U.S. Congress

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994.

See Donna Cassata, "Senate Panel Broadly Indicts CIA Culture of 'Negligence,'" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 Nov. 1994, 3136-3138: The SSCI's 116-page report on the CIA's handling of the Ames spy case says that the CIA "was guilty of 'gross negligence -- both individually and institutionally -- in creating and perpetrating the environment in which Ames was able to carry out his espionage activities for nine years without detection.'" CQ's presentation includes a sidebar containing "edited excerpts from Sen. Dennis DeConcini's Aug. 5 interview with Aldrich H. Ames."

[CIA/90s/94]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994.

[Oversight/90s]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs. 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, S. Rept. 99-522.

[CI/To90s]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Robert M. Gates: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, on nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, S. Hrg.; 102-799. 3 vols. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1991.

According to Surveillant 3.2/3, these transcripts of the hearings on Gates' second nomination to be DCI present "[a]ll the bickering, back stabbing, and fault-finding." Lowenthal comments that the picture that emerged in the hearings of the "sometimes brutal give and take of the analytical process ... apparently surprised some outsiders who had envisioned a fairly reserved and cerebral exchange of views."

[CIA/DCIs/Gates]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence. Report, together with Additional Views. Senate Exec. Rept. 102-19. 102d Cong., 1st sess.

Lowenthal notes that this report reviews the major controversies that were raised in the hearings on Gates' nomination; these included Iran-Contra and the issue of "politicized" intelligence.

[CIA/DCIs/Gates]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. NRO Headquarters Project. Washington, DC: GPO, 1995.

[NRO/90s/95]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Preliminary Inquiry into the Sale of Arms to Iran and Possible Diversion of Funds to the Nicaraguan Resistance. 100th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1987.

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence.

1. Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments together with Additional Views. Washington, DC: 8 Sep. 2006. Available at: http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf.

2. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress together with Additional Views. Washington, DC: 8 Sep. 2006. Available at: http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiinc.pdf.

[PostCW/06/WMD; Terrorism/06]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. S. 2726 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 23 May and 12 July 1990.

[Reform/90s; CI/90s]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 7 Jul. 2004 [released on 9 Jul. 2004]. [Available at: http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/iraq/documents.html#sicrpt; and at: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/index.html]

[GenPostCW/00s/03/Cong/Iraq/04]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. "Senate Intelligence Committee Unanimously Approves Pre-War Intelligence Report." Press Release, 17 Jun. 2004. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/06/ssci061704.html]

On 17 June 2004, the SSCI "voted unanimously to approve its report on pre-war intelligence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorists, threat to regional stability and violations of human rights.... The Committee is currently engaged with the Central Intelligence Agency over the issue of classification. The Committee is extremely disappointed by the CIA's excessive redactions to the report. Our goal is to release publicly as much of the report's findings and conclusions as soon as possible. We will work toward that goal, as we continue our work on phase two of the Committee's review."

[GenPostCW/00s/03/Cong/Iraq/04]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. The Soviet Oil Situation: An Evaluation of CIA Analysis of Soviet Oil Production. Committee Print. 95th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1978.

[Analysis; CIA]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Analysis and the Oil Issue, 1973-1974. Committee Print. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977. [Petersen]

[Analysis/Sov]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Collection, Production, & Quality. The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability & Objectives. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978. Committee Print.

Clark comment: The controversy and charges of politicization of the estimative process that began even before the Team A/Team B NIE was completed in December 1976 led the relatively new SSCI to initiate an inquiry. The unclassified version of the committee's report, released in February 1978, supports competitive analysis as a concept, but finds flaws in the composition -- that is, the political views or biases -- of Team B.

[Analysis/Sov/Teams]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources. Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearing, Aug. 3, 1977. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977.

Much of the material in this report comes from the testimony under grant of immunity of Sidney Gottlieb, who headed the CIA's MKULTRA project and Technical Services Division. Gottlieb died on 7 March 1999. See Tim Weiner, "Sidney Gottlieb, 80, Dies; Took LSD to C.I.A.," New York Times, 10 Mar. 1999; and Bart Barnes, "CIA Official Sidney Gottlieb, 80, Dies: Directed Tests With LSD in '50s, '60s," Washington Post, 11 Mar. 1999, B5.

[CIA/Accusations/Mind]

Return to U.S. Congress Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents