U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence in the War of Independence. Washington, DC: 1976. [https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/warindep/index.html -- no longer valid, 6/29/07]

Constantinides calls this a "quick and commendable introduction to the subject."

[CIA; RevWar]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Ed., Donald P. Steury. Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996

This is a selection of 41 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions from the 1950s to 1983. Only the shorter NIEs have been reproduced in their entirety; for the longer Estimates, the "Summaries" and "Key Judgments," along with extracts from their other sections, are included.

Cohen, FA 75.5, sees this compendium as "an indispensable window into one of the central issues confronting the American national security establishment."

Prados, JAH 83.4, finds that "a good selection of the relevant material" has been made. While this is "a useful contribution,... it has major drawbacks." These include the fact that much of information is "culled" from longer documents, giving the materials a fragmentary nature. Deletions for security reasons is a continuing problem. And the CIA "has failed adequately to identify the originals, which are given titles but not dated."

[Analysis/Sov][c]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Ed. Nicholas Dujmovic. "Oral History: Reflections of DCI[s] Colby and Helms on the CIA’s 'Time of Troubles.'" Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 3 (2007): 11-28. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/index.html]

"Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988, respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often been termed the CIA’s 'Time of Troubles' in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in several respects, illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency faces in serving a democracy."

[CIA/70s/Investigations; CIA/DCIs/Colby & Helms]

[U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. OSS Reports to the White House]

"Among the William J. Donovan papers are five volumes entitled OSS Reports to the White House contaning carbons of memoranda predominantly transmitting or paraphrasing intelligence reports for the President's personal attention.... [T]he bulk of the[ reports] are unedited reporting from individual case officers on subjects of particular importance or of paerticular interest to President Roosevelt." Studies 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963), 73.

1. "Memorandum for the President: Boston Series." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (Winter 1965): 81-90.

"Series of OSS field reports..., including assessment by Allen Dulles in April 1944, stationed in Switzerland, that according to well-placed sources German diplomatic and governmental morale was collapsing."

2. "Memorandum for the President: From Peter to Tito." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 53-84.

"Highly placed OSS officers record in dispatches the two-year process by which Tito and Stalin duped Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Yugoslav government in exile into facilitating the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Belgrade."

3. "Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 33-50.

"Dispatches from Allen Dulles and other US contacts detail the efforts of a Japanese peace group to end the Pacific war."

4. "Memoranda for the President: OSS-NKVD Liaison." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 63-74.

"Memos ... regarding possible wartime collaboration between OSS and the Soviet intelligence services (especially NKVD)."

5. "Memoranda for the President: Sunrise." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 73-98.

"Here a collection of reports from Allen Dulles, OSS agent in Bern Switzerland, on arrangements for surrender of the German army in Northern Italy in 1945."

[WWII/OSS/Gen]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Preparing U.S. Intelligence for the Information Age: Coping With the Information Overload. Washington, DC: 1993.

Surveillant 3.2/3: "The Scientific and Technical Committee (STIC) Open-Source Subcommittee ... believes there is an urgent need to develop automated tools for coping with information overload. The report gives an awareness of the extent of the problem."

[Analysis; OpenSource]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Public Affairs Staff. "Press Release: CIA Director Porter J. Goss Names New Deputy Director for Science and Technology." 12 Aug. 2005. [https://www.cia.gov]

On 12 August 2005, "CIA Director Porter J. Goss announced the selection of Stephanie L. O'Sullivan as Deputy Director for Science and Technology. O'Sullivan had served as Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology since June 2003."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen; CIA/Components/DS&T]

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "[Press Release:] CIA Statement on 'Legacy of Ashes.'"  6 Aug. 2007. [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/legacy-of-ashes.html]

In a rare event, the CIA has chosen to respond publicly to Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes (2007). Among other criticisms, the press release states that the author "paints far too dark a picture of the agency's past. Backed by selective citations, sweeping assertions, and a fascination with the negative, Weiner overlooks, minimizes, or distorts agency achievements." The statement notes that the book "is marked by errors great and small," and provides an "incomplete[] catalogue" of some of the errors. In the end, Weiner's "bias overwhelm[ed] his scholarship."

The Agency statement is reprinted in AFIO WIN 31-07 (13 Aug. 2007).

[CIA/00s/07; as review under Weiner, Legacy]

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