U.S. A

U.S. Air Force. Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force Mission Directive 15: Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR Agency). Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 27 Jan. 2009. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afmd_15.pdf]

This document "reflects the organizational realignment of the former Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) from a Primary Subordinate Unit (PSU) subordinate to Air Combat Command (ACC) to a FOA [Field Operating Agency] under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF/A2)."


U.S. Air Force. "General Intelligence Rules." Air Force Instruction 14-202 (vol. 3). 10 Mar. 2008. [http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi14-202v3.pdf]

"This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-2, Intelligence Rules and Procedures[,] and establishes Air Force general intelligence rules.... AF/A2 is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). AF/A2 sets policy for conducting and executing Air Force intelligence plans and programs."


U.S. Air Force. "Special Operations." Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7. 16 Dec. 2005. [http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-7.pdf]

From "Summary of Revisions": "As America continues to engage in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), AFSOF [Air Force Special Operations Forces] have had to shift from a platform-based to a capabilities-based model that can accommodate a GWOT-oriented campaign."

[MI/AF/00s & SpecOps; MI/SpecOps/00s]

U.S. Army. Center for Military History. "Rangers in Colonial and Revolutionary America." http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/revwar/revra.htm.

This is a brief and easily read article that traces the evolution of the "ranger tradition" from the seventeenth century wars between colonists and Native American tribes through the Revolutionary War.


U.S. Army. Counter Intelligence Corps School. Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II. Baltimore, MD: CIC School, CIC Center, [1951?]. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/cic.pdf]

Constantinides: This monograph "has all the faults of an official history.... It is general in its approach, dry, and devoid of accounts of operational activity.... It is, needless to say, heavy on organizational and line-of-command matters."


U.S. Army. INSCOM. History Office. "The Heraldry of Cryptology -- Addendum." Cryptologia 13, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 79-84.


U.S. Army. Intelligence Center. The History of the Counter Intelligence Corps. 30 vol. 1959.

According to Ruffner, "CIC Records...," CSI Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), a declassified version of this originally classified work "is available to researchers at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland.... [I]t provides a detailed history of the CIC from World War I through the Korean War. The product of several authors and years of research through scattered intelligence records, the official CIC history is the most authoritative account of the CIC's wartime and peacetime activities."


U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [COIN FM]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Petraeus, David H. [LTGEN/USA], and James F. Amos [LTGEN/USMC]. Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No, 3-24, Dec. 2006; Washington, DC: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No 3-33.5, Dec. 2006.

Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), find that the manual "provides a framework that draws on virtually all the key lessons that have been proposed by the wider literature on counterinsurgency.... What remains unanswered is how [the field manual] actually translates into practice on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere."

For Kahl, FA 86.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007), "[t]he COIN FM is not an academic document, but it is deeply informed by classical counterinsurgency theory.... The manual embraces a model commonly referred to as 'clear, hold, and build.'" While "it is difficult to know whether its template can work in all cases,... overall, the COIN FM probably represents the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare."

See American Political Science Association, "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis," Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 347-360.

Stephen Biddle sees the manual as "a remarkably thoughtful response to a vexing problem.... It is not perfect, however. In particular, it makes assumptions about the nature of insurgency and the relationship between the United States and the host government that are sometimes sound and sometimes not.... Iraq is precisely the kind of nonideological communal war of identity that the manual is least suited for."

To Stathis N. Kalyvas, "[t]he manual breaks little new ground." This is basically "an elaboration and reformulation of a body of work that emerged in the 1960s." It also "is in many ways a crysallization of the lessons that American commanders painfully learned in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003-05. As such, it seems to have been overtaken by developments on the ground since that period."

Wendy Brown comments that "[i]f the COIN manual updates the military's approach to counterinsurgency, it remains premised on a severely outmoded figure of sovereign power, one in which American powers within the theater of war are imagined to be under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.."

For Douglas A. Ollivant, "the manual itself is not particularly radical," but "it is a radical challenge to conventional military culture and raises deep questions about the type of military -- and especially the type of army -- the United States wishes to maintain."


U.S. Army Military History Institute: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec/USAMHI/default.cfm.

Includes reference bibliographies in subject categories across a wide range of military and military-related activities and periods.


U.S. Army Security Agency.

U.S. Army. Signal Corps. Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War: 1919. Washington, DC: GPO, 1919. [Petersen]


U.S. Attorney's Office. District of Maryland. "Former Maryland NSA Employee Convicted of Wrongfully Possessing Classified Information." 16 Dec. 2005. [http://usaomd.blogspot.com/2005_12_11_usaomd_archive.html]

On 15 December 2005, "a federal jury convicted Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr., ... on charges of unlawfully possessing classified information related to the national defense, and making a false statement to a U.S. government agency."


U.S. Attorney's Office. District of New Jersey. "News Release: Leandro Aragoncillo and Michael Ray Aquino." 12 Sep. 2005. [http://www.cicentre.com]

Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI intelligence analyst at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, was arrested on 10 September 2005 and charged with acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign official and passing classified information to that official and others in the Philippines. Also arrested was Michael Ray Aquino, a former official with the Philippines National Police. He is charged with with acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign official and passing classified information to that official and others in the Philippines.


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