."


Vol. XXVII. Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs. Ed., Edward C. Keefer. Washington, DC: GPO, 2000. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27]

See introductory note, "U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs," at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27/actionsstatement.

For materials on "Covert U.S. Government Financial Support to Thai Elections," see especially document numbers 305-306, 381, 383, 396-398, 400-402, and 404.


Vol. XXVIII. Laos. Ed., Edward C. Keefer. Washington, DC: GPO, 1998. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v28]

Vol. XXIX, Part 1. Korea. Ed., Karen L. Gatz. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1]

See documents 212-331.


Vol. XXIX, Part 2. Japan. Ed., Karen L. Gatz. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2]

From "Summary": "During the Johnson administration, U.S. officials became concerned that the covert programs of supporting key pro-American Japanese officials, begun in the late 1950s and continuing into the early 1960s, and splitting off the moderate wing of the leftist opposition, was neither appropriate nor worth the risk of exposure. As a result, these programs were phased out in 1964, but broader covert programs -- propaganda and social action -- to encourage key Japanese elements to reject the influence of the left continued at moderate levels through 1968."

[CA/Asia/Japan; Japan/Postwar]

Vol. XXXII. Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana. Eds., Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32]

From "Overview": "Lyndon B. Johnson made the major foreign policy decisions during his presidency, and the editors sought to document his role as far as possible. In the case of the intervention in the Dominican Republic, Johnson relied heavily upon the recommendations of his key advisers and special envoys... The role of the President and his major foreign policy advisers ... are less pronounced in the other chapters in the volume dealing with Cuba, Haiti, and British Guiana/Guyana."

[GenPostwar/60s/Gen; LA/Cuba/Gen & LA/Other/DominicanRepublic/ Guyana & Haiti]

Volume XXXIII. Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations. Eds., David C. Humphrey and James E. Miller. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33]

From 10 June 2004 Press Release from the Office of the Historian: "The volume ... documents organizational problems at the Central Intelligence Agency. Johnson did not want Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to brief him personally, as was McCone's practice with President Kennedy, and the President's Daily Brief was introduced in late 1964 to fill that void. When McCone resigned in April 1965, Admiral William Raborn was appointed Director of Central Intelligence to hold the position until long-time CIA employee and Deputy Director Richard Helms was fully trained to take over. Within a year, Helms succeeded Raborn. Key organizational issues faced by CIA Directors were wresting control of the National Reconnaissance Office from the Air Force, coordination of CIA activities abroad, and better approval mechanisms for covert operations."

In particular, see "The National Security Council and the White House," Documents no. 139 through 182 (31 Dec. 1963-5 Dec. 1968); and "The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, and the President," Documents no. 183 through 207 (4 May 1961-23 Jun. 1964), 208 through 230 (9 Jul. 1964-11 Aug. 1965), 231 through 259 (8 Sep. 1965-16 Dec. 1966), and 260 through 285 (14 Feb. 1967-2 Jan. 1969).


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